MNV Nair Memorial Lecture 2009
CLIMATE CHANGE
I am grateful to the Trivandrum Public Affairs Forum for doing me the
honour of inviting me to deliver the MNV Nair Memorial Lecture 2009. I
must have delivered half a dozen lectures in different parts of the
country this year in memory of various distinguished men and women who
had made distinct contributions to different institutions and
communities. But I knew none of them in person and I had to go by the
various accounts of their accomplishments. But today we are honouring
someone, who was a living presence amidst us till 2006 and inspired
many of us to contribute to the intellectual and public life of
Trivandrum. When I returned to this city after nearly 40 years abroad
with fancy ideas about my retired life, it was Sri. MNV Nair, who gave
me a sense of realism about the possibilities and limitations of
Kerala. His guidance and support were crucial in the setting up of the
Kerala International Centre, which has now become an important venue
for promotion of foreign policy awareness and analysis. In paying
homage to Sri. MNV Nair, I would like to acknowledge my own personal
indebtedness to him.
My involvement in environmental negotiations, particularly climate
change, is rather ancient, beginning with the Rio summit in 1992 and
ending with the Berlin Conference of Parties (COP) of 1995, where I
was the Vice Chairman of the Conference and spokesperson of the G-77.
It was the Berlin Mandate, which was formulated under the Chairmanship
of the present Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, that later became
the Kyoto Protocol. But I volunteered to speak on climate change today
because the basic issues relating to the subject have remained
unchanged, though we have reached the 15th session of the COP and the
dramatis personae have changed several times. In fact, the battle that
Indira Gandhi waged against environmental colonialism in Stockholm in
1972 still continues. The essential features of the Indian position
and the position of the developing countries are the same today as
they were at the time of Stockholm.
I do not intend to deal with either the science or the economics of
climate change; I shall only touch upon its political and diplomatic
dimensions. As far as the science is concerned, the International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Nobel Prize winning body of
scientists, headed by Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, has established beyond
any reasonable doubt that human activity of various kinds do
contribute to the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
leading to global warming. There are still some “deniers” even among
scientists, who believe that either there is no global warming at all
or nature will find its own way of restoring the equilibrium in the
atmosphere. The so-called “climategate” in Copenhagen, the leakage of
some emails purporting to suggest that some scientists in the IPCC
deliberately suppressed some scientific evidence to the effect that
anthropogenic emissions had nothing to do with global warming, did
muddy the atmosphere. Well, there are people who still believe that
the earth is flat and that Darwin’s theory of evolution is sheer
fiction. There is no doubt that it is time that human beings who have,
by their careless and extravagant consumption of the resources of the
earth, caused damage to mother earth, must take corrective action to
reverse the trend in climate change.
As stated earlier, Indira Gandhi had the vision and wisdom to go to
Stockholm in 1972, the only Prime Minister to do so, and to influence
the agenda that the western world was setting to mitigate
environmental problems. The theory being floated in Stockholm was that
the developing countries should desist from using the energy resources
of the earth for their economic development as the developed world
did, but conserve them and preserve the forests and lakes, which have
the capacity to sink greenhouse gases. The developing countries should
also adopt environmentally friendly technologies in their development
efforts. In Stockholm, Indira Gandhi called “poverty the biggest
polluter”, by which she meant that the environmental problems of the
developing countries are simply a reflection of their poverty. The
Stockholm conference finally resulted in an acknowledgement by the
international community of the link between environment and
development and also of the greater responsibility of the
industrialized countries regarding the contamination of the planet.
The “polluters must pay”, said Indira Gandhi, to clean up the mess
that they had created.
The historic Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 refined these concepts
further and formulated several programmes of action to deal with
environment and development in an integrated manner. The UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCC) was one of the two international
conventions, which opened for signature in Rio. This landmark
Convention expressed concern that human activities have been
substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases and that this will result in an additional warming of the
earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural
ecosystems and humankind. But the basic premise in the Convention was
that “the largest share of historical and current global emissions of
greenhouse gases has originated in developed counties, that per capita
emissions in developing counties are still relatively low and that the
share of global emissions originating in developing countries will
grow to meet their social and development needs.” In other words, the
“luxury emissions” of developed countries should be reduced
substantially, while the “survival emissions” of developing countries
should be allowed to grow in a controlled manner. The principles of
the Convention were particularly significant as the protection of the
climate should be “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common, but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.” Specific commitments for reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions by designated developed countries and for provision of new
and additional resources was included in the Convention and the
developing countries had no such commitments, in view of their need
for economic growth. The vision of international cooperation contained
in the Convention based on the balance between development needs and
environment protection made the Convention universally acceptable. A
new compact between the developed and developing countries raised new
hopes for mankind.
The journey from Rio to Copenhagen through Berlin, Kyoto, Bali and
other cities, however, turned out to be a great disappointment. The
Rio commitments remained unimplemented both in terms of emission cuts,
financing and technology transfer and each COP diluted the basic
principles farther and farther till the Copenhagen COP moved away from
those principles by excluding the whole concept of legally binding
commitments altogether. The Copenhagen COP ended in a discordant note
when it merely “took note” of an Accord produced by the so-called
major economies, the United States, India, China, Brazil and South
Africa. Most developing countries condemned the Accord and even
several developed countries expressed anguish that Copenhagen had
moved away from the Rio and Kyoto commitments. Of course, the words of
the Rio principles are scattered all over the Copenhagen document and
the commitment of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol is reiterated to
satisfy public opinion, but it contains only a pious wish to “to hold
the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take
action to meet this objective.” As for commitment of new and
additional resources, developed countries will provide an amount
“approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012”. They also
committed to the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion a year by
2020 as part of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, subject to
“meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation.”
The Copenhagen Accord is open for acceptance by the member states, but
judging from the intensity of protests from the developing world—some
called it Floppenhagen, some compared it to the holocaust and some
even accused those developing countries which accepted it as having
betrayed humanity for thirty pieces of silver—there will be few
takers. The only hope is that the negotiations will continue for a
year and a more precise agreement with legally binding commitments
will emerge.
India undoubtedly disappointed the developing world by breaking away
from its ranks to bail out the United States and China, the highest
emitters of greenhouse gases. India went to Copenhagen with a negative
mandate—no legally binding cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, no
monitoring and no burying of Kyoto Protocol. When it came under
pressure to accept new obligations, it found common cause with the
worst polluters in the world, the US and China, who were also under
similar pressure and let down the other developing countries and left
the conference declaring victory, not only for itself, but also for
the so-called BASIC countries. But the victor in the exercise was the
United States which changed the course of the climate change debate to
a new direction. Unlike in Rio and Kyoto, the United States was not
left alone to defy the world. President Obama accomplished his three
objectives of “mitigation, transparency and financing” the way he
wanted. India, China, Brazil and South Africa let the US off the hook.
Perhaps, this is the first time in the history of the UN that India is
part of a consensus in a small group, which is being disowned by a
majority of the developing countries. It is no great consolation that
we are in the company of three other major developing countries. A new
alliance between the “emerging economies” and the US has been forged
at Copenhagen, but its future remains in question as they begin to
grapple with legally binding commitments, which will be absolutely
essential in any action plan for climate. India and China will also
come under pressure at that time as the concept of per capita
emissions seems to have disappeared from the formulations in
Copenhagen.
President Obama’s insistence on transparency in actions by all states
figures in the Accord in the form of emerging economies reporting
every two years to the United Nations, which will be subject to
“international consultation and analysis”, a euphemism for
international monitoring. A US spokesman has already claimed that
China and India have set goals for mitigation and that they will be
challenged if they do not reach those goals. The “common but
differentiated responsibilities” of the individual countries, one of
the principles of Rio, has been forgotten as now all the major
economies have the same common responsibilities. In his speech to the
conference, President Obama, with his characteristic mastery of
juggling with words, changed the much negotiated principle into
“common but differentiated responses”. India would have been far
better off without this accord. Waiting out for another year with all
the options open would have been preferable to closing several doors
in an attempt to declare victory at Copenhagen. Minister Jairam Ramesh
did not carry conviction when he declared that the Copenhagen Accord
was good for India and the world. His approach looked more like the
way he himself described the typical Indian attitude towards the
United States: “Yankees go home, but take me along with you!”
The Indian position outlined by the Prime Minister at his plenary
speech was principled, firm and forward looking. He opposed any
dilution of the Convention signed in Rio, particularly the principle
of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. “To settle for something that would be seen
as diminished expectations and diminished implementation would be the
wrong message to emerge from this conference”, he said. He went on to
say, “those worst affected by climate change are the least responsible
for it. Whatever emerges from our negotiations must address this
glaring injustice, injustice to countries of Africa, injustice to the
Least Developed Countries, and injustice to the Small Developing
States, whose survival as viable states is in jeopardy.”
Unfortunately, the very countries that the Prime Minister mentioned
felt betrayed by the Copenhagen accord. The transparent and inclusive
process that India had promised also did not materialize in
Copenhagen.
The Copenhagen Accord can be defended only on the ground that it
prevented a complete breakdown of the negotiations and pointed a
realistic way in which the worst emitters could be brought into
certain broad commitments even if they are not legally binding or
verifiable. Instead of being a “deal breaker”, as India was rumoured
to be before the conference, it has become a “deal maker”. The
commitment to limit the rise in temperature to 2 degrees, with the
possibility of even considering bringing it down to 1.5 degrees holds
out some hope for mankind. The Accord retains much of the language of
the past to show that the way forward is not a complete break from the
past. The concept of a Fund to finance mitigation of and adaptation to
climate change has taken some concrete shape. The United States is now
a partner rather than a target in the global effort to safeguard the
environment. Cooperation rather than confrontation is the way to go
and these are the days of multiple alliances rather than nonalignment.
These accomplishments must, however, be weighed against the price
India will have to pay for breaking away from the mainstream movement
of developing countries, the charge that the US and other developed
countries have been let off without binding commitments and the
concession India has made by accepting some form of international
monitoring of its voluntary commitments. India has taken a calculated
risk by accepting what was essentially a US-China deal, which was
worked out between them over a year and presented by President Obama
as a way to save the Copenhagen conference from total failure. Only
time will tell whether Copenhagen will lead to a meaningful and
legally binding agreement to halt and reverse climate change.
The Copenhagen conference was remarkable for the demonstration of the
grave anxiety of the world about the deterioration of the environment.
The people are far ahead of their Governments on this issue and even
the most powerful and dictatorial Governments cannot stop the tide of
public opinion and I would like to conclude on that optimistic note.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
Friday, December 04, 2009
A diplomat and a politician
T P Sreenivasan remembers Ambassador SK Singh, a dominant figure in
the Indian Foreign Service and the governor of Rajasthan [ Images ]
and Arunachal Pradesh, who passed away on December 1.
Ambassador SK Singh was short in stature and had a squeaky voice, but
he stood tall and made his voice heard as a diplomat and as a
politician. As a diplomat, he was known for being politically savvy
and always at home among politicians of all hues. After he left the
Indian Foreign Service and dabbled in politics, he deployed his
diplomatic prowess to be a successful governor in Arunachal Pradesh
and Rajasthan. He had his ups and downs, but he remained calm and
confident in adversity.
Ambassador Singh was a dominant figure in the IFS during much of my
career, though I worked directly under him only when he was foreign
secretary and I was joint secretary (UN). He was already a legendary
official spokesman when I reached South Block. Though he operated from
the Shastri Bhavan, he was visible everywhere and was recognised as a
guide and a guardian by the New Delhi [ Images ] press corps. He was
clearly a role model for us at that time even though we knew very
little of his work.
I saw him in action first when he was additional secretary (UN and AD)
and I was special assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta. He was
quite a popular figure not only because he held charge of two very
important divisions in the ministry, but also because he was close to
the powers that be. Everybody seemed to be friendly with him, but
nobody seemed to know what his next move would be. He was loyal to
Jagat Mehta and served him well at a difficult time when Mehta was
eased out of the ministry. When efforts were made by some to change my
posting to New York after Mehta moved out, he gave me solid support
and made sure that I went to New York. He was gracious and generous
whenever I travelled with him to Latin America and other places from
New York.
His outstanding work in Vienna [ Images ] was well remembered when I
reached there, though he had acquired the reputation of a manipulator
in the UN system. His earlier experience in New York in the Fifth
Committee and the powerful Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions came in handy for him to use the UN system to
plant his favourites there and to get close to the high UN officials.
He got the Vienna residence and chancery renovated and refurbished.
Though the residence was maintained well by his successors, the office
was allowed to deteriorate and it took me my full term to make it
worthy of the Indian mission. He was a legend in many ways in Vienna.
SK Singh was a bit restless in Vienna as he was away from the scene of
action, where he always wanted to be, and his appointment to Islamabad
[ Images ] was a bonanza for him. He made such a mark in Islamabad
that it was rumoured that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi [ Images ] would
appoint him foreign secretary by superseding colleagues like AP
Venkateswaran and KPS Menon. But his elevation came only later, at the
fag end of Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as prime minister.
As foreign secretary, he gave me full support during the political
crisis in Fiji. But it was obvious that he approached every issue from
the perspective of the Congress party winning the elections. When the
military government in Fiji ordered me out since India [ Images ] had
not recognised it, he was in panic because he thought that the event
would affect Rajiv Gandhi's election prospects. I told him that the
Fiji policy should be projected as a success, but he was not too sure
of it and his instinct was to hush up my expulsion.
Life as foreign secretary became difficult for him when VP Singh
became PM and IK Gujral became foreign minister. I had seen how much
he used to needle Gujral when he was ambassador in Moscow [ Images ]
and Singh was dealing with administration in the ministry. Gujral was
not comfortable with Singh and prematurely replaced him with Muchkund
Dubey. Singh was told that he would be appointed governor, but nothing
was done till the Congress came back to power. With all his talent and
experience, he continued as governor till his very end.
SK Singh remained a bachelor till he became an ambassador and had
small children when he was foreign secretary. But he was obviously a
loving husband and a fond father.
Singh was in many hot spots during his career for no fault of his, but
the joke at that time was that any country would go up in flames if he
went there. When he was appointed foreign secretary, someone wrote
that everything was ripe for a revolution in India and it would
explode the moment Singh arrived on the scene!
SK Singh had many qualities of head and heart and his was a successful
life both as a diplomat and as governor. He had his detractors, who
thought that he was a master manipulator, but he will be remembered
with admiration and affection by his friends and colleagues.
T P Sreenivasan
T P Sreenivasan remembers Ambassador SK Singh, a dominant figure in
the Indian Foreign Service and the governor of Rajasthan [ Images ]
and Arunachal Pradesh, who passed away on December 1.
Ambassador SK Singh was short in stature and had a squeaky voice, but
he stood tall and made his voice heard as a diplomat and as a
politician. As a diplomat, he was known for being politically savvy
and always at home among politicians of all hues. After he left the
Indian Foreign Service and dabbled in politics, he deployed his
diplomatic prowess to be a successful governor in Arunachal Pradesh
and Rajasthan. He had his ups and downs, but he remained calm and
confident in adversity.
Ambassador Singh was a dominant figure in the IFS during much of my
career, though I worked directly under him only when he was foreign
secretary and I was joint secretary (UN). He was already a legendary
official spokesman when I reached South Block. Though he operated from
the Shastri Bhavan, he was visible everywhere and was recognised as a
guide and a guardian by the New Delhi [ Images ] press corps. He was
clearly a role model for us at that time even though we knew very
little of his work.
