The Hindu Lead article on IOZOP

Opinion » Lead

December 16, 2014

Updated: December 16, 2014 01:11 IST

New wars on the Cold War relic

T. P. Sreenivasa

Revisiting the Indian Ocean zone of peace concept, which has led to long debates since 1971, may prove hazardous in the present context, because the rivalry that is taking shape in the region is between the U.S. and its allies, and China.

The National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval, has sought to revisit the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2832 (XXVI) declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and which has called upon the great powers not to allow an escalation and an expansion of military presence in the Indian Ocean. (The Hindu, December 1, 2014). The expectation is that it can be used as a device to prevent China from holding sway in the Indian Ocean.

While the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP), in its original form, appears relevant in the present context, the innumerable problems India has faced on account of the resolution and the U.N. Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean must be recalled before we take any formal initiative in this regard. Sri Lanka, our comrade in arms in the IOZOP initiative, has played games with us even in the happier days of India-Sri Lanka relations and when China was not in the picture. The new narrative in the Indo-Pacific may not be congenial to depending on Sri Lanka or any other neighbour to deliver on the IOZOP in accordance with our interests.

The formulation
The idea of IOZOP goes back to the days of the 1964 Cairo Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, which had expressed concern over the efforts of the imperialists to establish bases in the Indian Ocean and declared that the Indian Ocean should not be a battleground for the big powers. The Lusaka Declaration (1970) refined the idea further and it led to the UNGA resolution, which proposed the IOZOP strictly in the context of the raging Cold War at that time.

The UNGA resolution said: “the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor adjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all times as a zone of peace”. It went on to define the zone of peace not as one where there was an absence of war or of a state of peace and tranquillity, but specifically about the great powers halting and eliminating all bases, military installations and logistical facilities, and the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It also envisaged universal collective security in the region without military alliances. Ships would have the right to unimpeded use of the zone, except warships posing a threat to the littoral and hinterland states of the region.

In subsequent years, in the Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which was set up under the aegis of the U.N. disarmament machinery, the concept divided rather than united permanent members and the littoral and hinterland states. The permanent members, except China, did not support the original resolution. France, the United States and the United Kingdom kept out of the committee as they felt that they had been directly targeted and the Soviet Union had participated in the work of the committee, paying lip service to the notion of a zone of peace. Australia was the spokesperson of the West, which raised questions on the feasibility of the elimination of foreign military presence.

Regional interpretations
Till the end of the Cold War, India stuck to the purist interpretation of the zone as an area free of foreign military presence, particularly bases and other facilities, conceived in the context of great power rivalry. Implicitly, India did not object to the movement of warships, as long as they did not threaten the regional states. Indira Gandhi reiterated this position at a press conference in Moscow, making the Soviet presence legitimate, even though there were reports that the Soviet Union was seeking to establish bases in Somalia and elsewhere.

“The innumerable problems India has faced on account of the U.N. resolution and the U.N. Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean must be recalled before we take any formal initiative in this regard.”

After a meeting of the littoral and hinterland states in 1979, India became acutely aware of a hidden agenda on the part of Sri Lanka and others to draw attention to the increasing strength of India, posing a threat to the smaller states in the region. Sri Lanka was not loath to have an American presence in the Indian Ocean as a stabilising factor. President Jayewardene said at one point that he did not know whether Sri Lanka wanted the Americans to get out of the Indian Ocean and even hinted that the interests of regional countries differed.

Pakistan began to emphasise “denuclearization” of the Indian Ocean after the Indian tests of 1974 and took the initiative of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia, which was strongly opposed by India. The polarisation was palpable in the Adhoc Committee. Consequently, the possibility of a Colombo Conference to implement the Declaration became remote. India did not find it helpful to hold the Colombo conference without the participation of the great powers. Nor did India participate fully in the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC) on the plea that it detracted from the concept of the zone of peace by inviting the great powers to it.

A fallout of the debate in the Indian Ocean Committee was that India and Australia had become antagonistic to each other. Australia began complaining about the growth of the Indian Navy and also countered India at disarmament forums, particularly at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations. At one point, K. Subrahmanyam maintained that the confrontation in the Indian Ocean should be treated as being triangular rather than bipolar as he felt that the military presence of the super powers was directed against the autonomy of the Non-Aligned countries.

China had taken a position of tactical support to the zone, as its presence in the Indian Ocean was not in focus. As a proclaimed supporter of the developing countries, China expressed solidarity for the littoral and hinterland states in seeking to eliminate foreign military presence. The focus on the Indian capabilities, which emerged in this context, was also a welcome development for China. It claimed legitimacy for itself as a permanent member of the Security Council and as an Asian power.

