Friday, June 04, 2010

Shashi Tharoor without Twitter, OSD and IPL----

A Successful Minister of State of External Affairs

By T.P.Sreenivasan

Shakespearean tragic heroes are known more for their tragic flaws than for their magic qualities. Hamlet was indecisive, Macbeth was ambitious, Othello was jealous and King Lear was vane. But Hamlet was a thoughtful and loyal son, Macbeth was a heroic warrior, Othello was a loving husband and King Lear was a doting father. The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones, as the bard himself has said

Being a Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs (MOS) must be very frustrating for any politician. The MOS has nothing to do with the sexy subjects the Ministry deals with—Pakistan, China, the United States, the other big powers and the United Nations. Moreover, any one, who has no role in the posting and promotion of IFS officers directly or indirectly, has any clout in South Block. But there is so much to do in other areas and, given the right attitude and hard work, any MOS can make a mark and use the position as a stepping stone to climb greater heights. Among the Ministers of State that I have worked with between 1977 and 2004, the two who made the biggest impact were Natwar Singh, on account of his direct access to the Prime Minister and Salman Khurshid, by sheer brilliance and hard work. More recently, Anand Sharma and E. Ahamed have proved their mettle and moved on to other positions. Many others have fallen by the wayside as they were misfits in the South Block. One of them read ‘Namibia’ as ‘Nambiar’ and the other pronounced “nodules” as “noodles”. Covering their meetings with their counterparts was often embarrassing for professional diplomats. They held their breath in the hope that the Minister would not say anything improper or undiplomatic.

Shashi Tharoor would have been a highly successful MOS in every respect, had he just focused on the work of his Ministry. A senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs told me what a delight it was to work with Tharoor. He would read a brief once and understand all the nuances of the issues he had to deal with. After that, he would handle any meeting with aplomb because he understood the intricacies of international relations, with his long experience at the United Nations. He had no problem dealing with unexpected issues raised by his interlocutors and he was never lost for words. “It was a pleasure watching him at work”, he said. This view was shared by many in the Ministry of External Affairs.

Those who miss him sorely in the South Block are the Ambassadors from the Gulf, Africa and Latin America, who are orphans once again as no Minister, not even the concerned Secretary has any time for them. They are often at the mercy of the concerned Joint Secretaries, who would condescend to give them time only if there was some urgent business to do. Ambassadors would like to send cables home about conversations at the highest level possible and it is rarely that they get chances to go beyond the level of the territorial Joint Secretaries. Tharoor knew many of these Ambassadors, who had served at the United Nations and made it a point to meet all of them and even accepted their invitations to visit their embassies.

A delegation of Latin American Ambassadors, who visited Trivandrum when Tharoor was the MOS were all praise for Tharoor for the attention he gave them, particularly to facilitate their visit to his own constituency. Now, with only one MOS in the Ministry, the Ambassadors from Africa, Latin America and the Gulf have no chance of meeting the MOS. By his exit, Tharoor has left a wide gulf in the Ministry.

Ironically, the longest speech Tharoor ever made in the Lok Sabha was after he resigned. But he had once an opportunity to handle a question on Afghanistan in the absence of the External Affairs Minister. Even senior Cabinet Ministers were greatly impressed with his performance. He was well briefed, inventive and articulate.

It was during his visits abroad that he proved his mettle, whether in bilateral discussions or in conferences. He certainly had drafts and briefs prepared for him by the bright officers of the Ministry of External affairs, but he made them his own because of his familiarity with the issues, his perception of Indian interests and his general geniality and oratorical skills. He breathed new life into the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) with his speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Council of Ministers in Yemen in June 2009. The association was largely an Indian creation and it had become imperative for India to give more substantive support to it. He gave a shot in the arm to another body, the Community of Democracies, set up with much fanfare during the Clinton era, when he addressed its Fifth Ministerial Conference in Lisbon in July 2009. He also delivered several speeches in different parts of India on foreign policy in general and different regions in particular. In the course of his short stint as MOS in the Ministry of External Affairs, he has built up an impressive repertoire of valuable pronouncements on foreign policy. His speeches on foreign policy at his own alma mater, St. Stephen’s College and at the Aligarh Muslim University were a clarion call for inclusive foreign policy making, with the cooperation of Universities, think tanks and strategic thinkers. His point that foreign policy is too important to be left to the foreign office alone must have struck a sympathetic chord across the nation.