I saw him in action first when he was additional secretary (UN and AD)
and I was special assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta. He was
quite a popular figure not only because he held charge of two very
important divisions in the ministry, but also because he was close to
the powers that be. Everybody seemed to be friendly with him, but
nobody seemed to know what his next move would be. He was loyal to
Jagat Mehta and served him well at a difficult time when Mehta was
eased out of the ministry. When efforts were made by some to change my
posting to New York after Mehta moved out, he gave me solid support
and made sure that I went to New York. He was gracious and generous
whenever I travelled with him to Latin America and other places from
New York.
His outstanding work in Vienna [ Images ] was well remembered when I
reached there, though he had acquired the reputation of a manipulator
in the UN system. His earlier experience in New York in the Fifth
Committee and the powerful Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions came in handy for him to use the UN system to
plant his favourites there and to get close to the high UN officials.
He got the Vienna residence and chancery renovated and refurbished.
Though the residence was maintained well by his successors, the office
was allowed to deteriorate and it took me my full term to make it
worthy of the Indian mission. He was a legend in many ways in Vienna.
SK Singh was a bit restless in Vienna as he was away from the scene of
action, where he always wanted to be, and his appointment to Islamabad
[ Images ] was a bonanza for him. He made such a mark in Islamabad
that it was rumoured that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi [ Images ] would
appoint him foreign secretary by superseding colleagues like AP
Venkateswaran and KPS Menon. But his elevation came only later, at the
fag end of Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as prime minister.
As foreign secretary, he gave me full support during the political
crisis in Fiji. But it was obvious that he approached every issue from
the perspective of the Congress party winning the elections. When the
military government in Fiji ordered me out since India [ Images ] had
not recognised it, he was in panic because he thought that the event
would affect Rajiv Gandhi's election prospects. I told him that the
Fiji policy should be projected as a success, but he was not too sure
of it and his instinct was to hush up my expulsion.
Life as foreign secretary became difficult for him when VP Singh
became PM and IK Gujral became foreign minister. I had seen how much
he used to needle Gujral when he was ambassador in Moscow [ Images ]
and Singh was dealing with administration in the ministry. Gujral was
not comfortable with Singh and prematurely replaced him with Muchkund
Dubey. Singh was told that he would be appointed governor, but nothing
was done till the Congress came back to power. With all his talent and
experience, he continued as governor till his very end.
SK Singh remained a bachelor till he became an ambassador and had
small children when he was foreign secretary. But he was obviously a
loving husband and a fond father.
Singh was in many hot spots during his career for no fault of his, but
the joke at that time was that any country would go up in flames if he
went there. When he was appointed foreign secretary, someone wrote
that everything was ripe for a revolution in India and it would
explode the moment Singh arrived on the scene!
SK Singh had many qualities of head and heart and his was a successful
life both as a diplomat and as governor. He had his detractors, who
thought that he was a master manipulator, but he will be remembered
with admiration and affection by his friends and colleagues.
T P Sreenivasan
Thursday, December 03, 2009
Dr Singh's cotton candy visit
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Indian foreign policy', they used to say in the late 'sixties, 'is 80
percent protocol, 10 percent alcohol and 10 percent Tikky Kaul'.
Today, Tikky Kaul has become a distant memory and the percentage of
protocol is certainly less, even if alcohol may be more.
A good percentage of Indian foreign policy today is cold calculation
to cope with the challenges all around. But Washington is still under
the impression that Indians can be won over by flattering protocol and
friendly hyperbole. Those who gloat over the Indian prime minister
being accorded the singular honour of being the first state guest of
the Obama [ Images ] administration should look at the other visitors
who were given no such honour, but went away with goodies in the bag.
Those close to the White House like the prime ministers of Israel and
the UK walk in and out without so much as a gun salute, while the
Indian prime minister gets pomp and splendour and plenty of good
words. Whether this is symbolism or form without substance, only time
will tell.
Dr Manmohan Singh [ Images ] himself set off the flow of sweet words
by asserting that the setbacks to the US economy were temporary and by
expressing confidence that the US would remain a preeminent economic
power. But he went beyond expressions of faith and optimism and spelt
out his agenda in no uncertain terms. He told Fareed Zakaria [ Images
] that India's [ Images ] ultimate goal was to join the NPT as a
nuclear weapons state and expressed the hope that it would happen
eventually.
In the past, this was implied rather than spelt out in such concrete
terms. In fact, the nuclear deal is seen as an alternative to the
outright declaration of India as a nuclear weapons state. On China
too, Dr Singh was frank and forthright, pointing to the inscrutability
of the Chinese attitude to India. He virtually served notice on
President Obama that he should not take the Chinese at face value.
On Af-Pak strategy, he provided valuable inputs into policy making by
underlining the importance of defeating the Taliban [ Images ] and the
need for the United States to stay in the region till the mission is
accomplished. He did not hesitate to spell out the Indian position on
climate change, however unpalatable it might have been for the Western
negotiators.
As against the clear Indian agenda for the visit, President Obama
seems to have launched a charm offensive, full of admiration for India
and its prime minister and promises of action in the future. Except
for the presence of an uninvited socialite couple at the banquet, the
protocol was perfect and the menu was exquisite. But the visit did not
move the relations further in any of the areas of special interest for
India. It has merely raised expectations.
The Indian and the US delegations, we now know, burnt the proverbial
midnight oil to conclude an agreement on setting up of an enrichment
facility, as agreed upon in the deal. There is optimism that only one
more sitting is required to dot the 'i's and cross the 't's in the
agreement. But the agreement on the setting up of a separate facility
under IAEA safeguards was a done deal under the 123 agreement, by
which permission was already given for reprocessing. The Obama
administration will be merely implementing the deal by drawing up the
procedures and modalities. Much more needs to be done in the US and in
India for the nuclear trade to flow and there is much hesitation among
the new czars in the State Department to contribute to India's nuclear
capability. They would rather let the rest of the world meet Indian
requirements than take the responsibility for Indian capabilities.
The Obama administration is still taking the NPT, CTBT and FMCT route
with regard to India. The deal, for them, is a temporary measure till
the edifice of nuclear non-proliferation is built on time-tested
pillars. To deal only with the participation of American private
companies in nuclear trade is to evade the real issues.
Perhaps, Dr Manmohan Singh's expectation that India would eventually
be admitted to the NPT as a nuclear weapons state has arisen from
Hillary Clinton's [ Images ] suggestion that the US should work with
India to develop a 21st century version of the NPT. But the White
House has shown no enthusiasm for the idea and her statement is being
seen as evidence of the fissures developing between her and the
president on some foreign policy issues.
The prime minister may have noticed that the US is seeking new
concessions from India such as a moratorium on fissile material
production and signature on the CTBT as new measures over and above
the provisions of the nuclear deal. The question being asked is not
what more will be done for India in the nuclear field, but what India
would do to support the US agenda on non-proliferation.
Clearly, discretion demands that we do not ask for anything new in
this area and operate the NSG exemption to our advantage. Nothing is
farther from the minds of the nonproliferationists in the US than the
recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state. That proposal should
await a more propitious moment.
The Indian visit took place as President Obama was finalising his new
Af-Pak policy, which came to light within a week after the prime
minister left Washington. There is hardly any evidence that the advice
of the prime minister made any difference to the surge cum exit policy
outlined by the President on December 2, 2009. In what may well be the
first time in history, the prime minister virtually endorsed an
occupation force in Afghanistan. He stressed the importance of the US
staying the course in Afghanistan and defeating the terrorist outfits
there. No joint efforts were discussed or approved in Washington and
the leaders merely agreed 'to enhance their respective efforts' in
Afghanistan.
President Obama did 'consult' the prime minister on phone before
announcing his new policy, but it appeared to be in the context of
India's possible assistance to training the Afghan forces. While
President Obama stressed his continuing interest in Pakistan even
beyond the war, he made no mention of the terrorist threat to India
even obliquely on account of Pakistan's sensitivities.
Dr Manmohan Singh was uncharacteristically blunt on China in public in
Washington and he may have been even more direct in his private
conversation with President Obama. But, as an economist, the prime
minister may well have understood the logic of the US policy towards
China at this critical moment in the global economic crisis. He must
have, however, stressed the inadvisability of assigning any special
responsibility to China in resolving the problems in South Asia. But
beyond assuring India of no external intervention in India-Pakistan
matters, President Obama could not have given any cause of comfort for
India in the context of China.
Nobody had expected any movement in India's quest for permanent
membership of the UN Security Council during the visit. But the
formulation in the joint statement on this issue is even weaker than
before. In the statement, President Obama merely 'looks forward to a
stable and prosperous India playing an increasingly important role in
world affairs' without any reference to UN reform.
On the vital issue of climate change, there was a comprehensive
understanding in Washington, which reflects the Indian position
accurately. Neither side conceded anything new in this context, but
the balanced text indicates the way Copenhagen conference will go in
finding a political compromise without specific agreements for
concrete action. The subsequent India-China-Brazil-South Africa
position has reinforced the perspective of developing countries on the
issues in Copenhagen and the battle lines have been drawn. The
Washington statement has only helped to identify the issues.
If the objective of the visit was to demonstrate the continuity in
bilateral relations beyond the Bush era, that has been attained by the
assertion of India's indispensability by President Obama, recalling
President Clinton's statements in 2000. But beyond that, the US
appeared to be looking for Indian concessions for favours received,
not to go the extra mile to meet Indian aspirations.
Those who have eaten cotton candy can understand the feeling in India
a week after the visit. The colourful and huge cotton candy is
attractive and mouth-watering. It melts in the mouth and satisfies the
sense of taste and smell. But it finishes too soon and leaves the
consumer no more satisfied than before. A certain sticky mess remains
around the mouth and a sense of emptiness persists. If left exposed
for a time to the atmosphere, it becomes less fluffy and coarse and
eventually disappears.
The visit was pleasing in every respect and full of symbolism, but
there is no guarantee that the promises will be fulfilled. The Obama
administration itself has been high on promises and low in
implementation so far and the Indian case may be no exception
.
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Indian foreign policy', they used to say in the late 'sixties, 'is 80
percent protocol, 10 percent alcohol and 10 percent Tikky Kaul'.
Today, Tikky Kaul has become a distant memory and the percentage of
protocol is certainly less, even if alcohol may be more.
A good percentage of Indian foreign policy today is cold calculation
to cope with the challenges all around. But Washington is still under
the impression that Indians can be won over by flattering protocol and
friendly hyperbole. Those who gloat over the Indian prime minister
being accorded the singular honour of being the first state guest of
the Obama [ Images ] administration should look at the other visitors
who were given no such honour, but went away with goodies in the bag.
Those close to the White House like the prime ministers of Israel and
the UK walk in and out without so much as a gun salute, while the
Indian prime minister gets pomp and splendour and plenty of good
words. Whether this is symbolism or form without substance, only time
will tell.
Dr Manmohan Singh [ Images ] himself set off the flow of sweet words
by asserting that the setbacks to the US economy were temporary and by
expressing confidence that the US would remain a preeminent economic
power. But he went beyond expressions of faith and optimism and spelt
out his agenda in no uncertain terms. He told Fareed Zakaria [ Images
] that India's [ Images ] ultimate goal was to join the NPT as a
nuclear weapons state and expressed the hope that it would happen
eventually.
In the past, this was implied rather than spelt out in such concrete
terms. In fact, the nuclear deal is seen as an alternative to the
outright declaration of India as a nuclear weapons state. On China
too, Dr Singh was frank and forthright, pointing to the inscrutability
of the Chinese attitude to India. He virtually served notice on
President Obama that he should not take the Chinese at face value.
On Af-Pak strategy, he provided valuable inputs into policy making by
underlining the importance of defeating the Taliban [ Images ] and the
need for the United States to stay in the region till the mission is
accomplished. He did not hesitate to spell out the Indian position on
climate change, however unpalatable it might have been for the Western
negotiators.
As against the clear Indian agenda for the visit, President Obama
seems to have launched a charm offensive, full of admiration for India
and its prime minister and promises of action in the future. Except
for the presence of an uninvited socialite couple at the banquet, the
protocol was perfect and the menu was exquisite. But the visit did not
move the relations further in any of the areas of special interest for
India. It has merely raised expectations.
The Indian and the US delegations, we now know, burnt the proverbial
midnight oil to conclude an agreement on setting up of an enrichment
facility, as agreed upon in the deal. There is optimism that only one
more sitting is required to dot the 'i's and cross the 't's in the
agreement. But the agreement on the setting up of a separate facility
under IAEA safeguards was a done deal under the 123 agreement, by
which permission was already given for reprocessing. The Obama
administration will be merely implementing the deal by drawing up the
procedures and modalities. Much more needs to be done in the US and in
India for the nuclear trade to flow and there is much hesitation among
the new czars in the State Department to contribute to India's nuclear
capability. They would rather let the rest of the world meet Indian
requirements than take the responsibility for Indian capabilities.
The Obama administration is still taking the NPT, CTBT and FMCT route
with regard to India. The deal, for them, is a temporary measure till
the edifice of nuclear non-proliferation is built on time-tested
pillars. To deal only with the participation of American private
companies in nuclear trade is to evade the real issues.
Perhaps, Dr Manmohan Singh's expectation that India would eventually
be admitted to the NPT as a nuclear weapons state has arisen from
Hillary Clinton's [ Images ] suggestion that the US should work with
India to develop a 21st century version of the NPT. But the White
House has shown no enthusiasm for the idea and her statement is being
seen as evidence of the fissures developing between her and the
president on some foreign policy issues.
The prime minister may have noticed that the US is seeking new
concessions from India such as a moratorium on fissile material
production and signature on the CTBT as new measures over and above
the provisions of the nuclear deal. The question being asked is not
what more will be done for India in the nuclear field, but what India
would do to support the US agenda on non-proliferation.
Clearly, discretion demands that we do not ask for anything new in
this area and operate the NSG exemption to our advantage. Nothing is
farther from the minds of the nonproliferationists in the US than the
recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state. That proposal should
await a more propitious moment.
The Indian visit took place as President Obama was finalising his new
Af-Pak policy, which came to light within a week after the prime
minister left Washington. There is hardly any evidence that the advice
of the prime minister made any difference to the surge cum exit policy
outlined by the President on December 2, 2009. In what may well be the
first time in history, the prime minister virtually endorsed an
occupation force in Afghanistan. He stressed the importance of the US
staying the course in Afghanistan and defeating the terrorist outfits
there. No joint efforts were discussed or approved in Washington and
the leaders merely agreed 'to enhance their respective efforts' in
Afghanistan.
President Obama did 'consult' the prime minister on phone before
announcing his new policy, but it appeared to be in the context of
India's possible assistance to training the Afghan forces. While
President Obama stressed his continuing interest in Pakistan even
beyond the war, he made no mention of the terrorist threat to India
even obliquely on account of Pakistan's sensitivities.
Dr Manmohan Singh was uncharacteristically blunt on China in public in
Washington and he may have been even more direct in his private
conversation with President Obama. But, as an economist, the prime
minister may well have understood the logic of the US policy towards
China at this critical moment in the global economic crisis. He must
have, however, stressed the inadvisability of assigning any special
responsibility to China in resolving the problems in South Asia. But
beyond assuring India of no external intervention in India-Pakistan
matters, President Obama could not have given any cause of comfort for
India in the context of China.