Shift in focus
After the end of the Cold War, the dynamics in the Committee underwent a sea change, with India itself shifting the focus of the zone of peace from the elimination of foreign military presence to one of cooperation between the major powers and the littoral and hinterland states. The debate became increasingly an embarrassed ritualisation of the demilitarisation effort. India’s joint exercises in the Ocean with multiple partners legitimised the presence of various navies including that of the U.S.

The Adhoc Committee soldiered on without a particular focus, merely recalling the old resolution and emphasising the need for the permanent members and major maritime users to join in an effort to bring about a balance in the Indian Ocean. From an arena of the Cold War, the Committee became ritualistic without a clear focus or agenda. Naturally, new threats, such as piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking, etc were brought in, making it a forum to combat non-state actors rather than the great powers.

Revisiting the zone of peace concept, which has led to the long debates since 1971 may prove hazardous in the present context, because the rivalry that is taking shape in the region is between the U.S. and its allies, and China. With the kind of support China demonstrated in Kathmandu among the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries, it is possible that the zone of peace idea will turn into a move to counter the U.S. as a foreign presence and to seek some balance between India and China in the Indian Ocean. China might well gain a status similar to India and strengthen its capabilities there. International focus on India’s naval acquisitions, present and future, may well become counterproductive. According to Admiral Arun Prakash, there are not many navies, worldwide, which have seen, in recent years, or are likely to see such significant accretions to their order-of-battle. “This force build-up, once complete, will not only enhance the Navy’s combat capability by an order of magnitude, but would also alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.”

A way out
The greatest resistance to the revival of the IOZOP will come from those who will argue that the idea itself is outdated as the Cold War and great power rivalry are non-existent. They are likely to remind us that we ourselves had stressed the Cold War angle more than anything else. Others will begin highlighting the spirit of cooperation that has dawned in the Indian Ocean and lamenting that India is reviving old ghosts. The U.S. may also look at the concept negatively as it will impinge on its own activities. China will marshal support to campaign against the concept of the zone, from which they are sought to be excluded. In other words, a new IOZOP will have even less chance of success than the old one.

A strategy of enhancing cooperation between the littoral and hinterland states and external powers without the reference to the IOZOP may have a greater chance of success. India has special strengths in combating piracy, alleviating natural disasters and trafficking. The involvement of the U.S. in fighting terrorism may be of an advantage. China has already taken note of India’s inclinations in the Asia-Pacific and offered cooperation to avoid the “Asia Pivot” and to adopt an alternative Chinese vision. An opportunity exists for us to develop a third plan of engagement between the regional countries and external forces for fruitful cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

(T.P. Sreenivasan was India’s representative to the U.N. Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean from 1980 to 1983 and from 1992 to 1995)

Climate Change Remarks

Chairman’s remarks by Former Ambassador T. P. Sreenivasan at the inaugural session of the Seminar on Climate Change: Extreme Events and Environmental Resilience. Sharing Experiences for Sustainable Development. December 15, 2014.

Distinguished Panelists and participants,

I have a suspicion that I have been invited to chair this session, which focuses on disaster prevention because of the perception that higher education is the biggest disaster in the state. I do not think that higher education is a disaster, but I have discovered that we need to have four “M”s to deal with the problems in higher education, Motivation, Mobility, Mindset and Money. Perhaps they are equally relevant in climate change and disaster mitigation.

I would like to believe, however, that I am here because of my long association with environmental issues at the UN between 1972 and 1995. As you know, it was Indira Gandhi, who established the link between environment and development at the Stockholm conference in 1972. Although our focus today is not on international negotiations, it is useful to know what is happening in international fora as a backdrop to this discussion. The Lima Conference of Parties (COP) of the Climate Change Convention concluded yesterday “successfully”. As you know, no conference fails at the UN as a last minute compromise is always arrived at. What happened in Lama was merely a postponement of the crucial issues, which could not be resolved. The major issues like “common but differentiated responsibilities”, mandatory reduction of emissions, per capita emissions and funding are merely forwarded to the Paris Conference next year.

The Rio consensus, Kyoto Protocol etc were almost abandoned in Copenhagen and the recent understanding between the US and China augurs a new approach in which there will be no mandatory cuts. Each country will submit its own mitigation plan to ensure that the average temperature of the earth does not go beyond 2 degrees Celsius. From now on, it will be a different ball game in climate change negotiations and there will not be much of a contribution from the developed countries to the developing ones.

