A tale of two deals
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“Iran’s new economic freedom and consequential prosperity will propel it
to the forefront of the region. It may even become a partner of the
U.S. and others in their battle against the Caliphate.” Picture shows
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (left) speaking with Hossein
Fereydoun (centre), the brother of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and
Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (right) in Austria.
The Iran deal marked a new beginning in Iran-U.S. relations, while the India deal was a culmination of a process of rapprochement
The finalisation of the P-5+1-Iran nuclear deal coincided with the tenth
anniversary of the India-U.S. nuclear deal by sheer chance. But the two
deals, which came ten years apart, reveal American strategy to deal
with nuclear proliferation in two distinct situations and two different
times. The U.S. appeared to make concessions in both cases, but the
deals served their immediate strategic interests.
The objective was to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle in both
cases, though it looked positive in the case of India and negative in
the case of Iran. The U.S. was alarmed by the weapon tests of India in
1998 even more than the revelation in 2002 of Iran’s nuclear activities.
Imposition of sanctions against India and Iran were swift and severe,
once it became clear that India would not sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Iran would not abandon enrichment.
Crippling sanctions
The position of strength the U.S. had in both cases derived from the crippling sanctions that India and Iran feared, though in the case of India, the sanctions had disappeared for extraneous reasons even before the negotiations on the deal began. The sanctions were, however, hanging over the head of Jaswant Singh when he negotiated with Strobe Talbott for two years, which actually led to the India-U.S. nuclear deal. Of course, Jaswant Singh pretended that sanctions were not an issue, but Talbott was very specific about the benchmarks to be reached for sanctions to be lifted. Had 26/11 not intervened, sanctions would have been the central issue of the India-U.S. nuclear deal also.
The position of strength the U.S. had in both cases derived from the crippling sanctions that India and Iran feared, though in the case of India, the sanctions had disappeared for extraneous reasons even before the negotiations on the deal began. The sanctions were, however, hanging over the head of Jaswant Singh when he negotiated with Strobe Talbott for two years, which actually led to the India-U.S. nuclear deal. Of course, Jaswant Singh pretended that sanctions were not an issue, but Talbott was very specific about the benchmarks to be reached for sanctions to be lifted. Had 26/11 not intervened, sanctions would have been the central issue of the India-U.S. nuclear deal also.
Sitting next to the Iranian Ambassador in the Board of Governors in the
early stages of the Iran issue at the IAEA from 2002 to 2004, this
writer was aware that Iran’s aspiration was to acquire the status of
pre-1998 India. That was the time when India had an ambivalent position
on its nuclear capability, with the option of weaponisation. Iran was
aware that the major difference between the two countries was that India
was not a signatory to the NPT, but expected that it could make up for
it by hide-and- seek. Iran expressed readiness to allow inspection of
their facilities, but each time the inspectors came back with more
questions than answers. The IAEA concluded that there was “something
rotten in the state of Denmark” but could not locate the source of the
stench.
Iran realized that the game was up when the matter went to the UN
Security Council, with the support of India, which was in the middle of
the negotiations for its own deal with the United States. Though the
Indian vote was in keeping with the position that India had taken since
2002, it was believed that the Indian vote was cast at the instance of
the United States. The subsequent massive sanctions and the dire
situation of the Iranian economy forced Iran to take the bitter medicine
of curtailing its nuclear activities to revitalize its economy.
In the case of India, the negotiations were between two countries, which
had a long history of engagement, though occasionally estranged. The
George W. Bush Administration was merely taking the “next steps” in a
strategic partnership established by the Clinton Administration. In the
case of Iran, it was a matter of breaking the ice and proceeding to
negotiate a deal, which was hard for a proud nation to swallow. The
trust deficit was so great that every detail had to be worked out with
sufficient safeguards.
In the case of India, the U.S. was confident enough to accept the
reality of its nuclear capability and seek limitations only in the
future development of nuclear weapons. In the case of Iran, the effort
was to halt and roll back the capability that Iran could acquire.
Liberated
Ten years down the line, the India-U.S. nuclear deal looks like a major concession to India, without any concomitant benefits to the U.S. But at the time of the negotiations, there were multiple levels of political dialogue at the levels of Governments, the U.S. Congress and the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, all aimed at tying India in knots. The Hyde Act appeared to circumscribe not only India’s nuclear ambitions, but also its foreign policy itself. But today, India remains unaffected by the political restraints imposed on it. Even after problems arose in nuclear trade between the U.S. and India, there is little acrimony between them on the provisions of the deal. The deal liberated India from the shackles of being a non-signatory of the NPT.
Ten years down the line, the India-U.S. nuclear deal looks like a major concession to India, without any concomitant benefits to the U.S. But at the time of the negotiations, there were multiple levels of political dialogue at the levels of Governments, the U.S. Congress and the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, all aimed at tying India in knots. The Hyde Act appeared to circumscribe not only India’s nuclear ambitions, but also its foreign policy itself. But today, India remains unaffected by the political restraints imposed on it. Even after problems arose in nuclear trade between the U.S. and India, there is little acrimony between them on the provisions of the deal. The deal liberated India from the shackles of being a non-signatory of the NPT.
In a sense, the deal has liberated Iran from the threats of war and
crippling sanctions, without having to abandon its nuclear programme
altogether. It is more transformational to the region and the world than
the India deal. Iran’s new economic freedom and consequential
prosperity will propel it to the forefront of the region, posing a
challenge to Saudi Arabia and others. It may even become a partner of
the United States and others in their battle against the Islamic State.
The Iran deal marked a new beginning in Iran-U.S. relations, while the
India deal was a culmination of a process of rapproachment.
The nuclear opening that India gained by the U.S.-India deal fell short
of expectations because of the Civil Nuclear Liability Law and the
Fukushima disaster, but it played a role in the emergence of India as an
economic power. In the case of Iran, the deal will be more
transformational for the country and game changing for the world.
(T.P. Sreenivasan is a former Ambassador of India and Governor for India of the IAEA.)
