India and UN Reform
(Paper presented by Former
Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan at the International Conference on the UN at the
Central University Kasargod. March 20, 2013.)
By T.P.Sreenivasan
India’s permanent membership of the
UN Security Council with the power of the veto is a distant dream even 33 years
after we initiated a move in the General Assembly to expand the Council.
Although the need for reform has been established and India’s case has been
strengthened, there is a multiplicity of formulas, ranging from maintaining the
status quo to a massive expansion by adding 6 permanent members and 6
non-permanent members. As of today, there is no formula, which can command 128
votes, including the votes of the five permanent members, the minimum
requirement for an amendment to the UN Charter.
The UN reform we are seeking,
particularly the expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council,
is nothing short of a revolution. We are challenging the very foundation of an
institution, born out of a world war, the winners of which gave themselves the
responsibility of maintaining world peace and security by assuming
extraordinary powers. The UN Charter, which was crafted by them, has been
embraced voluntarily by 193 nations. That there has not been a world war since
and that the UN has served, as a stabilizing factor in the world is the
strongest argument for continuing the status quo. But the contrary argument is
stronger, because the global equations have changed so much in the last 68
years that it is imperative that the UN must reflect those changes to maintain
its representative character and moral strength. The struggle is on between
those who wish to perpetuate their privileged positions and the forces of
change that cannot but win. But no one can predict the time and nature of
revolutions. They have their own logic and time.
The question today is not whether
change is needed, but whether the provisions of the very Charter that
established the institution can bring about a real change. If history is any
guide, major changes take place when the time is ripe, in unexpected ways,
regardless of the strength of those who seek change and those who resist. The
provisions of the law that seek to protect the establishment will be thrown to
the winds and the old system will yield place to the new. A Malayalam poet
declared many years ago: “Change your out dated laws, if not, they will change
you yourselves.” We have many examples in history to show that those who have
conceded changes have lasted longer than those who have resisted the forces of
change.
India was among those who lit the
first spark of inevitable change, back in 1979, at the height of the cold war,
when an item entitled “Equitable representation on and increase in the
membership of the Security Council” was inscribed on the agenda of the General
Assembly. The demand was to add a few more non-permanent members, on the simple
logic that the ratio between the strength of the General Assembly and that of
the Security Council should be maintained. The exponential increase in the
membership of the UN should be reflected in the size of the Security Council.
This principle was, in fact, followed in 1965 when the number of non-permanent
members was raised from 6 to 10.
The reaction from the permanent
members was instant and shocking. In an unprecedented show of solidarity, they
opposed the move tooth and nail. They argued that any expansion of the Security
Council would undermine its efficiency, integrity and credibility and ensured
that the agenda item was postponed year after year, with a nominal and sterile
debate. The idea remained alive, but no action was taken till the end of the
cold war.
The game changed in the early
nineties, when the idea of adding new permanent members was brought up by
Brazil and we initiated the exercise of ascertaining the views of the members
and setting up a mechanism to study the proposals and to reach consensus. The
permanent members led by the US offered a “quick fix” after initial hesitation
and proposed the addition of Japan and Germany as permanent members on the
ground of their being the highest contributors to the UN budget after the US
and a marginal increase in the non-permanent membership. If India had not
stopped the “quick fix” and insisted on comprehensive reform with the support
of the nonaligned group, the door for expansion would have been closed after
inducting Japan and Germany at that time. We demolished the payment argument by
stating that permanent membership should not be up for sale. If I may be
permitted to quote from my own speech at the Working Group in February 1995,
“Contribution to the UN should not be measured in terms of money. We do not
agree with the view expressed by a delegation that permanent membership is a
privilege that can be purchased. Financial contributions are determined on the
basis of “capacity to pay” and those who pay their assessments, however small,
are no whit less qualified for privilege than the major contributors.”