Tharoor followed up his idea of inclusive foreign policy making by reviving the Policy Planning Division in the Ministry with the participation of expertise from outside South Block. The Policy Planning Division was just a parking place most of the time, but it was a powerful force at the time when G.Parthasarathy and A.K.Damodaran turned it into a policy making body. Heads of territorial divisions in the Ministry never conceded space for the Policy Planning Division except when the leadership in the Ministry made use of it. Tharoor had made a good beginning by stressing the importance of policy planning. Planning for the future is as hazardous in foreign policy as in other areas, but planning with the best available data is the surest way to expect the unexpected.

Among his many purposeful visits abroad, the most important was his timely visit to Haiti soon after the devastating earthquake there. It must have been a sad moment for him to see many of his friends in the United Nations gone in the earthquake, but his visit, the first Ministerial visit to the island, brought much solace and comfort to the victims, specially to the Indian community.

Back home, Tharoor also attended to the needs of passport offices and Haj pilgrims to the extent possible. Both these operations of the Ministry have perennial problems and they will never be perfect, regardless of the efforts put in by successive teams. The outsourcing experiment in providing consular services has made them less personalized and less efficient. But a ministerial touch does energise matters and Tharoor has made an important contribution.

As MOS in the Ministry of External Affairs, Tharoor had more attributes than were considered necessary for the job in the past. Had it not been for twitter, his OSD and IPL, he may well have done well and qualified for higher responsibilities.

May 25, 2010

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Iran-Brazil-Turkey----Hazards of Mediation.

By T.P.Sreenivasan

I was in Brasilia last month, together with twenty others from around the globe, to discuss “Emerging Structures of Global Governance” at the initiative of the Government of Brazil. Our man in Brasilia, Ambassador B.S.Prakash, pleased with a highly successful visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who participated in two summits (Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) and India-Brazil-South Africa(IBSA) in one day, was all praise for the new initiatives of Brazil in the international arena. Al Jazeera had a story at the same time about the emergence of Brazil on the centre stage of the world. President Lula’s domestic success and heightened status in South America had encouraged him to play a global role. The seminar on global governance itself, where the best minds of Brazil asserted that there was a turning point in the international system, was aimed at providing leadership for change.

Turkey too was poised for a new role on the global scene. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuloglu, in spelling out the new directions in Turkish foreign policy, had stated, “Today, Turkey has a great deal of say in the international arena. More importantly, there is a critical group of countries that lends a careful ear to Turkey’s stance on a myriad of regional and international issues. At this point, the world expects great things from Turkey and we are fully aware of our responsibility to carry out a careful foreign policy.”

Given their non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council and their willingness to wade into international waters, it was no wonder that the two countries took on the most pressing of the international problems of the day, the face-off between the United States and Iran. Though it looked like an initiative taken on by them at the instance of Iran, the United States had obviously encouraged them to strike a bargain, though Hillary Clinton had predicted that they would fail. The skilful diplomats of Brazil and Turkey revived an old deal of swapping of Low Enriched Uranium in exchange for fuel rods, from which Iran had reneged ostensibly on account of the trust deficit between Iran and its western interlocutors. The idea that the Iranian uranium will be in the trusted hands of Turkey and the fuel rods will come from the same source as indicated before made the deal possible.

The ten article agreement is fairly simple and straightforward. The commitment to nonproliferation and respect to the rights of states to nuclear energy, research and fuel cycle have been asserted at the outset. In the most important part of the agreement, Turkey is to keep 1200 kilogram of Low Enriched Uranium fuel (3.5%) owned by Iran with monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran itself. In exchange, the Vienna Group (France, Russia, the US and the IAEA) will deliver 120 kilogram of nuclear fuel with 20% purity) to Iran for use in its research reactor in Teheran. By and large, the agreement is very similar to an earlier proposal, which was made by the IAEA in consultation with the US and others. Iran did not agree at that time as it was not sure that the western countries would honour their part of the agreement.

