IFS: A Service without a Soul
(Unedited version of a TOI article)
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Chatting with a serving IFS colleague on the sidelines of a meeting, I said that the current theories on the weaknesses of the Foreign Service were widely off the mark. What ail the service are not bad recruitment procedures, inadequate training or unsatisfactory living conditions. It is not even that the best brains are not attracted to the service. “The service has no soul”, I said spontaneously as I described the fundamental flaws in the Service. He agreed with everything I said, but his conclusion surprised me: if he could rewind his life back to the days of the UPSC examination, he would not opt for the IFS. There I disagreed. I would join the Foreign Service itself if I ever had the choice again. No other profession could match the challenges of the Foreign Service.
Like the Keralites discovered Kathakali after it was staged at the Lincoln Centre, people inside and outside the IFS have begun to analyze the state of the IFS after an American analyst, Daniel Markey, came out with a critique. But Markey had nothing dramatic or novel to say. He stated the obvious that the IFS was small and that it was hobbled by the selection process, inadequate mid career planning and no outside expertise. Much of his paper was devoted to the importance of the other actors in policy making, such as think tanks, universities, the media and private business. He was of the view that the “software” of Indian foreign policy was not equipped to lead India to great power status.
Those who are in the service or those who have just come out of it know well that IFS is the least integrated of the civil services. By its very nature, IFS is scattered all around the globe, often in isolated pockets. There is little interaction with the rest of the service except in large missions, where a number of officers may be posted together. In many missions, which may be characterized as “one man and his dog” missions; there is no opportunity to work with other officers. In the Ministry of External Affairs, the official responsibilities are such that no one has the time to consult each other. It is a mad race to get the attention of the political masters. More time is spent in the corridors of power rather than in lunch rooms. As a result, every officer is an island, without any support system. The IFS is, therefore, not conducive to collective thinking or action. A recent effort at cyber communication within the service has revealed more fissures than bonds. Only a couple of voices were heard when false accusations were hurled at a colleague.
In no other service is one man’s meat another man’s poison. If one officer gets himself an attractive posting by any method, it follows that his peers have to be content with a less attractive assignment. The upward mobility of the service is such that waiting out for a particular posting is not practical. There are no established criteria for selection and being insensitive to the needs of others, the competition is most often unequal and unfair. The situation is compounded by the recent tendency to blur the gradation of posts in relation to the grades to which the officers belong. There are too many instances of a Grade I officer being replaced by a Grade III officer. Promotions become irrelevant as both in terms of work and compensation, stations matter rather than Grades.
In fact, the posting policy is the most contentious matter in the IFS, making its members run from pillar to post to secure advantages. While promotion policy is fairly established, there are no rules at all regarding postings. Successive Foreign Secretaries have insisted that postings should be an art rather than a science. Proposals for a scientific method like a points system for postings have been set aside. Promotion becomes meaningless unless it is matched by a commensurate posting. The rat race is intensified by this situation and each one is unto himself or herself in the quest for choice postings. In the case of heads of missions, there is not even a system of making known the availability of posts, not to speak of applying objective criteria. The soullessness is evident everywhere.
Specialisation is one of the victims of the heartless postings policy. After the Government and the officers have invested much in language training, many do not get any opportunity to use the languages, particularly one country languages, as the exigencies of the service keep the officers in areas where the language is not used. Multilateral diplomacy demands special talents, but New York, Geneva and Vienna are given as rotational blessings. Even those who have special talents for multilateral diplomacy are moved away thoughtlessly. Career planning is left to the officers themselves. Those who have remained in the neighboring countries or in multilateral posts for long have done so by hook or by crook and not by any deliberate design.
Politicians play havoc with the service because of the general atmosphere of self promotion. “Blue- eyed” boys and girls are a curse of the service as no rules seem to apply to them. They go from one good posting to another and they even move out without completing their terms if they find the famed attractions of the post are unreal. Ministers with feudal backgrounds and tendencies have a field day in the Foreign Service. No Minister can know every officer and those whom the Minister knows get undue advantages. The attraction of life in Government after retirement is another reason for officers to get themselves politicized. How do officers, who have been the beneficiaries of political largesse, set things right?