Nobody had expected any movement in India's quest for permanent
membership of the UN Security Council during the visit. But the
formulation in the joint statement on this issue is even weaker than
before. In the statement, President Obama merely 'looks forward to a
stable and prosperous India playing an increasingly important role in
world affairs' without any reference to UN reform.
On the vital issue of climate change, there was a comprehensive
understanding in Washington, which reflects the Indian position
accurately. Neither side conceded anything new in this context, but
the balanced text indicates the way Copenhagen conference will go in
finding a political compromise without specific agreements for
concrete action. The subsequent India-China-Brazil-South Africa
position has reinforced the perspective of developing countries on the
issues in Copenhagen and the battle lines have been drawn. The
Washington statement has only helped to identify the issues.
If the objective of the visit was to demonstrate the continuity in
bilateral relations beyond the Bush era, that has been attained by the
assertion of India's indispensability by President Obama, recalling
President Clinton's statements in 2000. But beyond that, the US
appeared to be looking for Indian concessions for favours received,
not to go the extra mile to meet Indian aspirations.
Those who have eaten cotton candy can understand the feeling in India
a week after the visit. The colourful and huge cotton candy is
attractive and mouth-watering. It melts in the mouth and satisfies the
sense of taste and smell. But it finishes too soon and leaves the
consumer no more satisfied than before. A certain sticky mess remains
around the mouth and a sense of emptiness persists. If left exposed
for a time to the atmosphere, it becomes less fluffy and coarse and
eventually disappears.
The visit was pleasing in every respect and full of symbolism, but
there is no guarantee that the promises will be fulfilled. The Obama
administration itself has been high on promises and low in
implementation so far and the Indian case may be no exception
.
Monday, November 23, 2009
Shree-Sharu Wedding-- November 22, 2009
The setting sun beyond the wide sea behind a flower decked podium on the beach cast a golden light over Sharu and Shree as they tied the knot, with a select audience of relatives and friends, who had gathered from different parts of the globe. Two days of feasting, dancing and merrymaking came to an end in Goa on November 22, 2009, leaving everyone nostalgic about a wedding to remember.
In a toast to the newly married couple, Minister Vayalar Ravi recalled how he had seen Shree grow up from infancy, together with his own three children. Minister of State for External Affairs, Shashi Tharoor, who had inadvertently brought the couple together, Shree as a campaigner and Sharu as a TV reporter, sent a message of greetings. The message, which was read out at the dinner by Shree’s brother, Sree, told much of the story of the meeting and romance of the young couple
"I am delighted that the elections of 2009 delivered at least one enduring result -- the marriage we are all celebrating this weekend. Politics, it is said, makes strange bedfellows, but it is a relief to say that it can make a suitable boy and girl come together as well. There is nothing strange about a smart young colleague and a bright and curious journalist finding each other amidst the hurly-burly of an election campaign -- they must have seen in each other a blissful escape from the maddening pressures and tensions of political competition that surrounded us all. Either that, or my campaign failed to capture their interest sufficiently to keep them away from each other!
"I am sorry I cannot be with Shree and Sharavati to raise a glass in celebration of their nuptials or to join in the good cheer that you must all be experiencing. But I am well represented by my mother and sister, and by the man who brought them together, Jacob Joseph, who is now my Officer on Special Duty. After all, what duty can be more special than the duty of connecting two hearts and souls? Whatever else Jacob does for me or my constituency cannot match this singular accomplishment.
"My best wishes to Shree and Sharavati for a joyous married life together. And one piece of advice -- stay away from politics after this. One life-changing campaign is enough for a lifetime!"
Among the other guests were Princess Aswathy Thirunal, Prince Rama Varma and his spouse, Girija and Prince Marthanda Varma, who is married to Shree’s cousin, Gopika, all from the Travancore royal family.
The wedding was an event to remember, for the couple, their parents and for the near and dear ones who came all the way to the golden beaches of Goa to participate in the festivities and to bless them.
The Goa event was hosted by Sharu’s parents, Gauri and Naimish Choksi. Shree’s parents, Lekha and T.P.Sreenivasan , will host a reception in Trivandrum to celebrate the wedding.
The setting sun beyond the wide sea behind a flower decked podium on the beach cast a golden light over Sharu and Shree as they tied the knot, with a select audience of relatives and friends, who had gathered from different parts of the globe. Two days of feasting, dancing and merrymaking came to an end in Goa on November 22, 2009, leaving everyone nostalgic about a wedding to remember.
In a toast to the newly married couple, Minister Vayalar Ravi recalled how he had seen Shree grow up from infancy, together with his own three children. Minister of State for External Affairs, Shashi Tharoor, who had inadvertently brought the couple together, Shree as a campaigner and Sharu as a TV reporter, sent a message of greetings. The message, which was read out at the dinner by Shree’s brother, Sree, told much of the story of the meeting and romance of the young couple
"I am delighted that the elections of 2009 delivered at least one enduring result -- the marriage we are all celebrating this weekend. Politics, it is said, makes strange bedfellows, but it is a relief to say that it can make a suitable boy and girl come together as well. There is nothing strange about a smart young colleague and a bright and curious journalist finding each other amidst the hurly-burly of an election campaign -- they must have seen in each other a blissful escape from the maddening pressures and tensions of political competition that surrounded us all. Either that, or my campaign failed to capture their interest sufficiently to keep them away from each other!
"I am sorry I cannot be with Shree and Sharavati to raise a glass in celebration of their nuptials or to join in the good cheer that you must all be experiencing. But I am well represented by my mother and sister, and by the man who brought them together, Jacob Joseph, who is now my Officer on Special Duty. After all, what duty can be more special than the duty of connecting two hearts and souls? Whatever else Jacob does for me or my constituency cannot match this singular accomplishment.
"My best wishes to Shree and Sharavati for a joyous married life together. And one piece of advice -- stay away from politics after this. One life-changing campaign is enough for a lifetime!"
Among the other guests were Princess Aswathy Thirunal, Prince Rama Varma and his spouse, Girija and Prince Marthanda Varma, who is married to Shree’s cousin, Gopika, all from the Travancore royal family.
The wedding was an event to remember, for the couple, their parents and for the near and dear ones who came all the way to the golden beaches of Goa to participate in the festivities and to bless them.
The Goa event was hosted by Sharu’s parents, Gauri and Naimish Choksi. Shree’s parents, Lekha and T.P.Sreenivasan , will host a reception in Trivandrum to celebrate the wedding.
Friday, October 23, 2009
IFS: A Service without a Soul
(Unedited version of a TOI article)
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Chatting with a serving IFS colleague on the sidelines of a meeting, I said that the current theories on the weaknesses of the Foreign Service were widely off the mark. What ail the service are not bad recruitment procedures, inadequate training or unsatisfactory living conditions. It is not even that the best brains are not attracted to the service. “The service has no soul”, I said spontaneously as I described the fundamental flaws in the Service. He agreed with everything I said, but his conclusion surprised me: if he could rewind his life back to the days of the UPSC examination, he would not opt for the IFS. There I disagreed. I would join the Foreign Service itself if I ever had the choice again. No other profession could match the challenges of the Foreign Service.
Like the Keralites discovered Kathakali after it was staged at the Lincoln Centre, people inside and outside the IFS have begun to analyze the state of the IFS after an American analyst, Daniel Markey, came out with a critique. But Markey had nothing dramatic or novel to say. He stated the obvious that the IFS was small and that it was hobbled by the selection process, inadequate mid career planning and no outside expertise. Much of his paper was devoted to the importance of the other actors in policy making, such as think tanks, universities, the media and private business. He was of the view that the “software” of Indian foreign policy was not equipped to lead India to great power status.
Those who are in the service or those who have just come out of it know well that IFS is the least integrated of the civil services. By its very nature, IFS is scattered all around the globe, often in isolated pockets. There is little interaction with the rest of the service except in large missions, where a number of officers may be posted together. In many missions, which may be characterized as “one man and his dog” missions; there is no opportunity to work with other officers. In the Ministry of External Affairs, the official responsibilities are such that no one has the time to consult each other. It is a mad race to get the attention of the political masters. More time is spent in the corridors of power rather than in lunch rooms. As a result, every officer is an island, without any support system. The IFS is, therefore, not conducive to collective thinking or action. A recent effort at cyber communication within the service has revealed more fissures than bonds. Only a couple of voices were heard when false accusations were hurled at a colleague.
In no other service is one man’s meat another man’s poison. If one officer gets himself an attractive posting by any method, it follows that his peers have to be content with a less attractive assignment. The upward mobility of the service is such that waiting out for a particular posting is not practical. There are no established criteria for selection and being insensitive to the needs of others, the competition is most often unequal and unfair. The situation is compounded by the recent tendency to blur the gradation of posts in relation to the grades to which the officers belong. There are too many instances of a Grade I officer being replaced by a Grade III officer. Promotions become irrelevant as both in terms of work and compensation, stations matter rather than Grades.
In fact, the posting policy is the most contentious matter in the IFS, making its members run from pillar to post to secure advantages. While promotion policy is fairly established, there are no rules at all regarding postings. Successive Foreign Secretaries have insisted that postings should be an art rather than a science. Proposals for a scientific method like a points system for postings have been set aside. Promotion becomes meaningless unless it is matched by a commensurate posting. The rat race is intensified by this situation and each one is unto himself or herself in the quest for choice postings. In the case of heads of missions, there is not even a system of making known the availability of posts, not to speak of applying objective criteria. The soullessness is evident everywhere.
Specialisation is one of the victims of the heartless postings policy. After the Government and the officers have invested much in language training, many do not get any opportunity to use the languages, particularly one country languages, as the exigencies of the service keep the officers in areas where the language is not used. Multilateral diplomacy demands special talents, but New York, Geneva and Vienna are given as rotational blessings. Even those who have special talents for multilateral diplomacy are moved away thoughtlessly. Career planning is left to the officers themselves. Those who have remained in the neighboring countries or in multilateral posts for long have done so by hook or by crook and not by any deliberate design.
Politicians play havoc with the service because of the general atmosphere of self promotion. “Blue- eyed” boys and girls are a curse of the service as no rules seem to apply to them. They go from one good posting to another and they even move out without completing their terms if they find the famed attractions of the post are unreal. Ministers with feudal backgrounds and tendencies have a field day in the Foreign Service. No Minister can know every officer and those whom the Minister knows get undue advantages. The attraction of life in Government after retirement is another reason for officers to get themselves politicized. How do officers, who have been the beneficiaries of political largesse, set things right?
Training at any level in the IFS means listening to a series of lectures. These lectures vary in quality and usefulness. The probationers were virtual gypsies, moving from institution to institution before the Foreign Service Institute was established. At no time is any training given to do two of the most important functions expected of the officers at every level—political and economic reporting and recording of conversations. Of late, even proficiency in English is not insisted upon. When it was suggested that those who did not write their papers in English should not be considered for the Foreign Service, it was argued by some that it would be unconstitutional to be discriminatory! Language is an important tool in diplomacy, but we will soon have Indian diplomats without proficiency in English. It would be unpatriotic to exclude Hindi or Malayalam scholars from the Foreign Service.
A strong character is essential for anyone to survive for nearly forty years in the IFS with its culture shocks every three years. There is no safety net for those who fall by the wayside. The casualties in terms of physical and mental diseases, alcoholism and family dislocations are as common in the IFS as in the fighting forces. Even victims of armed attacks and robberies get no compensation of any kind. But if someone gets into trouble on account of any indiscretion, every one throws stones at them till he is completely destroyed. His solid service to the nation is never set off against a temporary weakness of the flesh. The lack of a support system is compounded by the heartless treatment of victims of professional hazards.
The truth remains, however, that, with all these deficiencies, the IFS has coped with its responsibilities and has done better than many of the more equipped diplomatic services around the world. Even if much of Indian diplomacy is conducted in person or on the phone, as Markey claims, it has served the nation well. Living conditions have also improved, though they are nowhere near to the standards of even other developing countries like China, Indonesia or Malaysia. If the Foreign Service has lost its luster for new entrants, it is because the other services have greater avenues of securing power and wealth. Young people seem to be motivated more by those than by idealism or desire for adventure.
The South Block has its cupboards full of reform proposals by many ignited minds. But as long as the service does not get a soul, a sense of belonging, arising out of a sense of fairness, equality and justice, no reform, no expansion will transform the software of Indian diplomacy.
(Unedited version of a TOI article)
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Chatting with a serving IFS colleague on the sidelines of a meeting, I said that the current theories on the weaknesses of the Foreign Service were widely off the mark. What ail the service are not bad recruitment procedures, inadequate training or unsatisfactory living conditions. It is not even that the best brains are not attracted to the service. “The service has no soul”, I said spontaneously as I described the fundamental flaws in the Service. He agreed with everything I said, but his conclusion surprised me: if he could rewind his life back to the days of the UPSC examination, he would not opt for the IFS. There I disagreed. I would join the Foreign Service itself if I ever had the choice again. No other profession could match the challenges of the Foreign Service.
Like the Keralites discovered Kathakali after it was staged at the Lincoln Centre, people inside and outside the IFS have begun to analyze the state of the IFS after an American analyst, Daniel Markey, came out with a critique. But Markey had nothing dramatic or novel to say. He stated the obvious that the IFS was small and that it was hobbled by the selection process, inadequate mid career planning and no outside expertise. Much of his paper was devoted to the importance of the other actors in policy making, such as think tanks, universities, the media and private business. He was of the view that the “software” of Indian foreign policy was not equipped to lead India to great power status.
Those who are in the service or those who have just come out of it know well that IFS is the least integrated of the civil services. By its very nature, IFS is scattered all around the globe, often in isolated pockets. There is little interaction with the rest of the service except in large missions, where a number of officers may be posted together. In many missions, which may be characterized as “one man and his dog” missions; there is no opportunity to work with other officers. In the Ministry of External Affairs, the official responsibilities are such that no one has the time to consult each other. It is a mad race to get the attention of the political masters. More time is spent in the corridors of power rather than in lunch rooms. As a result, every officer is an island, without any support system. The IFS is, therefore, not conducive to collective thinking or action. A recent effort at cyber communication within the service has revealed more fissures than bonds. Only a couple of voices were heard when false accusations were hurled at a colleague.
In no other service is one man’s meat another man’s poison. If one officer gets himself an attractive posting by any method, it follows that his peers have to be content with a less attractive assignment. The upward mobility of the service is such that waiting out for a particular posting is not practical. There are no established criteria for selection and being insensitive to the needs of others, the competition is most often unequal and unfair. The situation is compounded by the recent tendency to blur the gradation of posts in relation to the grades to which the officers belong. There are too many instances of a Grade I officer being replaced by a Grade III officer. Promotions become irrelevant as both in terms of work and compensation, stations matter rather than Grades.
In fact, the posting policy is the most contentious matter in the IFS, making its members run from pillar to post to secure advantages. While promotion policy is fairly established, there are no rules at all regarding postings. Successive Foreign Secretaries have insisted that postings should be an art rather than a science. Proposals for a scientific method like a points system for postings have been set aside. Promotion becomes meaningless unless it is matched by a commensurate posting. The rat race is intensified by this situation and each one is unto himself or herself in the quest for choice postings. In the case of heads of missions, there is not even a system of making known the availability of posts, not to speak of applying objective criteria. The soullessness is evident everywhere.
