Updated: October 28, 2015 22:34 IST
Salesmanship as statesmanship
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PTIA screen displays PM Modi’s speech at Madison Square Garden in New York recently. A close study of the choice of countries Mr. Modi has visited and the speeches he has made would reveal that his strategy is that of a pragmatic businessman who will make deals for his benefit, but the moment the profit dwindles, he will go in search of new clients. -
T.P. SREENIVASAN
From non-alignment, under which India acted without any specific agenda for itself, we have reached a stage of pragmatic alignment, where we view relationships through the prism of ‘profits’. Can a foreign policy solely based on perceived returns, without a global vision, be beneficial in the long run?
To characterise the foreign policy of the most peripatetic Indian Prime
Minister as ‘nationalist’ may appear contradictory. The popular demand
today is that he should be in India more often, to deal with the crying
needs of the country. He is selective in his eloquence on domestic
issues, but he is opening out his heart to foreign audiences.
He is seen more in the company of foreign leaders, not only political
leaders, but also leaders in technology, finance and economics. But the
core of his agenda is domestic, not international. His arena is international, but his concerns are domestic.
The transformation of India’s foreign policy from an ‘internationalist’
one to a ‘nationalist’ one may well have begun after Jawaharlal Nehru
and V.K. Krishna Menon. Domestic preoccupations were brought to centre
stage, though the old tradition of engagement in world affairs remained
alive. The torrent of international issues — such as the conflicts in
Indo-China and Korea, the Suez Canal crisis and even the conflict in
Austria — in all of which India played a role without any specific
agenda for itself, became a trickle.
T. P. Sreenivasan
Perhaps our early day interventions happened because of the activism of
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which pronounced itself on every major
international issue in its declarations. By shaping those
pronouncements, mainly by balancing and moderating them, India found
fulfilment in playing its international role. It did not find it
necessary to take initiatives to resolve disputes or avert conflicts,
except in its own neighbourhood. Our insistence on bilateralism in
resolving issues may also have been an inhibiting factor.
From international to regional
In the post-Cold War era, India’s internationalism began to be confined to regional and other groupings, most of them economic. Concerns about the protection of the global commons, such as the environment, assumed importance. We began looking at protecting our own interests, taking positions like ‘no mandatory reduction of green house gases for the developing countries’. We realised that our interests coincided with those of the great powers and the large developing countries like Brazil and even China. Copenhagen was a real turning point in our environment policy when we virtually disowned the Kyoto Protocol except in name. Our nuclear tests in 1998 and the subsequent nuclear deal with the United States left India with no like-minded countries in disarmament. It was the arm-twisting by the U.S. that made the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) provide us an exemption.
In the post-Cold War era, India’s internationalism began to be confined to regional and other groupings, most of them economic. Concerns about the protection of the global commons, such as the environment, assumed importance. We began looking at protecting our own interests, taking positions like ‘no mandatory reduction of green house gases for the developing countries’. We realised that our interests coincided with those of the great powers and the large developing countries like Brazil and even China. Copenhagen was a real turning point in our environment policy when we virtually disowned the Kyoto Protocol except in name. Our nuclear tests in 1998 and the subsequent nuclear deal with the United States left India with no like-minded countries in disarmament. It was the arm-twisting by the U.S. that made the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) provide us an exemption.
UNSC membership
We had earlier used the non-aligned position that only non-permanent membership should be increased until comprehensive reform is accomplished, just to thwart the U.S. sponsored quick fix solution of Germany and Japan being made Permanent Members. However, we then moved on to the G-4 initiative — under which India, Brazil, Japan and Germany would seek permanent membership — which has very few takers among the small developing countries. The G-77 virtually disappeared from many forums because India’s leadership in it withered away.
We had earlier used the non-aligned position that only non-permanent membership should be increased until comprehensive reform is accomplished, just to thwart the U.S. sponsored quick fix solution of Germany and Japan being made Permanent Members. However, we then moved on to the G-4 initiative — under which India, Brazil, Japan and Germany would seek permanent membership — which has very few takers among the small developing countries. The G-77 virtually disappeared from many forums because India’s leadership in it withered away.
India continued to take a global view in G-20 and
the World Trade Organization (WTO), primarily because of the reputation
of Dr. Manmohan Singh as an economic guru, even for Barack Obama. Dr.
Manmohan Singh’s withdrawal from the international arena and his close
relationship with the U.S. in India’s interests changed the Nehruvian
view that India’s dreams coincided with the world’s dreams. During our
last term at the U.N. Security Council, India seemed to be in a dilemma
as to whether we should work with the nonaligned caucus or plough a
lonely furrow; we ended up in flip-flops. Both the Permanent Members and
the nonaligned caucus found our term a mixed blessing.
“A study of Prime Minister Modi’s visits and speeches reveals
that his strategy is that of a businessman, one who makes deals only for
benefits. His neighbourhood policy is an example ”
Mr. Modi’s surprise initiatives in foreign policy from day one seemed to
project him as an internationalist. As Raja Mohan summarised in his
book Modi’s World, “he warmed up to America, recast the approach
to China and Pakistan, sustained the old friendship with Russia,
deepened the strategic partnership with Japan and Australia, boosted
India’s neighbourhood policy, wooed international business leaders and
reconnected with the Indian diaspora.”
