Foreign
Policy: More Continuity than Change
(The Indian Express)
By
T.P.Sreenivasan
Aspirants
to the post of National Security Adviser, numbering as many as the Prime
Ministerial candidates, may be burning the midnight oil to fashion foreign
policy and security strategies for their masters. They may have many ideas to
revamp policy, reshape institutions, including the Indian Foreign Service, and to
open new chapters in relations with the neighbours and major powers. They will
invent catchy phrases and innovative concepts to be flaunted at press
conferences. But once the initial euphoria is over and the new Government
settles down to business, it is likely to be continuity rather than change. it would
be old wine, even if it is in a new bottle.
No
Government makes foreign policy in solitary splendor. In fact, the concept of
independent foreign policy itself is misleading, as it should suit not only the
originator, but also its “consumers”, who are independent countries themselves,
with their own strategic priorities. Constant changes will be needed in foreign
policy to resonate with others. Totally unexpected events may overturn
carefully crafted policies overnight. The broad policies and strategy, outlined
by any Government will not be different from the traditional foreign policy,
which has enjoyed general consensus. Here, the insights, judgments and
instincts of professional diplomats will prevail, as has been seen at the time
of changes in the past.
The
announcement by the Morarji Government of “genuine nonalignment” and the Vajpayee
Government of nuclear weapon status for the country are being pointed out as
instances of fundamental changes brought about by new Governments in their
initial stages. But neither of these was fundamental or unanticipated. “Genuine
nonalignment” simply meant distancing the country from the Soviet Union, but
the Government soon discovered the true extent of our involvement with the
Soviet Union and quietly went about its business with the Soviet Union as
usual. Morarji went to Moscow to dilute the relationship with Moscow, but came
back even without disowning the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
The
nuclear tests of 1998 were not made in a day. Successive governments, right
from the days of Pandit Nehru, had maintained the nuclear option and made heavy
investments in explosive technology. The experiment in 1974 was nothing short
of a step towards weaponisation. It is very well known that P.V.Narasimha Rao
had scheduled tests and pulled back for fear of economic sanctions. The timing
of the tests in 1998 was determined more by the international situation arising
out of the provisions of the CTBT than by any ideology. India chose to face
sanctions after testing rather than face them for not signing the CTBT. The
main proponents of the test were Brajesh Mishra and K.Subrahmanyam, who were
strategists, not politicians. The fact that the subsequent Governments endorsed
the tests is enough proof of continuity in nuclear policy. Rumors about the possibility
of a new Government reviewing India’s non-first use doctrine provoked
widespread reaction from strategists. The proposal appears to have been dropped.
Practical
matters, rather than ideology, have determined our relations with our
neighbours, including Pakistan. Changes in policy were triggered by negative
reaction from our neighbours. Every possibility has been explored in different
shades of our policy ranging from the tough Indira doctrine to the soft Gujral
doctrine. No Government has advocated war as an option against Pakistan. The
Kargil war came after the biggest peace offensive by the Vajpayee Government
and, with all its tough talk, the Indian side refrained from crossing the Line
of Control. A new Government may criticize Manmohan Singh’s “extra mile”
policy, but it will not go beyond reciprocity, as war is no option between the
two nuclear-armed neighbours.
Changes
in nuances in Sri Lanka policy will depend on where the two Kazhagams will
stand in the new dispensation. But even if a Prime Minister emerges from those
two parties, there will only be war of words, not intervention on behalf of the
Tamils. India has tried every trick in the book from equipping the LTTE to fighting
it. New initiatives are hard to find when the Sri Lankan Government believes
that it has solved the Tamil issue. The case is not dissimilar with the other
neighbours. The more concessions we give, the more will be asked for, the more
we deny, the more blackmailing will be resorted to. We shall see more of the same
pressures and pulls under any Government in Delhi.
The
Vajpayee Cabinet had at least one member, who characterized China as “enemy
number one”. Vajpayee himself took Bill Clinton into confidence about the
threat from China. But the same Government sought a strategic dialogue with
China. Manmohan Singh has dealt with China with restraint despite provocations
on the logic that China is too big to threaten India. The dragon may well have
become vegetarian to make its rise peaceful. No political party has an
alternate formula for China. A new Government may give defence preparedness
more stress, but it will not be more assertive with China than its predecessor.
The
relations with the US will be high priority for any Government, even the
present one, if it comes back to power. It will look urgently into the points
of irritation, but it will find soon that the issues are intractable. The
grievances that the US has against India, like the nuclear liability act, the
fighter aircraft issue and liberalization of the economy to protect the US
interests are not easy to deal with. But friendly gestures in Asia Pacific,
such as joint exercises with the US, Japan and Australia will offer sufficient
compensation for the US. A new Government will have the advantage of being able
to distance itself from the Khobragade fiasco and begin relations afresh. But
any Government, even with participation of the left, will work hard to improve
relations with the only Super Power.
Indications
of institutional changes, hinted by some political parties, betray lack of
insight. Diplomats have been handling economic and trade issues for years, but
merging the External Affairs Ministry with the Trade Ministry will have adverse
implications for both. Long term policy planning and strategic thinking, which,
according to some American scholars, are lacking in India, will be tried, but
soon routine issues will once again dominate foreign relations. No one disputes
assigning a greater role for military leaders in policy and doctrines, but equally
important is the civilian control of defence. Regional satraps may become
prominent if we get a multiparty coalition, but they will not be allowed to
dabble in foreign policy beyond a point.
Change
will be part of the agenda of any Government that comes to power in India later
this month. A dream foreign policy that enhances India’s power and prestige
will be part of it. But, as Barrack Obama found out in the US, the power to
change is not limitless, especially in foreign policy. Moreover, the wish lists
that they will have to deal with domestically will be enormous and pressing. After
the initial declarations of innovative policies potential policy makers will be
hatching now, the new Government will reconcile themselves to the realities. It
is likely to focus on the primary purpose of foreign policy, which is to ensure
peaceful domestic development. The devil in the detail may change colours, but
the framework will be hard to change.