Specialisation is one of the victims of the heartless postings policy. After the Government and the officers have invested much in language training, many do not get any opportunity to use the languages, particularly one country languages, as the exigencies of the service keep the officers in areas where the language is not used. Multilateral diplomacy demands special talents, but New York, Geneva and Vienna are given as rotational blessings. Even those who have special talents for multilateral diplomacy are moved away thoughtlessly. Career planning is left to the officers themselves. Those who have remained in the neighboring countries or in multilateral posts for long have done so by hook or by crook and not by any deliberate design.
Politicians play havoc with the service because of the general atmosphere of self promotion. “Blue- eyed” boys and girls are a curse of the service as no rules seem to apply to them. They go from one good posting to another and they even move out without completing their terms if they find the famed attractions of the post are unreal. Ministers with feudal backgrounds and tendencies have a field day in the Foreign Service. No Minister can know every officer and those whom the Minister knows get undue advantages. The attraction of life in Government after retirement is another reason for officers to get themselves politicized. How do officers, who have been the beneficiaries of political largesse, set things right?
Training at any level in the IFS means listening to a series of lectures. These lectures vary in quality and usefulness. The probationers were virtual gypsies, moving from institution to institution before the Foreign Service Institute was established. At no time is any training given to do two of the most important functions expected of the officers at every level—political and economic reporting and recording of conversations. Of late, even proficiency in English is not insisted upon. When it was suggested that those who did not write their papers in English should not be considered for the Foreign Service, it was argued by some that it would be unconstitutional to be discriminatory! Language is an important tool in diplomacy, but we will soon have Indian diplomats without proficiency in English. It would be unpatriotic to exclude Hindi or Malayalam scholars from the Foreign Service.
A strong character is essential for anyone to survive for nearly forty years in the IFS with its culture shocks every three years. There is no safety net for those who fall by the wayside. The casualties in terms of physical and mental diseases, alcoholism and family dislocations are as common in the IFS as in the fighting forces. Even victims of armed attacks and robberies get no compensation of any kind. But if someone gets into trouble on account of any indiscretion, every one throws stones at them till he is completely destroyed. His solid service to the nation is never set off against a temporary weakness of the flesh. The lack of a support system is compounded by the heartless treatment of victims of professional hazards.
The truth remains, however, that, with all these deficiencies, the IFS has coped with its responsibilities and has done better than many of the more equipped diplomatic services around the world. Even if much of Indian diplomacy is conducted in person or on the phone, as Markey claims, it has served the nation well. Living conditions have also improved, though they are nowhere near to the standards of even other developing countries like China, Indonesia or Malaysia. If the Foreign Service has lost its luster for new entrants, it is because the other services have greater avenues of securing power and wealth. Young people seem to be motivated more by those than by idealism or desire for adventure.
The South Block has its cupboards full of reform proposals by many ignited minds. But as long as the service does not get a soul, a sense of belonging, arising out of a sense of fairness, equality and justice, no reform, no expansion will transform the software of Indian diplomacy.
The Times of India
Opinion
TOP ARTICLE
IFS: Service Without A Soul
T P Sreenivasan23 October 2009, 12:00am IST
Just as Keralites discovered Kathakali after it was staged at the
Lincoln Centre, the state of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) began to
beexamined after an American analyst, Daniel Markey, came out with a
critique. Markey had nothing novel to say. He said the IFS was small,
and hobbled by the selection process, inadequate mid-career planning
and lack of outside expertise. He highlighted the importance of other
actors in policymaking: think tanks, universities, the media and
private business. He believed the "software" of Indian foreign policy
was not equipped to lead India to great power status.
Those with experience in the service know the IFS is the least
integrated of the civil services. It is scattered around the globe,
often in isolated pockets. There is little interaction with the rest
of the service except in large missions. In the ministry of external
affairs, official responsibilities are such that no one has the time
to consult each other. More time is spent in the corridors of power
than in lunchrooms. Every officer is an island. The IFS is, therefore,
not conducive to collective thinking or action.
In no other service is one man's meat another man's poison. If one
officer gets himself an attractive posting by any method, his peers
have to be content with a less attractive assignment. There are no
established criteria for selection and the competition is most often
unequal and unfair. A recent tendency is to blur the gradation of
posts in relation to the grades to which officers belong. A grade I
officer can be replaced by a grade III officer. Promotions become
irrelevant as both in terms of work and compensation, stations matter
rather than grades.
IFS's contentious posting policy makes members run from pillar to post
to secure advantages. While promotion policy is fairly established, no
rules govern postings. Successive foreign secretaries have insisted
that postings should be an art rather than a science. In the case of
heads of missions, there is not even a system of making known the
availability of posts, not to speak of applying objective criteria.
The soullessness is evident everywhere.
Specialisation is a casualty. Though government and officers invest in
language training, many do not get any opportunity to use the
languages. Multilateral diplomacy demands special talents but New
York, Geneva and Vienna are given as rotational blessings. Even those
with special talents for multilateral diplomacy are moved
thoughtlessly. Career planning is left to the officers themselves.
Those who have remained in neighbouring countries or in multilateral
posts for long have done so by hook or by crook, not by the
government's deliberate design.
'Blue-eyed' boys and girls are a curse of the service, as no rules
seem to apply to them. Ministers with feudal backgrounds and
tendencies have a field day. No minister can know every officer and
those whom the minister knows get undue advantages. The attraction of
life in government after retirement is another reason officers get
politicised. How do officers, themselves the beneficiaries of
political largesse, set things right?
Training at any level in the IFS means listening to a series of
lectures. These vary in quality and usefulness. At no time is any
training given for two of the most important functions expected of
officers at every level: political and economic reporting and
recording of conversations. Of late, even proficiency in English is
not insisted upon. When it was suggested that those who did not write
their papers in English should not be considered for foreign service,
some argued that it would be unconstitutional to be discriminatory! We
will soon have diplomats without proficiency in English.
A strong character is essential for anyone to survive nearly 40 years
in the IFS. There is no safety net for those who fall. Casualties in
terms of physical and mental diseases, alcoholism and family
dislocations are as common here as in the fighting forces. Even
victims of armed attacks and robberies get no compensation. If someone
gets into trouble for any indiscretion, everyone throws stones at him
till he is destroyed. His solid service to the nation is never set off
against a temporary lapse. Lack of a support system is compounded by
the heartless treatment of victims of professional hazards.
However, with all these deficiencies, the IFS has coped with its
responsibilities and done better than many of the more equipped
diplomatic services around the world. Even if much of Indian diplomacy
is conducted in person or on the phone, as Markey claims, it has
served the nation well. Living conditions have improved, though
nowhere near to the standards of even other developing countries like
China, Indonesia or Malaysia. If the foreign service has lost its
lustre for new entrants, it is because the other services have greater
avenues of securing power and wealth.
South Block has its cupboards full of reform proposals by many ignited
minds. But as long as the service does not get a soul, a sense of
belonging, arising out of a sense of fairness, equality and justice,
no reform, no expansion will transform the software of Indian
diplomacy.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Opinion
TOP ARTICLE
IFS: Service Without A Soul
T P Sreenivasan23 October 2009, 12:00am IST
Just as Keralites discovered Kathakali after it was staged at the
Lincoln Centre, the state of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) began to
beexamined after an American analyst, Daniel Markey, came out with a
critique. Markey had nothing novel to say. He said the IFS was small,
and hobbled by the selection process, inadequate mid-career planning
and lack of outside expertise. He highlighted the importance of other
actors in policymaking: think tanks, universities, the media and
private business. He believed the "software" of Indian foreign policy
was not equipped to lead India to great power status.
Those with experience in the service know the IFS is the least
integrated of the civil services. It is scattered around the globe,
often in isolated pockets. There is little interaction with the rest
of the service except in large missions. In the ministry of external
affairs, official responsibilities are such that no one has the time
to consult each other. More time is spent in the corridors of power
than in lunchrooms. Every officer is an island. The IFS is, therefore,
not conducive to collective thinking or action.
In no other service is one man's meat another man's poison. If one
officer gets himself an attractive posting by any method, his peers
have to be content with a less attractive assignment. There are no
established criteria for selection and the competition is most often
unequal and unfair. A recent tendency is to blur the gradation of
posts in relation to the grades to which officers belong. A grade I
officer can be replaced by a grade III officer. Promotions become
irrelevant as both in terms of work and compensation, stations matter
rather than grades.
IFS's contentious posting policy makes members run from pillar to post
to secure advantages. While promotion policy is fairly established, no
rules govern postings. Successive foreign secretaries have insisted
that postings should be an art rather than a science. In the case of
heads of missions, there is not even a system of making known the
availability of posts, not to speak of applying objective criteria.
The soullessness is evident everywhere.
Specialisation is a casualty. Though government and officers invest in
language training, many do not get any opportunity to use the
languages. Multilateral diplomacy demands special talents but New
York, Geneva and Vienna are given as rotational blessings. Even those
with special talents for multilateral diplomacy are moved
thoughtlessly. Career planning is left to the officers themselves.
Those who have remained in neighbouring countries or in multilateral
posts for long have done so by hook or by crook, not by the
government's deliberate design.
'Blue-eyed' boys and girls are a curse of the service, as no rules
seem to apply to them. Ministers with feudal backgrounds and
tendencies have a field day. No minister can know every officer and
those whom the minister knows get undue advantages. The attraction of
life in government after retirement is another reason officers get
politicised. How do officers, themselves the beneficiaries of
political largesse, set things right?
Training at any level in the IFS means listening to a series of
lectures. These vary in quality and usefulness. At no time is any
training given for two of the most important functions expected of
officers at every level: political and economic reporting and
recording of conversations. Of late, even proficiency in English is
not insisted upon. When it was suggested that those who did not write
their papers in English should not be considered for foreign service,
some argued that it would be unconstitutional to be discriminatory! We
will soon have diplomats without proficiency in English.
A strong character is essential for anyone to survive nearly 40 years
in the IFS. There is no safety net for those who fall. Casualties in
terms of physical and mental diseases, alcoholism and family
dislocations are as common here as in the fighting forces. Even
victims of armed attacks and robberies get no compensation. If someone
gets into trouble for any indiscretion, everyone throws stones at him
till he is destroyed. His solid service to the nation is never set off
against a temporary lapse. Lack of a support system is compounded by
the heartless treatment of victims of professional hazards.
However, with all these deficiencies, the IFS has coped with its
responsibilities and done better than many of the more equipped
diplomatic services around the world. Even if much of Indian diplomacy
is conducted in person or on the phone, as Markey claims, it has
served the nation well. Living conditions have improved, though
nowhere near to the standards of even other developing countries like
China, Indonesia or Malaysia. If the foreign service has lost its
lustre for new entrants, it is because the other services have greater
avenues of securing power and wealth.
South Block has its cupboards full of reform proposals by many ignited
minds. But as long as the service does not get a soul, a sense of
belonging, arising out of a sense of fairness, equality and justice,
no reform, no expansion will transform the software of Indian
diplomacy.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Ambassador Muthamma
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Ambassador Muthamma
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Saturday, September 05, 2009
Brewhaha
By T.P.Sreenivasan
It was the twitter culture that did Obama in. He decided to
encapsulate the race issue and its solution in less than 140
characters. In the Gates case, the police behaved stupidly, he said,
without realising he shared his skin colour with the victim and the
police sergeant in question had another skin pigment. Hell broke loose
in no time and expression of regret over wrong choice of words was not
sufficient to put out the fire.
Obama is nothing, if not innovative. “We can!” he said again. Inviting
Gates and Crowley for a lunch or dinner in the White House would have
been overkill and so he hit upon a beer on the White House lawns, rain
or shine. Beer can put out any fire; spirit would have only fanned it
further. Boston has a Beer Summit every April and Gates and Crowley
should welcome a real summit with the chief himself and everything
would be forgotten and forgiven, thought the strategist President.
But the cure turned out to be worse than the disease. The three could
not agree even on the brand of the beer. San Miguel, the Boston beer
should have been the obvious choice, but there was no consensus and
red, blue and light were brought in. Then came the question of racial
balance at the summit and the President brought in his deputy more for
his colour than for his wisdom. There was no time to get his choice of
beer and so he ended up drinking the Boston beer that was originally
stocked for the occasion. In any case, as the only one not a party to
the dispute, Biden had to remain sober to keep the balance.
The setting was perfect, the brew was right and the racial balance was
intact. Then came the hard job to establish as to who behaved
stupidly. Was it Gates, who protested when he was accosted inside his
house by a policeman, who proceeded to handcuff him? Was it Crowley,
who thought he found a misfit in an aristocratic neighbourhood and
proceeded to treat the good professor as a criminal? Gates’ ID showed
that he was a Professor at Harvard, but how could he be sure that he
did not break into homes in his spare time? Why was it that an
institution like Harvard did not show the address of the Professor on
his ID? Or was it the President, who thought that, with his election
as President, there was no more racial prejudice in the United States?
Not even Biden could resolve the issue. No champagne was brought in at
the end of the summit to celebrate the grand reconciliation. Cameras
and recorders were kept away, but it did not take much effort for the
reporters to know that beer did not resolve years of racial prejudice.
No amount of beer could wash away the dirt accumulated over the years
in the minds of men. Gates and Crowley were seen mumbling things to
themselves as they left the White House lawns. Biden complimented his
boss for his wisdom and foresight in organising the event. Obama
shrugged it away. But he tried, didn’t he?
Obama has learnt his lesson. One swallow does not make a summer. One
African American President cannot heal all wounds. His “stupidity”
comment was honest, but honesty does not pay. Gates will, in future,
take special care of his key and will not give reason for his
suspicious neighbour to call 911 to report a break in. Crowley will
not change, because most criminals he comes across in his daily work
is of a particular colour. His only choice is to leave the police
force and sell beer to the White House for future summits, which
should be a growing industry, considering that racial prejudice is
still alive and well. Even the US Government tends to deploy more
African Americans at places, where the law is likely to be broken, be
it parking lots or customs barriers.
The beer summit brought a bonanza to journalists. “Brewhaha” was my
favourite, but “Coalition of the Swilling” “Ale to the Chief” and “The
cop, the Professor and the President: It All Comes to a Head” were
also good. Someone said that Gates should have tried to climb over the
White House wall to get to the lawn for the beer summit!
Another beer story should be a good tail-piece. An Australian lady
diplomat offered her resignation after five years in the service. When
asked why, she said: “When I joined the service, I was promised
champagne and proposals all the way. But in the last five years, I
have not seen anything but beer and propositions.”
By T.P.Sreenivasan
It was the twitter culture that did Obama in. He decided to
encapsulate the race issue and its solution in less than 140
characters. In the Gates case, the police behaved stupidly, he said,
without realising he shared his skin colour with the victim and the
police sergeant in question had another skin pigment. Hell broke loose
in no time and expression of regret over wrong choice of words was not
sufficient to put out the fire.
Obama is nothing, if not innovative. “We can!” he said again. Inviting
Gates and Crowley for a lunch or dinner in the White House would have
been overkill and so he hit upon a beer on the White House lawns, rain
or shine. Beer can put out any fire; spirit would have only fanned it
further. Boston has a Beer Summit every April and Gates and Crowley
should welcome a real summit with the chief himself and everything
would be forgotten and forgiven, thought the strategist President.