We could add to this his championship of the reform of the Security Council;
his stress on the environment; and him taking initiatives on getting
closer to France, Germany, Canada, the island states and now Africa. But
the change is not only in style and eloquence, but in turning Indian
foreign policy inward. He has abandoned internationalism, genuine in the
case of some of his predecessors and a cloak in the case of some
others. In any relationship, the litmus test now is: what India can gain
for itself, not what India can contribute to the humanity.
Focusing on national interests in formulating foreign policy is
fundamental for all countries. But turning statesmanship to salesmanship
is a new phenomenon in Indian foreign policy. Our tradition has been to
provide leadership to the world, not to demand it as our right, as Mr.
Modi did in the case of the permanent membership of the Security
Council. Speaking of our eminent qualifications is one thing, but
claiming it as a right may drive our supporters away. Our case was that
we were willing to serve on the Council to restore the balance there and
to make it more relevant, not to claim membership as a right to protect
our interests. Even the Permanent Members never claim that they have a
right to be there.
A close study of the choice of countries Mr. Modi has visited and the
speeches he has made would reveal that his strategy is that of a
pragmatic businessman who will make deals for his benefit, but the
moment the profit dwindles, he will go in search of new clients. His
neighbourhood policy is a case in point. He started off with the
ambition to remove poverty in South Asia through a renewed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), but soon discovered the perfidy of Pakistan. He persisted for a
while as India had much to gain from a transformation in India-Pakistan
relations. However, SAARC is no longer a priority in his development
agenda. Nepal is another case where his hopes were belied. Remember the
cordiality and the oneness he projected with Nepal in the name of the
eternal values the two countries shared? However, today, he has
virtually imposed an embargo on Nepal for not listening to our advice.
Indira Gandhi did the same once, but she had explained repeatedly to the
international community the rationale for her actions and had restored
normalcy after a while. The world will watch our policies and make
conclusions on our reliability and statesmanship.
Misplaced notion of grandeur
The common elements in Mr. Modi’s speeches abroad can be clearly identified. First and foremost, it is the grandeur of India and his own role as its man of destiny. Second, he claims that things have changed dramatically since he took over and that India is now ready to receive investments and recognition as a global player. He feels the world has a stake in India’s development and security and that it is imperative for other countries to work with India.
The common elements in Mr. Modi’s speeches abroad can be clearly identified. First and foremost, it is the grandeur of India and his own role as its man of destiny. Second, he claims that things have changed dramatically since he took over and that India is now ready to receive investments and recognition as a global player. He feels the world has a stake in India’s development and security and that it is imperative for other countries to work with India.
He does not offer any specific concessions but expects the others to
respond to his initiatives for their own benefit. According to him, ‘Make in India’ and ‘Digital India’
are opportunities for the world to promote India and derive benefits
for themselves. In other words, the logic is one applied to a honest
business in which every partner makes profit.
Statesmanship demands every national leader to have a global vision — he
should place his country in the larger context of the well-being of the
mankind. In Mr. Modi’s case, India is at the centre of the world. In
his speeches at the UN, he claims that what the UN does today was
anticipated by India long ago. If India considers the Earth as the
mother and calls the whole world a family, it has nothing to learn from
sustainable goals, so meticulously put together by other nations.
Mr. Modi raised the reform of the Security Council even in the
sustainable development session, without saying what India would do as a
Permanent Member for the world. His sticking his neck out on this
issue, when there is little hope of progress in the near future, seems
ill-informed at best. Similarly, he did not seem to notice that the
Presidents of the U.S. and China were grappling with the problems of too
much connectivity at the very moment he was selling ‘Digital India’ to the Silicon Valley.
Mr. Modi also seems to take the diaspora’s loyalty for granted and
expects the Indian community abroad to extend support to him at all
times. History has taught us that the diaspora can be critical of India
on occasions. The very people who supported the nuclear tests and the
nuclear deal were critical when the deal appeared to fall through.
Recent events in India have already sparked adverse reactions from them.
In Dubai, they were disappointed that their issues were not addressed
directly by the Prime Minister.
Whether or not a foreign policy which is premised on seeking advantages
for India — without projecting a grand vision for the world —will
benefit India, only time will tell. However, for an India that had once
taken greater pride in giving to the world than taking from it, Mr.
Modi’s foreign policy is strikingly new.
(T.P. Sreenivasan is a former Ambassador of India and a former Permanent Representative at the United Nations)
Successive speakers repeated the cat image but at the end of the day, we
found not only that the cats stayed on, but that another litter was on
its way. The conservative educationists are extremely reluctant to move
away from fixed ideas and practices. As in other established
enterprises, innovation is hard in education, since it will affect a
whole new generation, and may be expensive and risky. But unless we
eschew shibboleths and move with the times, the NEP will be old wine in
an old bottle.