It is encouraging that several SAARC countries are represented here. The recent summit in Kathmandu has exposed the chinks in the armor of SAARC. We do not even know whether SAARC in the present form will survive for long. But climate change and disaster prevention are areas in which there is potential for cooperation either with or without Pakistan. I welcome the delegates from SAARC countries.

Our session is meant to share experiences of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh and India. We have highly qualified and eminent people from these countries on the panel and I am sure that we will benefit immensely from this session.

Thank you.

Maritime Security

Maritime Security

(Talking points of Former Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan at the Seminar at Pondicherry University on December 9, 2014)

A few million Indians have never seen the snow. Many more have not seen the sea. One reason why maritime security has not received much attention is that policy is made in land locked Delhi by those who have not seen the sea, or at least not lived on the seashore. Only those who live near the sea can fully comprehend the vulnerabilities as well as the strengths of the sea. A Defense Minister of India is believed to have stated that he would deploy the navy in Jammu and Kashmir, if necessary.

Another reason for neglecting maritime security is the historical fact that most of the invaders, marauders and plunderers came by land. Though the arrivals from the sea have been equally game changing for India, they did not meet resistance because they used soft power to penetrate into India. They used trade, religion and philanthropy to gain influence and power. Therefore, the threat from the west and the north is more palpable and appears more urgent. It was only the Maharaja of Travancore, who chose to fight the Dutch and defeat them, the only case of India beating a European power at sea. Interestingly, the defeated Dutch commander became the commander of the Travancore navy. Sardar K.M.Panikkar, another Keralite, had sounded a clear warning in 1945: “While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the oceanic areas, to India, it is the vital sea. Her future is dependenton the freedom of its waters.”

Needless to say, there has been a sea change in the way we look at the sea today, particularly after the focus shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The accentuating rivalry between the US and China has compelled us to give greater attention to the Indian Ocean. According to Admiral Arun Prakash, there are not many navies, worldwide, which have seen, in recent years, or are likely to see such significant accretions to their order-of-battle. “This force build-up, once complete, will not only enhance the Navy’s combat capability by an order of magnitude, but would also alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.” But he goes on to say that expansion of the navy alone does not ensure maritime security. Equally important are industry, trade, indigenization of weapons based on a vast defense technology and industrial base.
The other speakers must have touched upon the various aspects of maritime security. My voice is one from the past, having been out of touch with policy making for nearly ten years. To make a contribution to this debate I thought I needed to share some relevant experience. An opportunity presented itself when I heard some talk of India revisiting the UN General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) declaring the Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace (IOZOP), which called upon great powers not to allow escalation and expansion of military presence in the Indian Ocean. The expectation is that it can be used as a device to prevent China from holding sway in the Indian Ocean.

Having been a member of the UN Adhoc Committee on the Indian Ocean for six years during and after the cold war I would like to refer to the problems India faced on account of the resolution and the UN Adhoc Committee. Sri Lanka, our comrade in arms in the IOZOP initiative had played games with us even in the happier days in India-Sri Lanka relations and when China was not in the picture. The new narrative in the Indo-Pacific may not be congenial to depending on Sri Lanka or any other neighbor to deliver on the IOZOP in accordance with our interests.

Instead of reviving the IOZOP concept, a strategy of enhancing cooperation between the littoral and hinterland states and external powers may have a greater chance of success. India has special strengths in combating piracy, alleviating natural disasters and trafficking.

China has already taken note of India’s inclinations in Asia Pacific and offered cooperation to avoid the “Asia Pivot” and to adopt an alternative Chinese vision. An opportunity exists for us to develop a third plan of engagement between the regional countries and external forces for fruitful cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

The importance of maritime security has come to focus, but much more remains to be done for India to be a leader than a follower of competing interests.

Thank you.

  

SAARC Summit Kathmandu

A summit Modi could have done without

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November 28, 2014 15:31 IST

'Pakistan's negativism should be seen as the reason for India losing interest in SAARC,' says Ambassador T P Sreenivasan.

Image: Prime Minister Narendra Modi ignores Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at the SAARC summit in Kathmandu.
Photograph: PTI

From choosing November 26 to commence a SAARC summit, to not knowing the likely outcome of India's initiative in a small group of countries, to not anticipating the pressure building up in favour of China's membership, everything went wrong for India at the Kathmandu summit.
The reverberations of gunfire across the border and the encounter with Pakistani terrorists were audible in the conference hall, preventing the prime ministers of India and Pakistan from shaking hands or even smiling at each other.
The net result was a further deterioration in India-Pakistan relations and an unnecessary confrontation with China on the issue of its status in SAARC.
This was a summit India could have done without.
Another year of waiting would not have made any difference to SAARC or to India's relations with its member nations.