But the cure turned out to be worse than the disease. The three could
not agree even on the brand of the beer. San Miguel, the Boston beer
should have been the obvious choice, but there was no consensus and
red, blue and light were brought in. Then came the question of racial
balance at the summit and the President brought in his deputy more for
his colour than for his wisdom. There was no time to get his choice of
beer and so he ended up drinking the Boston beer that was originally
stocked for the occasion. In any case, as the only one not a party to
the dispute, Biden had to remain sober to keep the balance.
The setting was perfect, the brew was right and the racial balance was
intact. Then came the hard job to establish as to who behaved
stupidly. Was it Gates, who protested when he was accosted inside his
house by a policeman, who proceeded to handcuff him? Was it Crowley,
who thought he found a misfit in an aristocratic neighbourhood and
proceeded to treat the good professor as a criminal? Gates’ ID showed
that he was a Professor at Harvard, but how could he be sure that he
did not break into homes in his spare time? Why was it that an
institution like Harvard did not show the address of the Professor on
his ID? Or was it the President, who thought that, with his election
as President, there was no more racial prejudice in the United States?
Not even Biden could resolve the issue. No champagne was brought in at
the end of the summit to celebrate the grand reconciliation. Cameras
and recorders were kept away, but it did not take much effort for the
reporters to know that beer did not resolve years of racial prejudice.
No amount of beer could wash away the dirt accumulated over the years
in the minds of men. Gates and Crowley were seen mumbling things to
themselves as they left the White House lawns. Biden complimented his
boss for his wisdom and foresight in organising the event. Obama
shrugged it away. But he tried, didn’t he?
Obama has learnt his lesson. One swallow does not make a summer. One
African American President cannot heal all wounds. His “stupidity”
comment was honest, but honesty does not pay. Gates will, in future,
take special care of his key and will not give reason for his
suspicious neighbour to call 911 to report a break in. Crowley will
not change, because most criminals he comes across in his daily work
is of a particular colour. His only choice is to leave the police
force and sell beer to the White House for future summits, which
should be a growing industry, considering that racial prejudice is
still alive and well. Even the US Government tends to deploy more
African Americans at places, where the law is likely to be broken, be
it parking lots or customs barriers.
The beer summit brought a bonanza to journalists. “Brewhaha” was my
favourite, but “Coalition of the Swilling” “Ale to the Chief” and “The
cop, the Professor and the President: It All Comes to a Head” were
also good. Someone said that Gates should have tried to climb over the
White House wall to get to the lawn for the beer summit!
Another beer story should be a good tail-piece. An Australian lady
diplomat offered her resignation after five years in the service. When
asked why, she said: “When I joined the service, I was promised
champagne and proposals all the way. But in the last five years, I
have not seen anything but beer and propositions.”
Santy’s Bombshell
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Two significant scientific accomplishments of India lost their sheen on the same day. The news of the loss of contact with Chandrayaan-1 flashed across the screens with an equally unexpected admission by one of the architects of the 1998 nuclear tests that the yield of the thermonuclear device was lower than what was claimed by India. Both are disappointing developments for Indian science, the latter with major strategic implications. Nothing succeeds like success and partial success will be seen as partial failure.
Dr. Santhanam, a frequent visitor to Washington during my days there, has a bit of Puckish humour about him and a certain transparency, which is unusual for nuclear scientists, bearing the burden of the nation’s secrets. But on matters of strategic thinking and scientific reasoning, he is precise and clear. It is for this reason that his sudden revelation, the first of its kind from the scientific establishment, surprised everyone. His statement carried such credibility that the whole weight of every one concerned came down heavily on him. Dr. Abdul Kalam, Mr. M.K.Narayanan, Mr. Brajesh Misra, Dr. Chidambaram and Dr.Kakodkar spoke in unison to disown Dr. Santhanam. The usual suspects in the dissident group of scientists, Dr. Prasad and Dr. Gopalakrishnan remained skeptical. The official position that the tests were a “huge success” and that the thermonuclear device had a yield of 60 kilotons was reiterated.
It is the way of the world that the general public will give greater credence to a “maverick” view rather than the establishment view as such doubts have been raised by outside agencies and strategic thinkers in India. More importantly, we need to analyze the repercussions that the Santhanam statement may have internationally. With the nuclear deal in position and the Obama Administration moving slowly, but steadily towards the CTBT and wondering whether the US should have any nuclear trade with India at all, the nuclear establishments around the globe must be revisiting the India file.
“I would like to declare on the floor of this august Assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty (CTBT), not now, not later” stated Ambassador Arundhati Ghose in the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996. Those words reverberate around the globe even today, though much has happened since, including Prime Minister Vajpayee’s expression of readiness to reconsider the matter if everyone else accepted the CTBT. But nothing that has happened till today has altered the reasons for the Indian position in 1996. There is no greater commitment to disarmament today, the discriminatory aspect still remains and violation of international law in the form of article 14 on Entry into Force is still there.
What has changed is the nuclear status of India, India’s moratorium and the nuclear deal, which involves the NSG waiver. Though the moratorium is voluntary, it has assumed a certain international significance as it is at the centre of the nuclear deal. Everyone understands that there is no deal without the moratorium. We have no obligation to sign the CTBT anymore as the Prime Minister’s assurance predates the nuclear deal. The CTBT itself is embroiled in the domestic politics of the US and its international power equations. Dr. Santhanam’s claim that he chose to make the revelation to reduce pressure on India to sign the CTBT, therefore, is far-fetched. Pressure on India to sign the CTBT is not an immediate contingency. President Obama has to find the required number of votes in the Senate to ratify the CTBT before he embarks on his messianic mission to bring it into force.
What the Dr. Santhanam statement does is calling into question the credibility of the Indian nuclear establishment. The findings put out by India have already been challenged by others, but Dr. Santhanam was one of those who were present at the test site with others in military fatigues. His crossing over to the side of the skeptics will be a serious challenge to the scientific establishment. His explanation that India needs more tests despite the moratorium will only make India suspect in the nuclear community. However well intentioned, his statement can only do more harm than good for India. The world outside will recall the passionate demand for testing at the time of the negotiations on the nuclear deal.
The question facing the nation relates also to the credibility of the minimum deterrent, a matter which may interest our adversaries. Dr. A.Gopalakrishnan and others have asked whether it is necessary at all to have a thermonuclear device when we already have fission weapons in our arsenal. It may be more productive to invest in research and development of fusion weapons and also participate in ITER. The higher priority should be for us to miniaturize the weapons and improve our capacity for delivery. Perhaps, this is what is implied by the confident assertion of the NSA and others that no further tests are necessary. In other words, the political purpose has been served and there is no requirement of further tests as Dr. Santhanam and others advocate. The objectives of the politicians and the scientists could be different, right from the beginning, according to Mr. CMA Nayar of the Kerala International Centre. The scientists may be disappointed, but the Government is not.
India has never revealed the specifics of the minimum deterrent. Mr. Jaswant Singh stated repeatedly that it was not a “fixity”. So no outsider can judge whether further tests are necessary to maintain the deterrent. Since the NSA has stated even after the statement of Dr. Santhanam that the test was only partly successful that no further tests are necessary, the Government is relying on the judgment of the mainstream scientists that the credibility of the arsenal is intact.
The non-proliferation Ayatollahs in the US will now go hammer and tongs at India for harbouring ambitions to test thermonuclear weapons and they will campaign against the implementation of the deal. No one can take away the NSG waiver unless India tests, but the needle of suspicion will be on India right now. The non-proliferation czars in the State Department will now be preparing for the eventuality of an Indian nuclear test. India will have to work overtime to restore confidence in bilateral relations. Dr. Santhanam’s bombshell will have an impact beyond our borders.
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Two significant scientific accomplishments of India lost their sheen on the same day. The news of the loss of contact with Chandrayaan-1 flashed across the screens with an equally unexpected admission by one of the architects of the 1998 nuclear tests that the yield of the thermonuclear device was lower than what was claimed by India. Both are disappointing developments for Indian science, the latter with major strategic implications. Nothing succeeds like success and partial success will be seen as partial failure.
Dr. Santhanam, a frequent visitor to Washington during my days there, has a bit of Puckish humour about him and a certain transparency, which is unusual for nuclear scientists, bearing the burden of the nation’s secrets. But on matters of strategic thinking and scientific reasoning, he is precise and clear. It is for this reason that his sudden revelation, the first of its kind from the scientific establishment, surprised everyone. His statement carried such credibility that the whole weight of every one concerned came down heavily on him. Dr. Abdul Kalam, Mr. M.K.Narayanan, Mr. Brajesh Misra, Dr. Chidambaram and Dr.Kakodkar spoke in unison to disown Dr. Santhanam. The usual suspects in the dissident group of scientists, Dr. Prasad and Dr. Gopalakrishnan remained skeptical. The official position that the tests were a “huge success” and that the thermonuclear device had a yield of 60 kilotons was reiterated.
It is the way of the world that the general public will give greater credence to a “maverick” view rather than the establishment view as such doubts have been raised by outside agencies and strategic thinkers in India. More importantly, we need to analyze the repercussions that the Santhanam statement may have internationally. With the nuclear deal in position and the Obama Administration moving slowly, but steadily towards the CTBT and wondering whether the US should have any nuclear trade with India at all, the nuclear establishments around the globe must be revisiting the India file.
“I would like to declare on the floor of this august Assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty (CTBT), not now, not later” stated Ambassador Arundhati Ghose in the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996. Those words reverberate around the globe even today, though much has happened since, including Prime Minister Vajpayee’s expression of readiness to reconsider the matter if everyone else accepted the CTBT. But nothing that has happened till today has altered the reasons for the Indian position in 1996. There is no greater commitment to disarmament today, the discriminatory aspect still remains and violation of international law in the form of article 14 on Entry into Force is still there.
What has changed is the nuclear status of India, India’s moratorium and the nuclear deal, which involves the NSG waiver. Though the moratorium is voluntary, it has assumed a certain international significance as it is at the centre of the nuclear deal. Everyone understands that there is no deal without the moratorium. We have no obligation to sign the CTBT anymore as the Prime Minister’s assurance predates the nuclear deal. The CTBT itself is embroiled in the domestic politics of the US and its international power equations. Dr. Santhanam’s claim that he chose to make the revelation to reduce pressure on India to sign the CTBT, therefore, is far-fetched. Pressure on India to sign the CTBT is not an immediate contingency. President Obama has to find the required number of votes in the Senate to ratify the CTBT before he embarks on his messianic mission to bring it into force.
What the Dr. Santhanam statement does is calling into question the credibility of the Indian nuclear establishment. The findings put out by India have already been challenged by others, but Dr. Santhanam was one of those who were present at the test site with others in military fatigues. His crossing over to the side of the skeptics will be a serious challenge to the scientific establishment. His explanation that India needs more tests despite the moratorium will only make India suspect in the nuclear community. However well intentioned, his statement can only do more harm than good for India. The world outside will recall the passionate demand for testing at the time of the negotiations on the nuclear deal.
The question facing the nation relates also to the credibility of the minimum deterrent, a matter which may interest our adversaries. Dr. A.Gopalakrishnan and others have asked whether it is necessary at all to have a thermonuclear device when we already have fission weapons in our arsenal. It may be more productive to invest in research and development of fusion weapons and also participate in ITER. The higher priority should be for us to miniaturize the weapons and improve our capacity for delivery. Perhaps, this is what is implied by the confident assertion of the NSA and others that no further tests are necessary. In other words, the political purpose has been served and there is no requirement of further tests as Dr. Santhanam and others advocate. The objectives of the politicians and the scientists could be different, right from the beginning, according to Mr. CMA Nayar of the Kerala International Centre. The scientists may be disappointed, but the Government is not.
India has never revealed the specifics of the minimum deterrent. Mr. Jaswant Singh stated repeatedly that it was not a “fixity”. So no outsider can judge whether further tests are necessary to maintain the deterrent. Since the NSA has stated even after the statement of Dr. Santhanam that the test was only partly successful that no further tests are necessary, the Government is relying on the judgment of the mainstream scientists that the credibility of the arsenal is intact.
The non-proliferation Ayatollahs in the US will now go hammer and tongs at India for harbouring ambitions to test thermonuclear weapons and they will campaign against the implementation of the deal. No one can take away the NSG waiver unless India tests, but the needle of suspicion will be on India right now. The non-proliferation czars in the State Department will now be preparing for the eventuality of an Indian nuclear test. India will have to work overtime to restore confidence in bilateral relations. Dr. Santhanam’s bombshell will have an impact beyond our borders.
Monday, August 03, 2009
Thoughts About Kala Kaarthikeyan
To call Kala Kaarthikeyan one of the best friends of our family is to
make an understatement. It is the same if I say she was an exceptional
person. She was much more than a friend and much more than an
exceptional person. She personified in her all the qualities, talents
and charms that a friend, a wife, a mother and a grandmother should
possess. Every one in our family has been deeply touched by her and
each one of us lost a little of ourselves when she passed away in
sleep.
Perhaps all her goodness, all her godliness, all her service and all
her discipline gave her a most peaceful journey to her heavenly abode.
We, who have been left behind, particularly her hero, Kaarthi have
become poorer by her departure.
I cannot recall here all the acts of kindness she has shown us
beginning in Moscow and ending in New Delhi over the last 35 years.
Like Kaarthi, she was there at every important moment in our lives,
happy or unhappy. Shri. Hamid Ansari, the present Vice President told
me once that however much we may try to reciprocate their friendly
gestures, we will still owe them more. I felt the same again and
again.
It was in Moscow that we first met when we arrived there more or less
at the same time. We lived in the same building and shared many many
hours together. One thing I can never forget is the opportunity I had
to drive Kala and her newly born daughter, Kanchana, from the hospital
to their apartment. not because there was no other car or driver, but
because I very much wanted to do it. Compared to all that they had
done for us, this was but a trifle, but I was proud of that privilege.
As we moved around the world, our paths crossed and our children loved
each other. One thing that did not change was Kala's smiling face, her
humility, her cooking skills and her hospitality, which nobody could
equal. She did not speak much and did not disagree with Kaarthi about
anything. She trusted him so much that she would not even ask him
where he went even at unearthly hours. She was not hesitant to say
that she really did not know where Kaarthi was at a particular time.
I wish she had lived longer, not because she should give more of her
love to us, but because we could give her little more in return to
her. Lekha will never forget how Kala took her from the dining table
straight to a hospital as she felt Lekha did not look well. Kanchana
and Kailash are her best gifts to the world.My two sons considered her
their godmother, like many others of their age.
Kala was slim, very disciplined, adept in many arts of living, not at
all a candidate for untimely demise. The only explanation is that God
needed her more than all of us. That thought should give Kaarthi,
Kanchana, Kailash and all of us some comfort at this agonising moment.
The prayers of many, who she helped in many ways, will guide her on
her next journey.
Sreeni and Lekha
To call Kala Kaarthikeyan one of the best friends of our family is to
make an understatement. It is the same if I say she was an exceptional
person. She was much more than a friend and much more than an
exceptional person. She personified in her all the qualities, talents
and charms that a friend, a wife, a mother and a grandmother should
possess. Every one in our family has been deeply touched by her and
each one of us lost a little of ourselves when she passed away in
sleep.
Perhaps all her goodness, all her godliness, all her service and all
her discipline gave her a most peaceful journey to her heavenly abode.
We, who have been left behind, particularly her hero, Kaarthi have
become poorer by her departure.