Training at any level in the IFS means listening to a series of lectures. These lectures vary in quality and usefulness. The probationers were virtual gypsies, moving from institution to institution before the Foreign Service Institute was established. At no time is any training given to do two of the most important functions expected of the officers at every level—political and economic reporting and recording of conversations. Of late, even proficiency in English is not insisted upon. When it was suggested that those who did not write their papers in English should not be considered for the Foreign Service, it was argued by some that it would be unconstitutional to be discriminatory! Language is an important tool in diplomacy, but we will soon have Indian diplomats without proficiency in English. It would be unpatriotic to exclude Hindi or Malayalam scholars from the Foreign Service.
A strong character is essential for anyone to survive for nearly forty years in the IFS with its culture shocks every three years. There is no safety net for those who fall by the wayside. The casualties in terms of physical and mental diseases, alcoholism and family dislocations are as common in the IFS as in the fighting forces. Even victims of armed attacks and robberies get no compensation of any kind. But if someone gets into trouble on account of any indiscretion, every one throws stones at them till he is completely destroyed. His solid service to the nation is never set off against a temporary weakness of the flesh. The lack of a support system is compounded by the heartless treatment of victims of professional hazards.
The truth remains, however, that, with all these deficiencies, the IFS has coped with its responsibilities and has done better than many of the more equipped diplomatic services around the world. Even if much of Indian diplomacy is conducted in person or on the phone, as Markey claims, it has served the nation well. Living conditions have also improved, though they are nowhere near to the standards of even other developing countries like China, Indonesia or Malaysia. If the Foreign Service has lost its luster for new entrants, it is because the other services have greater avenues of securing power and wealth. Young people seem to be motivated more by those than by idealism or desire for adventure.
The South Block has its cupboards full of reform proposals by many ignited minds. But as long as the service does not get a soul, a sense of belonging, arising out of a sense of fairness, equality and justice, no reform, no expansion will transform the software of Indian diplomacy.
Friday, October 23, 2009
The Times of India
Opinion
TOP ARTICLE
IFS: Service Without A Soul
T P Sreenivasan23 October 2009, 12:00am IST
Just as Keralites discovered Kathakali after it was staged at the
Lincoln Centre, the state of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) began to
beexamined after an American analyst, Daniel Markey, came out with a
critique. Markey had nothing novel to say. He said the IFS was small,
and hobbled by the selection process, inadequate mid-career planning
and lack of outside expertise. He highlighted the importance of other
actors in policymaking: think tanks, universities, the media and
private business. He believed the "software" of Indian foreign policy
was not equipped to lead India to great power status.
Those with experience in the service know the IFS is the least
integrated of the civil services. It is scattered around the globe,
often in isolated pockets. There is little interaction with the rest
of the service except in large missions. In the ministry of external
affairs, official responsibilities are such that no one has the time
to consult each other. More time is spent in the corridors of power
than in lunchrooms. Every officer is an island. The IFS is, therefore,
not conducive to collective thinking or action.
In no other service is one man's meat another man's poison. If one
officer gets himself an attractive posting by any method, his peers
have to be content with a less attractive assignment. There are no
established criteria for selection and the competition is most often
unequal and unfair. A recent tendency is to blur the gradation of
posts in relation to the grades to which officers belong. A grade I
officer can be replaced by a grade III officer. Promotions become
irrelevant as both in terms of work and compensation, stations matter
rather than grades.
IFS's contentious posting policy makes members run from pillar to post
to secure advantages. While promotion policy is fairly established, no
rules govern postings. Successive foreign secretaries have insisted
that postings should be an art rather than a science. In the case of
heads of missions, there is not even a system of making known the
availability of posts, not to speak of applying objective criteria.
The soullessness is evident everywhere.
Specialisation is a casualty. Though government and officers invest in
language training, many do not get any opportunity to use the
languages. Multilateral diplomacy demands special talents but New
York, Geneva and Vienna are given as rotational blessings. Even those
with special talents for multilateral diplomacy are moved
thoughtlessly. Career planning is left to the officers themselves.