The kind of optimism expressed by politicians and former diplomats alike even a few days before the commencement of the summit was astonishing. They betrayed a lack of appreciation of the history of SAARC and the obvious built-in impediments to its success.
The Gujral Doctrine, which was acknowledged as a failure, was virtually resurrected by the argument that India had to define its role, from seeking reciprocity in bilateral relations to being prepared to go the extra mile in meeting the aspirations of all the other SAARC nations.
To ask for a conflict-mediating or conflict-resolving institution on multilateral and bilateral issues is nothing short of suicidal.
Equally unrealistic was the suggestion that the time was opportune for a new regional architecture and that the time had come to reconnect with India's neighbours. The Indian resource position is not so robust that India could invest in SAARC as Germany did in the European Union.
India has never been unsympathetic to the aspirations of its neighbours. Therefore, advice that India must build trust with its neighbours, showing solidarity and forging with them a habit of cooperation, seems unwarranted. There are many instances of India bending backwards to satisfy its smaller neighbours. Kachativu and Teen Bigha are obvious concessions we made for friendship.
The sense of optimism that India could work with SAARC countries to alleviate poverty and build a coalition to advance Indian interests, which characterised the initiatives of the Modi government from day one, has already been proved wrong.
Nawaz Sharif's visit was followed by a sharp deterioration of relations, leading to heavy firing across the border and encounters with terrorists. The display of animosity between India and Pakistan in New York cast a shadow on both countries.
Under the circumstances, a SAARC summit was doomed to fail. To expect that Pakistan would accept Indian initiatives on energy and road and railways at this time was incorrigible optimism.

Image: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi during Xi's visit to India in September.
Photograph: MEA/Flickr

The claim that the summit enabled India to isolate Pakistan is false. The normal reaction of all countries, particularly our neighbours, to an India-Pakistan confrontation is to become peacemakers, not to take sides. The greatest favour that they show to us is to say that all matters should be resolved bilaterally.
The Nepalese prime minister, enthused as the host to ensure the success of the summit, pushed the two sides to compromise, not to find fault with either.
The spectacle of Indian and Pakistan leaders avoiding each other amused the others, even after the 32 second handshake and the acceptance by Pakistan of the energy agreement. In fact, India was on the edge of isolation when the other seven showed willingness to accept China as a member.
The suggestion that India should promote SAARC minus Pakistan is impossible. SAARC has been established on the basis that every decision has to be by consensus, not by vote.
Although this provision was made at India's behest in the first instance, the others will quote the same provision to prevent a break-up.
The point to note about SAARC is that it is the sum total of India's bilateral relations with the other countries, though it has a multilateral flavor. The clout that we had with them has been reduced, with the emergence of China as alternate source of strength and money.
The ambition of the founder of SAARC, Zia-ur Rehman, was not to forge a genuinely multilateral organisation, but to create a front to extract concessions from India and that was the reason why Indira Gandhi resisted it as long as she could. Today, SAARC is moving in the direction that its founder had set for it.
Kathmandu showed for the first time that India cannot keep China out of SAARC for long even if we argue that China is not a South Asian country. The moment China enters SAARC, the Indian role will change dramatically. This is another reason why we should gradually reduce the central role of SAARC in South Asia.
The association is not of any particular importance to us in cultivating our neighbours and Pakistan's negativism should be seen by the countries concerned as the reason for India losing interest in SAARC. In a sense, we do not have a major stake in projecting SAARC as a viable regional forum.
Prime Minister Modi has done well to signal in Kathmandu that we will work with our neighbours, regardless of SAARC. Unless Pakistan sees the economic compulsions of a regional organisation to tone down their political animosity towards India, our focus should not be on SAARC, but on the individual South Asian States.
There, the competition will be with China and not with Pakistan and it will be an uphill task. But, with Pakistan out of the game, we may have a better chance to build partnerships with the others.
As to the question whether the prime minister's vision of SAARC is turning out to be an illusion, it should be admitted that it is indeed so. It is time for him to play down the importance of SAARC and reach out farther for strategic partnerships.
His success with the United States, Japan, Australia and even the South Pacific states is encouraging. He should recognise the inherent weaknesses and dangers of SAARC and devise an alternative strategy to deal with his neighbours.
T P Sreenivasan is a former Ambassador of India and Governor for India at the IAEA; Executive Vice-Chairman, Kerala State Higher Education Council and Director General, Kerala International Centre.
You can read Ambassador Sreenivasan's earlier columns here.

T P Sreenivasan