I cannot recall here all the acts of kindness she has shown us
beginning in Moscow and ending in New Delhi over the last 35 years.
Like Kaarthi, she was there at every important moment in our lives,
happy or unhappy. Shri. Hamid Ansari, the present Vice President told
me once that however much we may try to reciprocate their friendly
gestures, we will still owe them more. I felt the same again and
again.
It was in Moscow that we first met when we arrived there more or less
at the same time. We lived in the same building and shared many many
hours together. One thing I can never forget is the opportunity I had
to drive Kala and her newly born daughter, Kanchana, from the hospital
to their apartment. not because there was no other car or driver, but
because I very much wanted to do it. Compared to all that they had
done for us, this was but a trifle, but I was proud of that privilege.
As we moved around the world, our paths crossed and our children loved
each other. One thing that did not change was Kala's smiling face, her
humility, her cooking skills and her hospitality, which nobody could
equal. She did not speak much and did not disagree with Kaarthi about
anything. She trusted him so much that she would not even ask him
where he went even at unearthly hours. She was not hesitant to say
that she really did not know where Kaarthi was at a particular time.
I wish she had lived longer, not because she should give more of her
love to us, but because we could give her little more in return to
her. Lekha will never forget how Kala took her from the dining table
straight to a hospital as she felt Lekha did not look well. Kanchana
and Kailash are her best gifts to the world.My two sons considered her
their godmother, like many others of their age.
Kala was slim, very disciplined, adept in many arts of living, not at
all a candidate for untimely demise. The only explanation is that God
needed her more than all of us. That thought should give Kaarthi,
Kanchana, Kailash and all of us some comfort at this agonising moment.
The prayers of many, who she helped in many ways, will guide her on
her next journey.
Sreeni and Lekha
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Hillary sets up camp on the right track
By T.P.Serrnivasan
Hillary Clinton, who was named after Sir Edmund Hillary [ Images ] whom her parents admired, set out on her own hazardous expedition to India well equipped and well prepared.
She could not have reached the summit in a hurry, given the treacherous glaciers on every step of the way, but she has covered some ground, set the course and is poised to climb further.
Two unrelated developments blinded the way as the journey began. The India-Pak Joint Statement from the venue of the NAM Summit completely spoiled the political climate in New Delhi [ Images ].
The polarisation was so acute that the whole thing, nothing more than a diplomatic fiasco, was seen as manipulation by the United States. If she is so effective in absentia in Egypt [ Images ], what havoc would she cause in person in Delhi? That was the question.
Kasab [ Images ] wiped Hillary Clinton [ Images ] off the television screens on the day she arrived in Delhi after her successful visit to Mumbai [ Images ], which set the tone for combating terrorism, boosting trade and enhancing economic cooperation.
The so-called confession by the terrorist should have been a non-event, which revealed no new facts, but he was given attributes of political judgement and a sense of timing. Analysts linked his confession to the India-Pakistan Joint Statement and the filing of charges in a Pakistani court and made it into the news of the decade. Hillary Clinton's visit looked like a side show beside the exploits of Kasab.
Strobe Talbott's FT op-ed suggesting that Hillary Clinton should deliver tough messages on climate change and non-proliferation made our knights put on their shining armour to take on the windmills.
There was nothing in the environment minister's speech which was new or earth-shaking. That is the language Indian climate change negotiators, including this writer, have been using ever since Rio in every forum. Ours are survival emissions and not luxury ones like those of the developed world and we would not sacrifice our development for the sake of environmental protection.
Indira Gandhi [ Images ] had declared in 1972 in Stockholm that poverty is the worst polluter and that the polluters must pay. It did not take any great courage to make these arguments, but to pre-empt a constructive discussion by posturing did not help matters.
Hillary had taken her climate change negotiator with her to India to look for solutions, not to repeat well known positions. He has been working diligently with the Chinese and eventually we will end up accepting a deal, which the Chinese will work out with the US and take credit for.
The achievements of the visit were modest. The agreement reached, but not signed, on defence matters, is a necessary formality if the defence contracts should fructify. No Administration in the US can go against a Congressional requirement, but the terms have to be such that our sovereign right to use the equipment in our best interests should not be compromised.
This must have been in the works since the 2005 signing of the Defence Agreement. It should not be beyond our officials to work out a formula, which would meet the requirement without hurting our interests.
Defence Minister Antony is not someone who is dazzled by US weapons technology. He will buy equipment after due deliberation and full consultations and he will sign nothing that will surrender our sovereignty. This is not the first time that assurances of end use have been given to secure supplies.
The progress on the nuclear deal is impressive. India's emphasis on commencing the reprocessing dialogue has been respected and the two sides will meet on neutral ground to work out the details.
The prophets of doom on the basis of moves within G-8 on enrichment and reprocessing technologies were surprised by Hillary's clarification that the contemplated prohibition would not apply to India. Now they are predicting that the truth will come out when the negotiations begin.
For the present at least, there is no reason to cry wolf. The US points are also being met by the allocation of two sites and the near completion of acceding to the Convention on Nuclear Damage.
Just after the Clinton visit, I spoke to someone close to the Obama [ Images ] Administration about the nuclear agreement. He said that he had no great expectation that India will buy nuclear reactors from the US.
The internal procedures for selling such equipment are so stringent that it will take years before any deal would be concluded. He said that the defence purchases and collaboration in combating terror were more crucial in maintaining the momentum of the relationship.
He pointed out that Hillary's reference to the syndicate of terrorism in Pakistan was a signal to India that it was not just the fight against the Taliban [ Images ] that was important, but also the elimination of terrorist outfits like the LeT.
Hillary was not at all combative in her approach to the major issues that remain to be tackled. She took a slightly long term perspective and signalled certain directions for solutions. Climate change, non-proliferation and trade are the three issues that need to be addressed in the new strategic dialogue.
More than just establishing the architecture for such a dialogue, she has given broad indications for finding a way. She established that while President Obama is engaged in more pressing problems, he considers cooperation with India a major part of his foreign policy.
On the question of matching protestations of India's importance with action to meet Indian aspirations for full participation in global governance, it was obvious that the Obama Administration had not yet come to any clear position.
To state that dialogue should continue on this issue is going behind square one. Earlier, there was at least an affirmation that India should have its place in bodies like the Security Council and G-8.
Nothing that Hillary Clinton did or said, at least publicly, has attracted criticism. This in itself is a sign of success. Further engagement is necessary to climb the heights and the two sides have at least set up a base camp to continue the climb in fair weather.
T P Sreenivasan is a former ambassador to Vienna [ Images ] and the United Nations. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, working on a book on India-US nuclear cooperation.
By T.P.Serrnivasan
Hillary Clinton, who was named after Sir Edmund Hillary [ Images ] whom her parents admired, set out on her own hazardous expedition to India well equipped and well prepared.
She could not have reached the summit in a hurry, given the treacherous glaciers on every step of the way, but she has covered some ground, set the course and is poised to climb further.
Two unrelated developments blinded the way as the journey began. The India-Pak Joint Statement from the venue of the NAM Summit completely spoiled the political climate in New Delhi [ Images ].
The polarisation was so acute that the whole thing, nothing more than a diplomatic fiasco, was seen as manipulation by the United States. If she is so effective in absentia in Egypt [ Images ], what havoc would she cause in person in Delhi? That was the question.
Kasab [ Images ] wiped Hillary Clinton [ Images ] off the television screens on the day she arrived in Delhi after her successful visit to Mumbai [ Images ], which set the tone for combating terrorism, boosting trade and enhancing economic cooperation.
The so-called confession by the terrorist should have been a non-event, which revealed no new facts, but he was given attributes of political judgement and a sense of timing. Analysts linked his confession to the India-Pakistan Joint Statement and the filing of charges in a Pakistani court and made it into the news of the decade. Hillary Clinton's visit looked like a side show beside the exploits of Kasab.
Strobe Talbott's FT op-ed suggesting that Hillary Clinton should deliver tough messages on climate change and non-proliferation made our knights put on their shining armour to take on the windmills.
There was nothing in the environment minister's speech which was new or earth-shaking. That is the language Indian climate change negotiators, including this writer, have been using ever since Rio in every forum. Ours are survival emissions and not luxury ones like those of the developed world and we would not sacrifice our development for the sake of environmental protection.
Indira Gandhi [ Images ] had declared in 1972 in Stockholm that poverty is the worst polluter and that the polluters must pay. It did not take any great courage to make these arguments, but to pre-empt a constructive discussion by posturing did not help matters.
Hillary had taken her climate change negotiator with her to India to look for solutions, not to repeat well known positions. He has been working diligently with the Chinese and eventually we will end up accepting a deal, which the Chinese will work out with the US and take credit for.
The achievements of the visit were modest. The agreement reached, but not signed, on defence matters, is a necessary formality if the defence contracts should fructify. No Administration in the US can go against a Congressional requirement, but the terms have to be such that our sovereign right to use the equipment in our best interests should not be compromised.
This must have been in the works since the 2005 signing of the Defence Agreement. It should not be beyond our officials to work out a formula, which would meet the requirement without hurting our interests.
Defence Minister Antony is not someone who is dazzled by US weapons technology. He will buy equipment after due deliberation and full consultations and he will sign nothing that will surrender our sovereignty. This is not the first time that assurances of end use have been given to secure supplies.
The progress on the nuclear deal is impressive. India's emphasis on commencing the reprocessing dialogue has been respected and the two sides will meet on neutral ground to work out the details.
The prophets of doom on the basis of moves within G-8 on enrichment and reprocessing technologies were surprised by Hillary's clarification that the contemplated prohibition would not apply to India. Now they are predicting that the truth will come out when the negotiations begin.
For the present at least, there is no reason to cry wolf. The US points are also being met by the allocation of two sites and the near completion of acceding to the Convention on Nuclear Damage.
Just after the Clinton visit, I spoke to someone close to the Obama [ Images ] Administration about the nuclear agreement. He said that he had no great expectation that India will buy nuclear reactors from the US.
The internal procedures for selling such equipment are so stringent that it will take years before any deal would be concluded. He said that the defence purchases and collaboration in combating terror were more crucial in maintaining the momentum of the relationship.
He pointed out that Hillary's reference to the syndicate of terrorism in Pakistan was a signal to India that it was not just the fight against the Taliban [ Images ] that was important, but also the elimination of terrorist outfits like the LeT.
Hillary was not at all combative in her approach to the major issues that remain to be tackled. She took a slightly long term perspective and signalled certain directions for solutions. Climate change, non-proliferation and trade are the three issues that need to be addressed in the new strategic dialogue.
More than just establishing the architecture for such a dialogue, she has given broad indications for finding a way. She established that while President Obama is engaged in more pressing problems, he considers cooperation with India a major part of his foreign policy.
On the question of matching protestations of India's importance with action to meet Indian aspirations for full participation in global governance, it was obvious that the Obama Administration had not yet come to any clear position.
To state that dialogue should continue on this issue is going behind square one. Earlier, there was at least an affirmation that India should have its place in bodies like the Security Council and G-8.
Nothing that Hillary Clinton did or said, at least publicly, has attracted criticism. This in itself is a sign of success. Further engagement is necessary to climb the heights and the two sides have at least set up a base camp to continue the climb in fair weather.
T P Sreenivasan is a former ambassador to Vienna [ Images ] and the United Nations. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, working on a book on India-US nuclear cooperation.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Good Intention, Bad Drafting
By T.P.Sreenivasan
I have lived all my professional life with comments from fellow Indians that Pakistani diplomats were smarter than the Indian ones. The only consolation was that, according to Pakistani diplomats, they heard from their nationals that Indians were way ahead of them.
In fact, no one could tell, as both were smart and often the outsiders marvelled at the brilliance of South Asian diplomats. Any document produced between them was so balanced that both could claim victory.
But for once, the Indian diplomats have been outsmarted by the Pakistanis in Egypt [ Images ]. The joint statement may be no sellout in substance because India has made it clear that the composite dialogue will begin only after verifiable action is taken by Pakistan. But the text simply says the opposite.
'Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues.'
This is simple English language, which cannot be interpreted in any way other than as a commitment by India not only to begin the dialogue without waiting for any action by Pakistan this time, but also not to suspend it even if there are other terrorist incidents in the future. There is only give and no take in this particular instance.
Some may claim that there is a major 'take' in the text in the form of the missing 'K' word. Yes, the word 'Kashmir' is not there in the text. But why all issues, including 'all outstanding issues'? Why did not the sentence stop with 'all issues with Pakistan'? Quite obviously, Kashmir is the outstanding issue in the text, as anyone can see.
The very fact that Pakistani spokesmen are gloating over their success, while many Indian thinkers and writers are agitated is proof, if proof were needed, that, for once, our capable diplomats let their guard down and let the Pakistanis run with the ball. There is no escape route in the text, even if our cleverest spokesmen like Minister of State Shashi Tharoor [ Images ], who apparently had no say in the drafting, argue that our options are open.
The only way is to refrain from starting the composite dialogue till we have satisfaction over Pakistani action on Mumbai [ Images ]. We simply do not budge and stick to our position regardless of the language of the statement.
I have no quarrel with the idea of resumption of talks if that indeed is the intention. There may be matters, which are not in the public domain, in the mind of the prime minister. He may want to strengthen the democratic forces in Pakistan as against the army and the ISI and President Zardari may well gain by the Indian gesture.
It may also please the Americans in light of the Hillary visit. But if that is the intention, we do not need to hide behind ambiguity. There may be some merit in saying in public what we say privately. If the honest judgement is that it will serve the national interests, by all means let us go for it. Let us not lose the substance and preserve the form.
NAM summits seem to be the places where we make concessions to Pakistan. It was in Havana that India conceded for the first time that Pakistan was as much a victim of terror as India was. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Pakistan was the obvious target in the eyes of the members of the UN when we talked about terrorism. We had managed to create such a vocabulary over the years and Pakistan felt compelled to exercise its right of reply every time the word, 'terrorism' was mentioned.
By conceding that the greatest perpetrator of terror against India was a victim of terror, we let Pakistan off the hook. Moreover, since Pakistan accuses India of State terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir [ Images ] and also in Lahore [ Images ], we were also unwittingly accepting the allegation.
By stating that 'terrorism is the main threat to both the countries' with an unprecedented reference to Baluchistan, we have given away our trump card. This aspect of the statement is even more damaging for us.
To say that the sentence on Baluchistan has been attributed to the prime minister of Pakistan is to question the whole logic of bilateral statements. Otherwise, why not have a sentence attributed to the Indian prime minister that Kashmir is an integral part of India?
The UN records are replete with the various tricks that Pakistan has tried to tie us in knots. One instance deserves special mention. In the midst of the preparatory work for the Vienna [ Images ] Conference on Human Rights in Geneva, the Indian delegate had to leave the committee to walk her dog.
Using this opportunity, the Pakistani delegate moved an amendment to the text to urge member states to refrain from violating human rights in 'UN recognised disputed territories'.
The committee was willing to accept it, but the chairman kept it pending till he could consult the Indian delegate. She was told the next day that the amendment would be included if India had no objection. She called me in New York and asked whether she could let it go. I was aghast because it was a thinly veiled reference to Jammu and Kashmir. There were many disputes in the world, but Kashmir was the only one which was mentioned as a disputed territory in every UN map. We were saved from great embarrassment because of the thoughtfulness of the chairman.