Those who have remained in neighbouring countries or in multilateral
posts for long have done so by hook or by crook, not by the
government's deliberate design.
'Blue-eyed' boys and girls are a curse of the service, as no rules
seem to apply to them. Ministers with feudal backgrounds and
tendencies have a field day. No minister can know every officer and
those whom the minister knows get undue advantages. The attraction of
life in government after retirement is another reason officers get
politicised. How do officers, themselves the beneficiaries of
political largesse, set things right?
Training at any level in the IFS means listening to a series of
lectures. These vary in quality and usefulness. At no time is any
training given for two of the most important functions expected of
officers at every level: political and economic reporting and
recording of conversations. Of late, even proficiency in English is
not insisted upon. When it was suggested that those who did not write
their papers in English should not be considered for foreign service,
some argued that it would be unconstitutional to be discriminatory! We
will soon have diplomats without proficiency in English.
A strong character is essential for anyone to survive nearly 40 years
in the IFS. There is no safety net for those who fall. Casualties in
terms of physical and mental diseases, alcoholism and family
dislocations are as common here as in the fighting forces. Even
victims of armed attacks and robberies get no compensation. If someone
gets into trouble for any indiscretion, everyone throws stones at him
till he is destroyed. His solid service to the nation is never set off
against a temporary lapse. Lack of a support system is compounded by
the heartless treatment of victims of professional hazards.
However, with all these deficiencies, the IFS has coped with its
responsibilities and done better than many of the more equipped
diplomatic services around the world. Even if much of Indian diplomacy
is conducted in person or on the phone, as Markey claims, it has
served the nation well. Living conditions have improved, though
nowhere near to the standards of even other developing countries like
China, Indonesia or Malaysia. If the foreign service has lost its
lustre for new entrants, it is because the other services have greater
avenues of securing power and wealth.
South Block has its cupboards full of reform proposals by many ignited
minds. But as long as the service does not get a soul, a sense of
belonging, arising out of a sense of fairness, equality and justice,
no reform, no expansion will transform the software of Indian
diplomacy.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Opinion
TOP ARTICLE
IFS: Service Without A Soul
T P Sreenivasan23 October 2009, 12:00am IST
Just as Keralites discovered Kathakali after it was staged at the
Lincoln Centre, the state of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) began to
beexamined after an American analyst, Daniel Markey, came out with a
critique. Markey had nothing novel to say. He said the IFS was small,
and hobbled by the selection process, inadequate mid-career planning
and lack of outside expertise. He highlighted the importance of other
actors in policymaking: think tanks, universities, the media and
private business. He believed the "software" of Indian foreign policy
was not equipped to lead India to great power status.
Those with experience in the service know the IFS is the least
integrated of the civil services. It is scattered around the globe,
often in isolated pockets. There is little interaction with the rest
of the service except in large missions. In the ministry of external
affairs, official responsibilities are such that no one has the time
to consult each other. More time is spent in the corridors of power
than in lunchrooms. Every officer is an island. The IFS is, therefore,
not conducive to collective thinking or action.
In no other service is one man's meat another man's poison. If one
officer gets himself an attractive posting by any method, his peers
have to be content with a less attractive assignment. There are no
established criteria for selection and the competition is most often
unequal and unfair. A recent tendency is to blur the gradation of
posts in relation to the grades to which officers belong. A grade I
officer can be replaced by a grade III officer. Promotions become
irrelevant as both in terms of work and compensation, stations matter
rather than grades.
IFS's contentious posting policy makes members run from pillar to post
to secure advantages. While promotion policy is fairly established, no
rules govern postings. Successive foreign secretaries have insisted
that postings should be an art rather than a science. In the case of
heads of missions, there is not even a system of making known the
availability of posts, not to speak of applying objective criteria.
The soullessness is evident everywhere.
Specialisation is a casualty. Though government and officers invest in
language training, many do not get any opportunity to use the
languages. Multilateral diplomacy demands special talents but New
York, Geneva and Vienna are given as rotational blessings. Even those
with special talents for multilateral diplomacy are moved
thoughtlessly. Career planning is left to the officers themselves.
Those who have remained in neighbouring countries or in multilateral
posts for long have done so by hook or by crook, not by the
government's deliberate design.