As a lethargic debate went on in
the Working Group for years, national positions evolved and loyalties changed,
but it became clear that the expansion of the Security Council could not be
easily accomplished. The formation of an interest group called the “Coffee
Club” and later “Uniting for Consensus” which opposed any expansion of the
permanent membership made the situation more chaotic. We ourselves advanced our
position from seeking to establish criteria, such as population, seminal
contribution to the UN, participation in peacekeeping operations etc to staking
a claim and began campaigning bilaterally in capitals. Over the years, our
claim became strong and it became universally recognized that if a single
developing country were to become a permanent member, that would be India. One
adverse consequence of the debate, however, was that the discussions
highlighted that a vast majority of member states had not served even once on
the Security Council, while countries like India, Japan, Pakistan and Egypt had
served on the Council several times. This led to our long absence from the
Council from 1993 to 2010 after having been elected as a non-permanent member 7
times in the earlier period.
Efforts made outside the Working
Group were also fruitless. After the deliberations of a High Level Group,
Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed two Plans; Plan A, proposing creation of
6 permanent and 3 non-permanent seats and Plan B, proposing 8 new seats for 4
years subject to renewal and 1 non-permanent seat. The Plan B had greater
acceptability in the Group and it was at the insistence of Indian member of the
Group that Plan A was included. Another exercise undertaken by India, Brazil,
Germany and Japan (G-4) to get the General Assembly to adopt a resolution on
expansion failed to take off because of differences with the African Group. It,
however, resulted in the G-4 conceding for the first time that they would not
insist on the veto at least for 15 years. The General Assembly recently entered
intergovernmental negotiations to suggest a “timeline perspective” to agree on
reform in two stages on the basis of a draft text, but no progress has been reported
as yet. A move was initiated by the G-4 to introduce a resolution to decide
that both permanent and non-permanent membership will be expanded, but it did
not command majority support and was abandoned.
The only silver lining in our quest
for a permanent seat on the Security Council is that the need for expansion has
been recognized by the entire membership and that there is also recognition
that if the permanent membership is ever expanded, India will be the first
developing country to find a place in it. For the rest, there are almost as
many views as there are members of the UN about the size, composition and rights
and responsibilities of the members of the Security Council.
The framers of the UN Charter did
not intend that it should be amended easily. But that has not prevented the UN
from transforming itself to deal with new issues and new circumstances. Today’s
preoccupations of the UN like peacekeeping, human rights, environment, climate
change etc were not anticipated in the Charter. The flexibility and resilience
of the Charter have been tested again and again and nothing in the Charter has
prevented the UN from taking on new responsibilities and obligations. Charter
amendments have not been initiated even to remove anachronisms like the enemy
countries clause and the name of one of the permanent members. The most crucial
article of the Charter on the veto itself has been changed in practice as
abstention by a permanent member is considered a concurring vote. The proposals
for reform like the working methods of the Council introduced in the Working
Group from time to time are mere diversionary tactics as these can be adopted
without any amendment to the Charter. But when it comes to an expansion of the
Security Council, the only way is to bring a Charter amendment. This explains
why the only amendment of the Charter was made in 1965 to raise the number of
non-permanent members from 6 to 10 when the strength of the General Assembly
increased. The different groups of countries and entrenched interests are in no
mood to repeat the exercise, particularly if the permanent membership should be
touched.
The permanent members, for
instance, consider that they only stand to lose by adding new permanent members
with veto. They have made it clear that there is no question of veto being
extended to the new permanent members, even though some of them tactically
accept the African demand for veto. Even the UK, France and Russia, who have
extended support to India and others, have not taken any action to bring about
changes. One thing that France and the UK dread is the suggestion that the EU
should have only one representative, while they already have two inside and
another at the door. They are not willing to float a formula for expansion even
to set the ball rolling. The same is the case with many others, who have
pledged support to India and other candidates. In many cases, such support is
an easy gesture to win goodwill.
A major development in February
this year was the emergence of a draft resolution from the Caribbean Community,
which is nothing but a wish list of the aspirants to permanent membership as
well as of those who seek an expansion of the non-permanent membership. The
draft envisages a Security Council consisting of 11 permanent members with veto
and 16 non-permanent members. The additional seats will give two permanent
seats to Africa, two permanent seats to Asia, one permanent seat to Europe and
one permanent seat to Latin America. The G-4 has reason for joy about this
formula as it meets its own demand. Africa’s demand for two permanent seats has
also been met. But the permanent members, the Coffee Club and several
countries, which have championed the abolition of the veto will vigorously
oppose the Caricom draft. But if it can secure more than 128 votes in the
General Assembly, the pressure will increase on the permanent members to at
least offer an alternative formula and enter into serious negotiations in a new
forum as the present Intergovernmental Negotiations have reached a dead end.