India-Pakistan problems have made their contribution to many UN resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. One celebrated case is on the question of self-determination. Although the UN Charter declares that all peoples have the right to self-determination, India had reserved its position on this issue.
India and Pakistan used to quarrel over this problem for many years, but it was agreed between us that all peoples 'under alien or colonial domination' have the right to self- determination, much to the relief of the rest of the world. Whenever the issue came up, this phrase was inserted and there was no more argument on it. I do not know the history of that formulation, but we believe that Palestine, but not Jammu and Kashmir, is covered by it.
I remember we had to put 'state(s)' in a text on peace-keeping because we wanted plural and Pakistan wanted singular. We were willing to accept 'state or states,' but Pakistan would not agree. We had the last laugh because neither the Chinese nor the Arabic text could accommodate the grand compromise between India and Pakistan. They just wrote 'state or states' without realising that it was not acceptable to Pakistan.
The latest joint statement may well become historic like the other compromises, but no interpretation of the text will meet our position unless we believe that terror or no terror, we will proceed with the composite dialogue. It will not matter since the battle will be in the composite talks and we will certainly mind our language there.
Former Ambassador T P Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.
By T.P.Sreenivasan
I have lived all my professional life with comments from fellow Indians that Pakistani diplomats were smarter than the Indian ones. The only consolation was that, according to Pakistani diplomats, they heard from their nationals that Indians were way ahead of them.
In fact, no one could tell, as both were smart and often the outsiders marvelled at the brilliance of South Asian diplomats. Any document produced between them was so balanced that both could claim victory.
But for once, the Indian diplomats have been outsmarted by the Pakistanis in Egypt [ Images ]. The joint statement may be no sellout in substance because India has made it clear that the composite dialogue will begin only after verifiable action is taken by Pakistan. But the text simply says the opposite.
'Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues.'
This is simple English language, which cannot be interpreted in any way other than as a commitment by India not only to begin the dialogue without waiting for any action by Pakistan this time, but also not to suspend it even if there are other terrorist incidents in the future. There is only give and no take in this particular instance.
Some may claim that there is a major 'take' in the text in the form of the missing 'K' word. Yes, the word 'Kashmir' is not there in the text. But why all issues, including 'all outstanding issues'? Why did not the sentence stop with 'all issues with Pakistan'? Quite obviously, Kashmir is the outstanding issue in the text, as anyone can see.
The very fact that Pakistani spokesmen are gloating over their success, while many Indian thinkers and writers are agitated is proof, if proof were needed, that, for once, our capable diplomats let their guard down and let the Pakistanis run with the ball. There is no escape route in the text, even if our cleverest spokesmen like Minister of State Shashi Tharoor [ Images ], who apparently had no say in the drafting, argue that our options are open.
The only way is to refrain from starting the composite dialogue till we have satisfaction over Pakistani action on Mumbai [ Images ]. We simply do not budge and stick to our position regardless of the language of the statement.
I have no quarrel with the idea of resumption of talks if that indeed is the intention. There may be matters, which are not in the public domain, in the mind of the prime minister. He may want to strengthen the democratic forces in Pakistan as against the army and the ISI and President Zardari may well gain by the Indian gesture.
It may also please the Americans in light of the Hillary visit. But if that is the intention, we do not need to hide behind ambiguity. There may be some merit in saying in public what we say privately. If the honest judgement is that it will serve the national interests, by all means let us go for it. Let us not lose the substance and preserve the form.
NAM summits seem to be the places where we make concessions to Pakistan. It was in Havana that India conceded for the first time that Pakistan was as much a victim of terror as India was. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Pakistan was the obvious target in the eyes of the members of the UN when we talked about terrorism. We had managed to create such a vocabulary over the years and Pakistan felt compelled to exercise its right of reply every time the word, 'terrorism' was mentioned.
By conceding that the greatest perpetrator of terror against India was a victim of terror, we let Pakistan off the hook. Moreover, since Pakistan accuses India of State terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir [ Images ] and also in Lahore [ Images ], we were also unwittingly accepting the allegation.
By stating that 'terrorism is the main threat to both the countries' with an unprecedented reference to Baluchistan, we have given away our trump card. This aspect of the statement is even more damaging for us.
To say that the sentence on Baluchistan has been attributed to the prime minister of Pakistan is to question the whole logic of bilateral statements. Otherwise, why not have a sentence attributed to the Indian prime minister that Kashmir is an integral part of India?
The UN records are replete with the various tricks that Pakistan has tried to tie us in knots. One instance deserves special mention. In the midst of the preparatory work for the Vienna [ Images ] Conference on Human Rights in Geneva, the Indian delegate had to leave the committee to walk her dog.
Using this opportunity, the Pakistani delegate moved an amendment to the text to urge member states to refrain from violating human rights in 'UN recognised disputed territories'.
The committee was willing to accept it, but the chairman kept it pending till he could consult the Indian delegate. She was told the next day that the amendment would be included if India had no objection. She called me in New York and asked whether she could let it go. I was aghast because it was a thinly veiled reference to Jammu and Kashmir. There were many disputes in the world, but Kashmir was the only one which was mentioned as a disputed territory in every UN map. We were saved from great embarrassment because of the thoughtfulness of the chairman.
India-Pakistan problems have made their contribution to many UN resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. One celebrated case is on the question of self-determination. Although the UN Charter declares that all peoples have the right to self-determination, India had reserved its position on this issue.
India and Pakistan used to quarrel over this problem for many years, but it was agreed between us that all peoples 'under alien or colonial domination' have the right to self- determination, much to the relief of the rest of the world. Whenever the issue came up, this phrase was inserted and there was no more argument on it. I do not know the history of that formulation, but we believe that Palestine, but not Jammu and Kashmir, is covered by it.
I remember we had to put 'state(s)' in a text on peace-keeping because we wanted plural and Pakistan wanted singular. We were willing to accept 'state or states,' but Pakistan would not agree. We had the last laugh because neither the Chinese nor the Arabic text could accommodate the grand compromise between India and Pakistan. They just wrote 'state or states' without realising that it was not acceptable to Pakistan.
The latest joint statement may well become historic like the other compromises, but no interpretation of the text will meet our position unless we believe that terror or no terror, we will proceed with the composite dialogue. It will not matter since the battle will be in the composite talks and we will certainly mind our language there.
Former Ambassador T P Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Remarks by Former Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan at the Brookings
Institution on July 15, 2009
Thank you, Steve, for your generous remarks. Let me thank you also for
inviting me to spend a delightful two months at the Brookings and for
mentoring me. Five years after retiring from the Indian Foreign
Service, I felt the need for some education and that prompted me to
seek this opportunity and it has been a marvelous experience. I am
grateful to the entire Brookings community, particularly President
Strobe Talbott, for the many courtesies extended to me. A special word
of gratitude to Dhruva Jaishankar, who has been most helpful. He
constantly reminded me of his father, Ambassador Jaishankar, who was a
young recruit to the Indian Foreign Service when I met him many years
ago.
I should also place on record my gratitude to Mr. Sreedhar Menon and
Mr. Tushar Kothari for joining hands with Brookings to make my
Fellowship possible.
The purpose of this presentation is not to give you any dramatic
findings from my study of India –US nuclear cooperation in the last
two months. I shall reserve them for my book. Today, I would rather
seek to elicit insights from you into the subject of India-US nuclear
cooperation, particularly the prospects for such cooperation in the
new setting in the US and in India.
I had noticed a certain nuclear deal fatigue in Washington, though
many of its architects and its opponents gave me their time quite
liberally. The forthcoming visit of the Secretary of State to India
and a G-8 decision on reprocessing and enrichment has, however,
generated new interest in the subject, at least in India.
The US voted for change, drastic change, while India voted for no
change. Of course, neither of the electorates had India- US relations
on their mind when they voted. But the advent of new governments in
the US and India cannot but have a major impact on India-US relations,
more so on nuclear cooperation.
In India, the Manmohan Singh Government received a new mandate, but
with a significant difference in its composition . The new coalition
is more cohesive, with the Congress Party in a commanding position.
Even more significantly, the leftist parties are not a part of the
coalition. The left parties had left the coalition on the issue of the
strategic partnership with the United States and, more specifically,
the nuclear deal and fought the election on that issue. Therefore, the
victory of the Congress party is a vindication of its policy of
seeking a closer relationship with the US and it will not be
constrained by the reservations of the leftists. In the US, the new
administration is committed to a strategic relationship with India,
but it includes individuals, who have held the view that the nuclear
deal does not contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the
US. The priorities of the new administration also seem to have changed
on account of the global economic crisis and the developments in the
Afpak region. Ironically, the coyness of the former Government of
India has now shifted to the new administration in the US, making it
still difficult for them to become embracing democracies.
To explore whether the nuclear deal has any chance of being
implemented by the present administration, we need to go into the
reasons why the Bush administration made the policies necessary to
sign a 123 agreement with India. The conventional wisdom is that
development of a strategic relationship with India to balance China,
gaining access to the emerging market in India and bringing India into
the non-proliferation regime are among the reasons. These reasons
still hold good today, though Democrats have traditionally been
comfortable with China. Against the background of global recession,
the US is likely to be more sensitive to Chinese views, which include
opposition to the nuclear agreement. But the proclaimed commitment of
the Obama administration to implement the nuclear agreement could be
attributed to the continuing validity of some of the original reasons.
No one doubts the desire of the new administration to strengthen and
diversify India-US relations, an idea, which the Bush administration
had inherited from the Clinton administration.
Perhaps, it is the adherence of the Obama administration to the
non-proliferation regime, which will create roadblocks in the
implementation of the agreement. It is far from clear whether the Bush
administration meant the agreement with India to be the beginning of
the end of the NPT regime. Possibly, it did not love NPT less, but
loved India more. If, in the process of shaping a new arrangement with
India, the NPT regime suffered, it did not seem to be of concern. A
moratorium, rather than ratification of the CTBT, was sufficient to
bring India into the nuclear mainstream. Similarly, a commitment to
negotiate an FMCT in good faith and to sign it, when ready, was
adequate and no interim measure was necessary to cease production of
fissile materials. More than anything else, India’s possession of
nuclear weapons and absence of comprehensive safeguards did not stand
in the way of India having the same rights and privileges as other
responsible states like the US. These might all be anathema to some of
the
Non-proliferation champions in the new administration.
Although President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons
is welcome to India, the path he has chosen to reach there is strewn
with dangers that may upstage the nuclear agreement. If the US Senate
ratifies the CTBT and the pressure is mounted on India to sign the
it, the two countries are likely to be on a collision course. Indian
public opinion was seen to be strongly in favor of an option to test
and one of the virtues of the agreement is that it does not expressly
prohibit testing. “We have the right to test and they have the right
to react” is the grand compromise that sold the agreement to the
Indian public. How long do the two countries have before a crisis
arises on this issue? FMCT is at some distance, but much depends on
how soon and in what form the FMCT will present itself. The
possibility of difficulties arising on this cannot be ruled out,
depending on the timing of the finalization of the FMCT.
As for the issues that the previous administration left unresolved
such as reprocessing and perpetuity of supplies, the situation is even
grimmer. A decision by G-8 to refrain from transferring enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to non-NPT countries has already set the
Ganges on fire. The fear is that the G-8 countries in the NSG will try
to reopen the clean waiver given to India, following the latest
decision. It has been pointed out that the G-8 decisions are not
binding; the NSG waiver cannot be reopened except by consensus and
that ENR material transfers, according to the 123 Agreement, were
“subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and
license policies”. It is also a fact that President Obama is not
enthusiastic about reprocessing even within the US, On June 29,
2009,he quietly cancelled a lengthy environmental review that was the
first step in allowing the resumption of commercial nuclear
reprocessing in the US. But anything that affects full civilian
nuclear cooperation is seen as detrimental to the spirit of the
agreement.
Another concern is that the agreed dialogue on reprocessing may itself
run into rough weather as the Indian position is that it cannot buy
anything
from the US till this as well as the perpetuity of supplies issue are
resolved. The US, on the other hand, attaches importance to India
signing the Convention on Nuclear Damages and earmarking two sites for
American nuclear parks. Some experts have suggested that these issues
are not so urgent, because India can merrily go on purchasing material
from other countries, leaving the US out. This approach can hardly
please the Americans, including the architects of the agreement.
Another aspect of the nuclear cooperation I would like to explore is
the linkage between the talks between Jaswant Singh and
Strobe Talbott and the 123 agreement. I had seen it as a logical
outcome of the marathon talks as the five benchmarks that Talbott had
put forward figure in one form or the other in the Joint Statement.
Headway was made in the talks on CTBT, FMCT, export controls and India
had no problem in working for the normalization of relations with
Pakistan. The only issue on which there was no progress was the
so-called strategic restraint, which had to do with the nuclear
weapons India has developed. When the US decided to exclude the
military installations from the purview of the agreement, a meeting
point suddenly emerged and an agreement became possible. In effect, it
was a change in the US insistence on strategic restraint that led to
the new understanding.
But there are others, who believe that that the agreement was a new
idea, invented by the Bush administration and that the previous talks
and the NSSP discussions were useful only in creating the atmospherics
for the
agreement. “Clinton created the atmospherics, we created policy”, an
architect of the agreement told me. This lets the BJP off the hook for
disowning an agreement they had initiated. But this is a point worth
investigating. I know for a fact that the BJP Government had mooted
the idea of inspection of additional nuclear facilities in return for
relaxation of the technology denial regime.
Today, there are a number of proposals for the globe to move towards
nuclear disarmament. Even some of the cold warriors are moving away
from the deterrence doctrine to recommend not only reduction, but also
elimination of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia are in the process
of taking the initial steps in that direction. Some cynics are of the
view that these proposals are designed merely to avoid a breakdown of
the NPT Review Conference in 2010. Some movement towards nuclear
disarmament may prompt non-nuclear weapon states to recommit
themselves to their nuclear virginity. The India-US nuclear agreement
is likely to get some attention in this context. It remains to be seen
whether the US would go slow on the implementation of the agreement to
avoid criticism on that account.
The relationship between defense and nuclear cooperation has been a
matter of discussion in India. The leftist parties had alleged that
massive acquisition of weapons from the US was a precondition for the
nuclear agreement. It is to be explored whether defense cooperation
will provide sufficient incentive for the US to maintain nuclear
cooperation even if there is delay in nuclear trade.
.
These issues I have raised are by no means exhaustive. Since the
agreement is unprecedented, it is not easy to anticipate every problem
that is likely to arise. I would very much encourage a discussion on
these and other aspects. I am sure that I will greatly benefit from
your views and advice. On that will depend the nature of the study I
am planning to produce.
Thank you.
Institution on July 15, 2009
Thank you, Steve, for your generous remarks. Let me thank you also for
inviting me to spend a delightful two months at the Brookings and for
mentoring me. Five years after retiring from the Indian Foreign
Service, I felt the need for some education and that prompted me to
seek this opportunity and it has been a marvelous experience. I am
grateful to the entire Brookings community, particularly President
Strobe Talbott, for the many courtesies extended to me. A special word
of gratitude to Dhruva Jaishankar, who has been most helpful. He
constantly reminded me of his father, Ambassador Jaishankar, who was a
young recruit to the Indian Foreign Service when I met him many years
ago.
I should also place on record my gratitude to Mr. Sreedhar Menon and
Mr. Tushar Kothari for joining hands with Brookings to make my
Fellowship possible.