'Blue-eyed' boys and girls are a curse of the service, as no rules
seem to apply to them. Ministers with feudal backgrounds and
tendencies have a field day. No minister can know every officer and
those whom the minister knows get undue advantages. The attraction of
life in government after retirement is another reason officers get
politicised. How do officers, themselves the beneficiaries of
political largesse, set things right?
Training at any level in the IFS means listening to a series of
lectures. These vary in quality and usefulness. At no time is any
training given for two of the most important functions expected of
officers at every level: political and economic reporting and
recording of conversations. Of late, even proficiency in English is
not insisted upon. When it was suggested that those who did not write
their papers in English should not be considered for foreign service,
some argued that it would be unconstitutional to be discriminatory! We
will soon have diplomats without proficiency in English.
A strong character is essential for anyone to survive nearly 40 years
in the IFS. There is no safety net for those who fall. Casualties in
terms of physical and mental diseases, alcoholism and family
dislocations are as common here as in the fighting forces. Even
victims of armed attacks and robberies get no compensation. If someone
gets into trouble for any indiscretion, everyone throws stones at him
till he is destroyed. His solid service to the nation is never set off
against a temporary lapse. Lack of a support system is compounded by
the heartless treatment of victims of professional hazards.
However, with all these deficiencies, the IFS has coped with its
responsibilities and done better than many of the more equipped
diplomatic services around the world. Even if much of Indian diplomacy
is conducted in person or on the phone, as Markey claims, it has
served the nation well. Living conditions have improved, though
nowhere near to the standards of even other developing countries like
China, Indonesia or Malaysia. If the foreign service has lost its
lustre for new entrants, it is because the other services have greater
avenues of securing power and wealth.
South Block has its cupboards full of reform proposals by many ignited
minds. But as long as the service does not get a soul, a sense of
belonging, arising out of a sense of fairness, equality and justice,
no reform, no expansion will transform the software of Indian
diplomacy.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Ambassador Muthamma
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Ambassador Muthamma
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Ambassador Muthamma will be remembered as much for her intellectual
abilities as for her grit, determination and absolute fearlessness. As
a pioneer, she faced many adversities in life and in the IFS itself,
but remained steadfast in her faith in gender equality and rule of
law. Consequently, she appeared aggressive in her ways and very few
knew that she was also a very sensitive and friendly human being.
I did not work with Ambassador Muthamma, but I had a few glimpses of
her in my early years in the service. These were mostly during my
stint as the Special Assistant to Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, with
whom she had a complex relationship. What struck me most about her was
that, unlike some others in the service, she did not allow her
problems with the Foreign Secretary to colour her attitude towards me
as a young officer. She would rant and rave about Mr. Mehta as she
stopped at my perch in the corridor leading to the Foreign Secretary's
office, but never left without a kind word or gesture towards me. She
inspired awe as well as respect whenever I met her.
I shall never forget a meeting between Ambassador Muthamma and Mr.
Jagat Mehta at the Shiphol Airport in Amsterdam. We were not expecting
the ambassador to come to the airport when we transited because of the
strained relationship between them, but Ambassador Muthamma was not
one to fail in courtesies. But the atmosphere was far from relaxed and
I found myself caught in a clash of the titans. Both of them talked to
me rather than to each other and there was nothing I could contribute
to the conversation. Ambassador Muthamma was visibly rattled at the
end of the conversation, but she did not forget to take me to the duty
free shop and get some chocolates for me before we boarded the
aircraft. She did not tell me not to share it with the Foreign
Secretary.
My first ever meeting with Ambassador Muthamma was in strange
circumstances. I had just moved into a room in the External Affairs
Hostel as an IFS probationer and was generally feeling out of place in
a strange environment. I was woken up from sleep in the middle of the
night by a knock at the door and I was bewildered to see a lady in a
night gown outside my room. Before I could suspect anything else, she
introduced herself as the Joint Secretary (Americas). That was a time
when we used to believe that Joint Secretaries were giants in the
bureaucracy and I was astonished that one of them had come to visit me
at such an hour. She then said she had come up because my movements in
the room were disturbing her in her room just below mine.This was even
more surprising as I thought I was fast asleep at the time. I
hurriedly promised her to stay quiet as an argument was inappropriate
and she left. She came to me the next day at the restaurant and
explained to me that even the slightest noises would disturb her sleep
and that she was moving to the top floor of the building to avoid
hearing noises from above her room. But I learned later that she had
no peace even there because she happened to be above the room of a
colleague who partied his nights away with gay abandon. She eventually
moved out of the hostel for peace and quiet.