But as it has happened in the past, the permanent five will try, by hook or by
crook, to stave off a vote on the Caricom draft in the General Assembly.
The US, which had supported Japan
and Germany in the early nineties, now favours “two or so” new permanent
members, including Japan and “2 or 3” non-permanent members making an addition
of only 5 more to the Security Council. Such a formula is a non-starter. The
support extended to India by President Obama during his visit to India is in
the form of a wish without a commitment to bring it about. His words were: “In
the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed Security Council that includes
India as a permanent member.” Though this is a significant departure from the
previous US position, it is not enough for the US to extend support to India;
it should shape a formula, which is acceptable to the membership. Its reservation
over Germany and Brazil will itself deprive it of being decisive on the issue
of expansion.
We did not need Wikileaks to find
the reasons for the reluctance of the US to bring about expansion of the
Council. But we now have it in black and white what we knew from the beginning.
“We believe expansion of the Council along the lines of the models currently
discussed will dilute US influence in the body…..On most important issues of
the day—Sanctions, Human Rights, Middle East etc---Brazil, India and most African
states are currently far less sympathetic to our views than our European
allies”, said the US Ambassador in a cable in December 2007. The US delegation
at the UN seems to have only a watching brief till intervention becomes
necessary to prevent an expansion that will not serve US interests. A special
report of the Council on Foreign Relations which has urged the President to do
so makes the expansion contingent on demonstration of the qualifications of
permanent membership. The position of the aspirants on non-proliferation,
climate change and human rights will be subject to scrutiny. The Caricom draft
will electrify the US delegation into action against it as it flies in the face
of the US position.
China is opposed explicitly to
Japan and implicitly to India, though it pays lip service to developing
countries’ representation on the Council. Its position could be decisive as the
permanent members will coordinate their positions before any advance is made. France,
UK and Russia are not likely to support the draft, despite their declared
support for a modest expansion, including recognition of India’s credentials
for permanent membership.
It is clear that it will be
difficult to accomplish the fundamental change we are seeking by way of the
procedure laid down for change. Like it happened in the case of the formation
of G-20 when G-8 could not resolve the unprecedented economic crisis, a
situation may arise when the P-5 find it difficult to maintain international
peace and security without additional permanent members and thus force their
hands to accept change. Such an ominous future was predicted by the President
of the General Assembly, when he said on May 16, 2011, “Unless we find the
determination to advance on the issue, the UN will lose its credibility. Our
organization will be marginalized and important issues will be discussed in
other forums and groupings, which are perceived to be more efficient and more
representative of the new realities of the day.” Such a situation may arise
sooner than later and that gives us reason for hope.
India and the other aspirants for
permanent membership, in the meantime, must maintain pressure for expansion.
But to give the impression that permanent membership is the holy grail of
Indian foreign policy does not enhance our prestige. Legend has it that India
spurned an offer to take over China’s permanent seat on the Security Council,
saying that we would win it in our own right one day. That position has won us
more glory than what we have gained by our constant knocking at all doors.
Making support for our permanent membership the litmus test of bilateral
relations is untenable. We should appear more confident and secure even as we
demand our rightful place in keeping with our status as the largest democracy
with a dynamic, fast growing economy, an impressive record in UN peacekeeping,
ability to protect the global commons and to combat transnational terrorism and
strong record against proliferation.
Without appearing to spurn the
proverbial “sour grapes”, we should acknowledge that that permanent membership
without veto is not such an attractive trophy that we should expend unlimited
resources and energy on it. As it happened during our recent term as a
non-permanent member, India will be called upon to take sides on every issue in
the world, sometimes losing friends in the process, as we are fiercely
independent and do not play second fiddle to anyone. The lack of the veto may
make us vulnerable as a result, if issues of crucial importance to us come up
in the Council. India has been playing a significant role even without being on
the Security Council for many years. A posture of our willingness to serve when
required to do so rather than being desperate about securing a seat here and
now may be a good strategy to adopt. The UN needs reform not to make one
country or the other happy, but to make itself more relevant, credible and
effective in the world and it will be ready for a revolution sooner rather than
later.
Thank you.