Both Turkey and Brazil were in direct contact with the US right from the Washington Nuclear Security Summit on this issue and they had reason to believe that the new deal would be acceptable to the US. The Turkish Foreign Minister was confident that the sanctions were no more necessary. “This agreement should be regarded positively and there is no need for sanctions, now that we have made guarantees and the low enriched uranium will remain in Turkey”, he said. India too voiced cautious optimism about the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil. But Israel was quick in rejecting the deal by stating that Iran had “manipulated” Turkey and Brazil. Israel felt that Iran would not honour the agreement and the involvement of rising powers such as Brazil and Turkey would radically complicate matters. “The Iranian nuclear installations are going to continue working and Teheran will pursue its efforts to obtain a military nuclear programme while developing long-range missiles”, said an Israeli official.

Predictably, the US too rejected the deal and moved forward with the sanctions resolution, which apparently has the acquiescence of both Russia and China. The US has pointed out that the new deal does not say anything about the cessation of enrichment of uranium by Iran. The European Union has also taken the position that the deal is not enough to stop work on tougher sanctions. “If Iran has now accepted the IAEA proposal, this is welcome, but it does not solve the fundamental problem, which is that the international community has serious concerns about the peaceful intention of the Iran nuclear programme”, said a spokesperson of the European Union. The reasons for the rejection of the deal were not clear immediately, but the main reason is that considerable time has passed since the west had made a similar proposal. At that time, the transfer of 1200 kilogram of Low Enriched Uranium would have left Teheran with much less than the 1000 kilogram of LEU required to make a bomb. But in the interim period, Teheran has enriched more uranium and even after the transfer, it will have sufficient stocks to move towards weaponisation. Today, Iran is estimated to have nearly 2500 kilogram of LEU. But why this fact was not pointed out to Turkey and Brazil at the time of the negotiations remains a mystery.

Iran, Turkey and Brazil have, however, continued to press the world to accept the deal and delay the imposition of sanctions. Turkey has written to 26 countries saying that the deal would resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran by way of diplomacy and negotiations. The activism of Turkey and Brazil as the mediators is likely to embarrass the United States and its partners.

On the larger geopolitical context, the involvement of Turkey and Brazil in what was essentially a tussle between Iran and the west, appeared to mark the beginnings of a new world order. Iranian acceptance of a deal which was originally proposed by the west with new guarantors, one of them a regional Islamic country and the other outside the region, seemed like the rejection of the west as a partner and the discovery of an alternative, with broader international implications. Iran did not trust France and Russia, but it had no problems with Turkey and Brazil.

There must be red faces in Turkey and Brazil on account of the rejection of their deal by the west, which had encouraged them to enter into negotiations with Iran. The jubilation of Iran will also be an embarrassment for them. They must have discovered the hazards of mediation in an issue, which has assumed innumerable dimensions. Their zest for playing a new role in international relations may well have suffered a setback by the Iran experience.
Iran-Brazil-Turkey----Hazards of Mediation.

By T.P.Sreenivasan

I was in Brasilia last month, together with twenty others from around the globe, to discuss “Emerging Structures of Global Governance” at the initiative of the Government of Brazil. Our man in Brasilia, Ambassador B.S.Prakash, pleased with a highly successful visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who participated in two summits (Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) and India-Brazil-South Africa(IBSA) in one day, was all praise for the new initiatives of Brazil in the international arena. Al Jazeera had a story at the same time about the emergence of Brazil on the centre stage of the world. President Lula’s domestic success and heightened status in South America had encouraged him to play a global role. The seminar on global governance itself, where the best minds of Brazil asserted that there was a turning point in the international system, was aimed at providing leadership for change.

Turkey too was poised for a new role on the global scene. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuloglu, in spelling out the new directions in Turkish foreign policy, had stated, “Today, Turkey has a great deal of say in the international arena. More importantly, there is a critical group of countries that lends a careful ear to Turkey’s stance on a myriad of regional and international issues. At this point, the world expects great things from Turkey and we are fully aware of our responsibility to carry out a careful foreign policy.”