I shall not go into the Foreign Secretary's letter on women officers
and the court case filed by Ambassador Muthamma against the delay in
her promotion to Grade I as these have been documented elsewhere.
Suffice it to say that in both these cases, Mr. Mehta was more sinned
against than sinning. Ambassador Muthamma was aware of this fact and,
therefore, did not have any personal animosity towards Mr.Mehta.
I do not know whether a story in circulation of unrequited love about
Ambassador Muthamma was apocryphal or not. But I knew for certain that
within her tough exterior, there was a kind and sensitive heart.
Saturday, September 05, 2009
Brewhaha
By T.P.Sreenivasan
It was the twitter culture that did Obama in. He decided to
encapsulate the race issue and its solution in less than 140
characters. In the Gates case, the police behaved stupidly, he said,
without realising he shared his skin colour with the victim and the
police sergeant in question had another skin pigment. Hell broke loose
in no time and expression of regret over wrong choice of words was not
sufficient to put out the fire.
Obama is nothing, if not innovative. “We can!” he said again. Inviting
Gates and Crowley for a lunch or dinner in the White House would have
been overkill and so he hit upon a beer on the White House lawns, rain
or shine. Beer can put out any fire; spirit would have only fanned it
further. Boston has a Beer Summit every April and Gates and Crowley
should welcome a real summit with the chief himself and everything
would be forgotten and forgiven, thought the strategist President.
But the cure turned out to be worse than the disease. The three could
not agree even on the brand of the beer. San Miguel, the Boston beer
should have been the obvious choice, but there was no consensus and
red, blue and light were brought in. Then came the question of racial
balance at the summit and the President brought in his deputy more for
his colour than for his wisdom. There was no time to get his choice of
beer and so he ended up drinking the Boston beer that was originally
stocked for the occasion. In any case, as the only one not a party to
the dispute, Biden had to remain sober to keep the balance.
The setting was perfect, the brew was right and the racial balance was
intact. Then came the hard job to establish as to who behaved
stupidly. Was it Gates, who protested when he was accosted inside his
house by a policeman, who proceeded to handcuff him? Was it Crowley,
who thought he found a misfit in an aristocratic neighbourhood and
proceeded to treat the good professor as a criminal? Gates’ ID showed
that he was a Professor at Harvard, but how could he be sure that he
did not break into homes in his spare time? Why was it that an
institution like Harvard did not show the address of the Professor on
his ID? Or was it the President, who thought that, with his election
as President, there was no more racial prejudice in the United States?
Not even Biden could resolve the issue. No champagne was brought in at
the end of the summit to celebrate the grand reconciliation. Cameras
and recorders were kept away, but it did not take much effort for the
reporters to know that beer did not resolve years of racial prejudice.
No amount of beer could wash away the dirt accumulated over the years
in the minds of men. Gates and Crowley were seen mumbling things to
themselves as they left the White House lawns. Biden complimented his
boss for his wisdom and foresight in organising the event. Obama
shrugged it away. But he tried, didn’t he?
Obama has learnt his lesson. One swallow does not make a summer. One
African American President cannot heal all wounds. His “stupidity”
comment was honest, but honesty does not pay. Gates will, in future,
take special care of his key and will not give reason for his
suspicious neighbour to call 911 to report a break in. Crowley will
not change, because most criminals he comes across in his daily work
is of a particular colour. His only choice is to leave the police
force and sell beer to the White House for future summits, which
should be a growing industry, considering that racial prejudice is
still alive and well. Even the US Government tends to deploy more
African Americans at places, where the law is likely to be broken, be
it parking lots or customs barriers.