The purpose of this presentation is not to give you any dramatic
findings from my study of India –US nuclear cooperation in the last
two months. I shall reserve them for my book. Today, I would rather
seek to elicit insights from you into the subject of India-US nuclear
cooperation, particularly the prospects for such cooperation in the
new setting in the US and in India.
I had noticed a certain nuclear deal fatigue in Washington, though
many of its architects and its opponents gave me their time quite
liberally. The forthcoming visit of the Secretary of State to India
and a G-8 decision on reprocessing and enrichment has, however,
generated new interest in the subject, at least in India.
The US voted for change, drastic change, while India voted for no
change. Of course, neither of the electorates had India- US relations
on their mind when they voted. But the advent of new governments in
the US and India cannot but have a major impact on India-US relations,
more so on nuclear cooperation.
In India, the Manmohan Singh Government received a new mandate, but
with a significant difference in its composition . The new coalition
is more cohesive, with the Congress Party in a commanding position.
Even more significantly, the leftist parties are not a part of the
coalition. The left parties had left the coalition on the issue of the
strategic partnership with the United States and, more specifically,
the nuclear deal and fought the election on that issue. Therefore, the
victory of the Congress party is a vindication of its policy of
seeking a closer relationship with the US and it will not be
constrained by the reservations of the leftists. In the US, the new
administration is committed to a strategic relationship with India,
but it includes individuals, who have held the view that the nuclear
deal does not contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the
US. The priorities of the new administration also seem to have changed
on account of the global economic crisis and the developments in the
Afpak region. Ironically, the coyness of the former Government of
India has now shifted to the new administration in the US, making it
still difficult for them to become embracing democracies.
To explore whether the nuclear deal has any chance of being
implemented by the present administration, we need to go into the
reasons why the Bush administration made the policies necessary to
sign a 123 agreement with India. The conventional wisdom is that
development of a strategic relationship with India to balance China,
gaining access to the emerging market in India and bringing India into
the non-proliferation regime are among the reasons. These reasons
still hold good today, though Democrats have traditionally been
comfortable with China. Against the background of global recession,
the US is likely to be more sensitive to Chinese views, which include
opposition to the nuclear agreement. But the proclaimed commitment of
the Obama administration to implement the nuclear agreement could be
attributed to the continuing validity of some of the original reasons.
No one doubts the desire of the new administration to strengthen and
diversify India-US relations, an idea, which the Bush administration
had inherited from the Clinton administration.
Perhaps, it is the adherence of the Obama administration to the
non-proliferation regime, which will create roadblocks in the
implementation of the agreement. It is far from clear whether the Bush
administration meant the agreement with India to be the beginning of
the end of the NPT regime. Possibly, it did not love NPT less, but
loved India more. If, in the process of shaping a new arrangement with
India, the NPT regime suffered, it did not seem to be of concern. A
moratorium, rather than ratification of the CTBT, was sufficient to
bring India into the nuclear mainstream. Similarly, a commitment to
negotiate an FMCT in good faith and to sign it, when ready, was
adequate and no interim measure was necessary to cease production of
fissile materials. More than anything else, India’s possession of
nuclear weapons and absence of comprehensive safeguards did not stand
in the way of India having the same rights and privileges as other
responsible states like the US. These might all be anathema to some of
the
Non-proliferation champions in the new administration.
Although President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons
is welcome to India, the path he has chosen to reach there is strewn
with dangers that may upstage the nuclear agreement. If the US Senate
ratifies the CTBT and the pressure is mounted on India to sign the
it, the two countries are likely to be on a collision course. Indian
public opinion was seen to be strongly in favor of an option to test
and one of the virtues of the agreement is that it does not expressly
prohibit testing. “We have the right to test and they have the right
to react” is the grand compromise that sold the agreement to the
Indian public. How long do the two countries have before a crisis
arises on this issue? FMCT is at some distance, but much depends on
how soon and in what form the FMCT will present itself. The
possibility of difficulties arising on this cannot be ruled out,
depending on the timing of the finalization of the FMCT.
As for the issues that the previous administration left unresolved
such as reprocessing and perpetuity of supplies, the situation is even
grimmer. A decision by G-8 to refrain from transferring enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to non-NPT countries has already set the
Ganges on fire. The fear is that the G-8 countries in the NSG will try
to reopen the clean waiver given to India, following the latest
decision. It has been pointed out that the G-8 decisions are not
binding; the NSG waiver cannot be reopened except by consensus and
that ENR material transfers, according to the 123 Agreement, were
“subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and
license policies”. It is also a fact that President Obama is not
enthusiastic about reprocessing even within the US, On June 29,
2009,he quietly cancelled a lengthy environmental review that was the
first step in allowing the resumption of commercial nuclear
reprocessing in the US. But anything that affects full civilian
nuclear cooperation is seen as detrimental to the spirit of the
agreement.
Another concern is that the agreed dialogue on reprocessing may itself
run into rough weather as the Indian position is that it cannot buy
anything
from the US till this as well as the perpetuity of supplies issue are
resolved. The US, on the other hand, attaches importance to India
signing the Convention on Nuclear Damages and earmarking two sites for
American nuclear parks. Some experts have suggested that these issues
are not so urgent, because India can merrily go on purchasing material
from other countries, leaving the US out. This approach can hardly
please the Americans, including the architects of the agreement.
Another aspect of the nuclear cooperation I would like to explore is
the linkage between the talks between Jaswant Singh and
Strobe Talbott and the 123 agreement. I had seen it as a logical
outcome of the marathon talks as the five benchmarks that Talbott had
put forward figure in one form or the other in the Joint Statement.
Headway was made in the talks on CTBT, FMCT, export controls and India
had no problem in working for the normalization of relations with
Pakistan. The only issue on which there was no progress was the
so-called strategic restraint, which had to do with the nuclear
weapons India has developed. When the US decided to exclude the
military installations from the purview of the agreement, a meeting
point suddenly emerged and an agreement became possible. In effect, it
was a change in the US insistence on strategic restraint that led to
the new understanding.
But there are others, who believe that that the agreement was a new
idea, invented by the Bush administration and that the previous talks
and the NSSP discussions were useful only in creating the atmospherics
for the
agreement. “Clinton created the atmospherics, we created policy”, an
architect of the agreement told me. This lets the BJP off the hook for
disowning an agreement they had initiated. But this is a point worth
investigating. I know for a fact that the BJP Government had mooted
the idea of inspection of additional nuclear facilities in return for
relaxation of the technology denial regime.
Today, there are a number of proposals for the globe to move towards
nuclear disarmament. Even some of the cold warriors are moving away
from the deterrence doctrine to recommend not only reduction, but also
elimination of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia are in the process
of taking the initial steps in that direction. Some cynics are of the
view that these proposals are designed merely to avoid a breakdown of
the NPT Review Conference in 2010. Some movement towards nuclear
disarmament may prompt non-nuclear weapon states to recommit
themselves to their nuclear virginity. The India-US nuclear agreement
is likely to get some attention in this context. It remains to be seen
whether the US would go slow on the implementation of the agreement to
avoid criticism on that account.
The relationship between defense and nuclear cooperation has been a
matter of discussion in India. The leftist parties had alleged that
massive acquisition of weapons from the US was a precondition for the
nuclear agreement. It is to be explored whether defense cooperation
will provide sufficient incentive for the US to maintain nuclear
cooperation even if there is delay in nuclear trade.
.
These issues I have raised are by no means exhaustive. Since the
agreement is unprecedented, it is not easy to anticipate every problem
that is likely to arise. I would very much encourage a discussion on
these and other aspects. I am sure that I will greatly benefit from
your views and advice. On that will depend the nature of the study I
am planning to produce.
Thank you.
Hillary's Passage to India
By T.P. Sreenivasan
India adored Edmund Hillary, a New Zealander who conquered Mount Everest in 1953 long before Hillary Clinton came on the scene. That name recognition may have contributed to Hillary Clinton being referred to as “(D-Punjab)” in a memo from Barack Obama’s campaign during their fight for the nomination. As she sets out on her journey to India today in her new capacity as secretary of state, she has as much a hazardous climb ahead of her as Sir Hillary had in the previous century.
The recent elections in India and the United States will have a profound impact on the ties between the two countries. The Bush Administration was ready for a tight embrace of India, but India shied away because of the hesitation of the leftists, who were part of the ruling coalition. But today, when India is ready to move forward with a popular mandate, it appears that it is the turn of the U.S. to backtrack. Priorities seem to have changed on the Potomac. Short-term concerns may well have overtaken the logic for building a long term relationship.
Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton have set the right tone with India, but it is on policy that trouble may arise. The contours of the nuclear agreement with India, in particular, do not fit neatly into the policy framework of the Democrats. In the eyes of some Obama advisers, the nuclear deal was a sellout to India and, given a choice, they would retrieve much of what was negotiated by Bush. But the Obama Administration is committed to the implementation of the deal in a way that it does not hurt the nonproliferation objectives of the U.S. India, on the other hand, wishes to consolidate the gains of the Bush era and build on them.
The next steps that each country has in mind do not coincide. The U.S. side wants India to adhere to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages to provide liability protection to U.S. companies and announce two nuclear reactor park sites for U.S. firms. The Indians would rather tackle the modalities of reprocessing and tie up perpetuity of supplies. The latest G-8 decision to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing items to non-NPT countries strikes at the very root of full civil nuclear cooperation. This move might jeopardize the talks scheduled for modalities of reprocessing. What would happen to the spent fuel from Tarapur if reprocessing is not facilitated? This partnership may end up looking like a three-legged race in which two athletes are tethered together but incapable of deploying their collective strength.
The path to a world without nuclear weapons that Mr. Obama delineates is also different from the Indian vision. He sees the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as the major milestones in this journey. India can hardly afford to embrace these as it has to preserve and protect its minimum deterrent against real and immediate threats.
Other tensions are brewing as well: Indian industry has anxieties over Mr. Obama’s emphasis on moving jobs from Bangalore to Buffalo, when the market forces dictate movement in the opposite direction. Skills developed in India and facilities set up exclusively for the U.S. market should not become monuments of failed theories of globalization.
War on terror is a common responsibility for the U.S. and India and a primary area of cooperation. But the biggest perpetrator of terror on India is also the chief fighter of terrorism for the U.S. The U.S will not talk to terrorists, but it wants India to keep talking to Pakistan even after the horror in Mumbai. Moreover, the U.S. persists with old solutions for new problems such as propping up regimes with dollar infusions. Mrs. Clinton will face questions in India as to what guarantees the U.S. has extracted about the end use of the lethal weapons that are gifted to Pakistan.
At the G-8 summit earlier this month, India once again called for the reform of the Security Council as an imperative for equity in the new international matrix. As though in anticipation, Mrs. Clinton made the tantalizing offer “to cooperate with New Delhi as it shoulders the responsibilities that accompany its new position of global leadership.” She should know that nothing short of a commitment to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council on objective criteria such as population and constructive contributions will meet the aspirations of New Delhi. If she can make that commitment, she needs to do nothing else to make the visit historic. Signing some agreements or setting up commissions will not have the same impact.
Sir Hillary did not climb Everest by himself. He shared his moment of glory with an Indian, Tenzing Norgay, whose contribution may well have been as significant. Mrs. Clinton will have the same support if she is willing to share the view from the summit with her Indian counterpart, S.M. Krishna, by no means a novice in statesmanship.
Mr. Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Istitution in Washington. He was India’s deputy ambassador to the U.S. from 1997 to 2000 and permanent representative to the United Nations from 2000 to 2004.
By T.P. Sreenivasan
India adored Edmund Hillary, a New Zealander who conquered Mount Everest in 1953 long before Hillary Clinton came on the scene. That name recognition may have contributed to Hillary Clinton being referred to as “(D-Punjab)” in a memo from Barack Obama’s campaign during their fight for the nomination. As she sets out on her journey to India today in her new capacity as secretary of state, she has as much a hazardous climb ahead of her as Sir Hillary had in the previous century.
The recent elections in India and the United States will have a profound impact on the ties between the two countries. The Bush Administration was ready for a tight embrace of India, but India shied away because of the hesitation of the leftists, who were part of the ruling coalition. But today, when India is ready to move forward with a popular mandate, it appears that it is the turn of the U.S. to backtrack. Priorities seem to have changed on the Potomac. Short-term concerns may well have overtaken the logic for building a long term relationship.
Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton have set the right tone with India, but it is on policy that trouble may arise. The contours of the nuclear agreement with India, in particular, do not fit neatly into the policy framework of the Democrats. In the eyes of some Obama advisers, the nuclear deal was a sellout to India and, given a choice, they would retrieve much of what was negotiated by Bush. But the Obama Administration is committed to the implementation of the deal in a way that it does not hurt the nonproliferation objectives of the U.S. India, on the other hand, wishes to consolidate the gains of the Bush era and build on them.
The next steps that each country has in mind do not coincide. The U.S. side wants India to adhere to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages to provide liability protection to U.S. companies and announce two nuclear reactor park sites for U.S. firms. The Indians would rather tackle the modalities of reprocessing and tie up perpetuity of supplies. The latest G-8 decision to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing items to non-NPT countries strikes at the very root of full civil nuclear cooperation. This move might jeopardize the talks scheduled for modalities of reprocessing. What would happen to the spent fuel from Tarapur if reprocessing is not facilitated? This partnership may end up looking like a three-legged race in which two athletes are tethered together but incapable of deploying their collective strength.
The path to a world without nuclear weapons that Mr. Obama delineates is also different from the Indian vision. He sees the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as the major milestones in this journey. India can hardly afford to embrace these as it has to preserve and protect its minimum deterrent against real and immediate threats.
Other tensions are brewing as well: Indian industry has anxieties over Mr. Obama’s emphasis on moving jobs from Bangalore to Buffalo, when the market forces dictate movement in the opposite direction. Skills developed in India and facilities set up exclusively for the U.S. market should not become monuments of failed theories of globalization.
War on terror is a common responsibility for the U.S. and India and a primary area of cooperation. But the biggest perpetrator of terror on India is also the chief fighter of terrorism for the U.S. The U.S will not talk to terrorists, but it wants India to keep talking to Pakistan even after the horror in Mumbai. Moreover, the U.S. persists with old solutions for new problems such as propping up regimes with dollar infusions. Mrs. Clinton will face questions in India as to what guarantees the U.S. has extracted about the end use of the lethal weapons that are gifted to Pakistan.
At the G-8 summit earlier this month, India once again called for the reform of the Security Council as an imperative for equity in the new international matrix. As though in anticipation, Mrs. Clinton made the tantalizing offer “to cooperate with New Delhi as it shoulders the responsibilities that accompany its new position of global leadership.” She should know that nothing short of a commitment to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council on objective criteria such as population and constructive contributions will meet the aspirations of New Delhi. If she can make that commitment, she needs to do nothing else to make the visit historic. Signing some agreements or setting up commissions will not have the same impact.
Sir Hillary did not climb Everest by himself. He shared his moment of glory with an Indian, Tenzing Norgay, whose contribution may well have been as significant. Mrs. Clinton will have the same support if she is willing to share the view from the summit with her Indian counterpart, S.M. Krishna, by no means a novice in statesmanship.
Mr. Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Istitution in Washington. He was India’s deputy ambassador to the U.S. from 1997 to 2000 and permanent representative to the United Nations from 2000 to 2004.
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