Given their non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council and their willingness to wade into international waters, it was no wonder that the two countries took on the most pressing of the international problems of the day, the face-off between the United States and Iran. Though it looked like an initiative taken on by them at the instance of Iran, the United States had obviously encouraged them to strike a bargain, though Hillary Clinton had predicted that they would fail. The skilful diplomats of Brazil and Turkey revived an old deal of swapping of Low Enriched Uranium in exchange for fuel rods, from which Iran had reneged ostensibly on account of the trust deficit between Iran and its western interlocutors. The idea that the Iranian uranium will be in the trusted hands of Turkey and the fuel rods will come from the same source as indicated before made the deal possible.

The ten article agreement is fairly simple and straightforward. The commitment to nonproliferation and respect to the rights of states to nuclear energy, research and fuel cycle have been asserted at the outset. In the most important part of the agreement, Turkey is to keep 1200 kilogram of Low Enriched Uranium fuel (3.5%) owned by Iran with monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran itself. In exchange, the Vienna Group (France, Russia, the US and the IAEA) will deliver 120 kilogram of nuclear fuel with 20% purity) to Iran for use in its research reactor in Teheran. By and large, the agreement is very similar to an earlier proposal, which was made by the IAEA in consultation with the US and others. Iran did not agree at that time as it was not sure that the western countries would honour their part of the agreement.

Both Turkey and Brazil were in direct contact with the US right from the Washington Nuclear Security Summit on this issue and they had reason to believe that the new deal would be acceptable to the US. The Turkish Foreign Minister was confident that the sanctions were no more necessary. “This agreement should be regarded positively and there is no need for sanctions, now that we have made guarantees and the low enriched uranium will remain in Turkey”, he said. India too voiced cautious optimism about the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil. But Israel was quick in rejecting the deal by stating that Iran had “manipulated” Turkey and Brazil. Israel felt that Iran would not honour the agreement and the involvement of rising powers such as Brazil and Turkey would radically complicate matters. “The Iranian nuclear installations are going to continue working and Teheran will pursue its efforts to obtain a military nuclear programme while developing long-range missiles”, said an Israeli official.

Predictably, the US too rejected the deal and moved forward with the sanctions resolution, which apparently has the acquiescence of both Russia and China. The US has pointed out that the new deal does not say anything about the cessation of enrichment of uranium by Iran. The European Union has also taken the position that the deal is not enough to stop work on tougher sanctions. “If Iran has now accepted the IAEA proposal, this is welcome, but it does not solve the fundamental problem, which is that the international community has serious concerns about the peaceful intention of the Iran nuclear programme”, said a spokesperson of the European Union. The reasons for the rejection of the deal were not clear immediately, but the main reason is that considerable time has passed since the west had made a similar proposal. At that time, the transfer of 1200 kilogram of Low Enriched Uranium would have left Teheran with much less than the 1000 kilogram of LEU required to make a bomb. But in the interim period, Teheran has enriched more uranium and even after the transfer, it will have sufficient stocks to move towards weaponisation. Today, Iran is estimated to have nearly 2500 kilogram of LEU. But why this fact was not pointed out to Turkey and Brazil at the time of the negotiations remains a mystery.

Iran, Turkey and Brazil have, however, continued to press the world to accept the deal and delay the imposition of sanctions. Turkey has written to 26 countries saying that the deal would resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran by way of diplomacy and negotiations. The activism of Turkey and Brazil as the mediators is likely to embarrass the United States and its partners.

On the larger geopolitical context, the involvement of Turkey and Brazil in what was essentially a tussle between Iran and the west, appeared to mark the beginnings of a new world order. Iranian acceptance of a deal which was originally proposed by the west with new guarantors, one of them a regional Islamic country and the other outside the region, seemed like the rejection of the west as a partner and the discovery of an alternative, with broader international implications. Iran did not trust France and Russia, but it had no problems with Turkey and Brazil.

There must be red faces in Turkey and Brazil on account of the rejection of their deal by the west, which had encouraged them to enter into negotiations with Iran. The jubilation of Iran will also be an embarrassment for them. They must have discovered the hazards of mediation in an issue, which has assumed innumerable dimensions. Their zest for playing a new role in international relations may well have suffered a setback by the Iran experience.