The beer summit brought a bonanza to journalists. “Brewhaha” was my
favourite, but “Coalition of the Swilling” “Ale to the Chief” and “The
cop, the Professor and the President: It All Comes to a Head” were
also good. Someone said that Gates should have tried to climb over the
White House wall to get to the lawn for the beer summit!
Another beer story should be a good tail-piece. An Australian lady
diplomat offered her resignation after five years in the service. When
asked why, she said: “When I joined the service, I was promised
champagne and proposals all the way. But in the last five years, I
have not seen anything but beer and propositions.”
By T.P.Sreenivasan
It was the twitter culture that did Obama in. He decided to
encapsulate the race issue and its solution in less than 140
characters. In the Gates case, the police behaved stupidly, he said,
without realising he shared his skin colour with the victim and the
police sergeant in question had another skin pigment. Hell broke loose
in no time and expression of regret over wrong choice of words was not
sufficient to put out the fire.
Obama is nothing, if not innovative. “We can!” he said again. Inviting
Gates and Crowley for a lunch or dinner in the White House would have
been overkill and so he hit upon a beer on the White House lawns, rain
or shine. Beer can put out any fire; spirit would have only fanned it
further. Boston has a Beer Summit every April and Gates and Crowley
should welcome a real summit with the chief himself and everything
would be forgotten and forgiven, thought the strategist President.
But the cure turned out to be worse than the disease. The three could
not agree even on the brand of the beer. San Miguel, the Boston beer
should have been the obvious choice, but there was no consensus and
red, blue and light were brought in. Then came the question of racial
balance at the summit and the President brought in his deputy more for
his colour than for his wisdom. There was no time to get his choice of
beer and so he ended up drinking the Boston beer that was originally
stocked for the occasion. In any case, as the only one not a party to
the dispute, Biden had to remain sober to keep the balance.
The setting was perfect, the brew was right and the racial balance was
intact. Then came the hard job to establish as to who behaved
stupidly. Was it Gates, who protested when he was accosted inside his
house by a policeman, who proceeded to handcuff him? Was it Crowley,
who thought he found a misfit in an aristocratic neighbourhood and
proceeded to treat the good professor as a criminal? Gates’ ID showed
that he was a Professor at Harvard, but how could he be sure that he
did not break into homes in his spare time? Why was it that an
institution like Harvard did not show the address of the Professor on
his ID? Or was it the President, who thought that, with his election
as President, there was no more racial prejudice in the United States?
Not even Biden could resolve the issue. No champagne was brought in at
the end of the summit to celebrate the grand reconciliation. Cameras
and recorders were kept away, but it did not take much effort for the
reporters to know that beer did not resolve years of racial prejudice.
No amount of beer could wash away the dirt accumulated over the years
in the minds of men. Gates and Crowley were seen mumbling things to
themselves as they left the White House lawns. Biden complimented his
boss for his wisdom and foresight in organising the event. Obama
shrugged it away. But he tried, didn’t he?
Obama has learnt his lesson. One swallow does not make a summer. One
African American President cannot heal all wounds. His “stupidity”
comment was honest, but honesty does not pay. Gates will, in future,
take special care of his key and will not give reason for his
suspicious neighbour to call 911 to report a break in. Crowley will
not change, because most criminals he comes across in his daily work
is of a particular colour. His only choice is to leave the police
force and sell beer to the White House for future summits, which
should be a growing industry, considering that racial prejudice is
still alive and well. Even the US Government tends to deploy more
African Americans at places, where the law is likely to be broken, be
it parking lots or customs barriers.
The beer summit brought a bonanza to journalists. “Brewhaha” was my
favourite, but “Coalition of the Swilling” “Ale to the Chief” and “The
cop, the Professor and the President: It All Comes to a Head” were
also good. Someone said that Gates should have tried to climb over the
White House wall to get to the lawn for the beer summit!
Another beer story should be a good tail-piece. An Australian lady
diplomat offered her resignation after five years in the service. When
asked why, she said: “When I joined the service, I was promised
champagne and proposals all the way. But in the last five years, I
have not seen anything but beer and propositions.”
Santy’s Bombshell
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Two significant scientific accomplishments of India lost their sheen on the same day. The news of the loss of contact with Chandrayaan-1 flashed across the screens with an equally unexpected admission by one of the architects of the 1998 nuclear tests that the yield of the thermonuclear device was lower than what was claimed by India. Both are disappointing developments for Indian science, the latter with major strategic implications. Nothing succeeds like success and partial success will be seen as partial failure.
Dr. Santhanam, a frequent visitor to Washington during my days there, has a bit of Puckish humour about him and a certain transparency, which is unusual for nuclear scientists, bearing the burden of the nation’s secrets. But on matters of strategic thinking and scientific reasoning, he is precise and clear. It is for this reason that his sudden revelation, the first of its kind from the scientific establishment, surprised everyone. His statement carried such credibility that the whole weight of every one concerned came down heavily on him. Dr. Abdul Kalam, Mr. M.K.Narayanan, Mr. Brajesh Misra, Dr. Chidambaram and Dr.Kakodkar spoke in unison to disown Dr. Santhanam. The usual suspects in the dissident group of scientists, Dr. Prasad and Dr. Gopalakrishnan remained skeptical. The official position that the tests were a “huge success” and that the thermonuclear device had a yield of 60 kilotons was reiterated.
It is the way of the world that the general public will give greater credence to a “maverick” view rather than the establishment view as such doubts have been raised by outside agencies and strategic thinkers in India. More importantly, we need to analyze the repercussions that the Santhanam statement may have internationally. With the nuclear deal in position and the Obama Administration moving slowly, but steadily towards the CTBT and wondering whether the US should have any nuclear trade with India at all, the nuclear establishments around the globe must be revisiting the India file.
“I would like to declare on the floor of this august Assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty (CTBT), not now, not later” stated Ambassador Arundhati Ghose in the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996. Those words reverberate around the globe even today, though much has happened since, including Prime Minister Vajpayee’s expression of readiness to reconsider the matter if everyone else accepted the CTBT. But nothing that has happened till today has altered the reasons for the Indian position in 1996. There is no greater commitment to disarmament today, the discriminatory aspect still remains and violation of international law in the form of article 14 on Entry into Force is still there.
What has changed is the nuclear status of India, India’s moratorium and the nuclear deal, which involves the NSG waiver. Though the moratorium is voluntary, it has assumed a certain international significance as it is at the centre of the nuclear deal. Everyone understands that there is no deal without the moratorium. We have no obligation to sign the CTBT anymore as the Prime Minister’s assurance predates the nuclear deal. The CTBT itself is embroiled in the domestic politics of the US and its international power equations. Dr. Santhanam’s claim that he chose to make the revelation to reduce pressure on India to sign the CTBT, therefore, is far-fetched. Pressure on India to sign the CTBT is not an immediate contingency. President Obama has to find the required number of votes in the Senate to ratify the CTBT before he embarks on his messianic mission to bring it into force.
What the Dr. Santhanam statement does is calling into question the credibility of the Indian nuclear establishment. The findings put out by India have already been challenged by others, but Dr. Santhanam was one of those who were present at the test site with others in military fatigues. His crossing over to the side of the skeptics will be a serious challenge to the scientific establishment. His explanation that India needs more tests despite the moratorium will only make India suspect in the nuclear community. However well intentioned, his statement can only do more harm than good for India. The world outside will recall the passionate demand for testing at the time of the negotiations on the nuclear deal.
The question facing the nation relates also to the credibility of the minimum deterrent, a matter which may interest our adversaries. Dr. A.Gopalakrishnan and others have asked whether it is necessary at all to have a thermonuclear device when we already have fission weapons in our arsenal. It may be more productive to invest in research and development of fusion weapons and also participate in ITER. The higher priority should be for us to miniaturize the weapons and improve our capacity for delivery. Perhaps, this is what is implied by the confident assertion of the NSA and others that no further tests are necessary. In other words, the political purpose has been served and there is no requirement of further tests as Dr. Santhanam and others advocate. The objectives of the politicians and the scientists could be different, right from the beginning, according to Mr. CMA Nayar of the Kerala International Centre. The scientists may be disappointed, but the Government is not.
India has never revealed the specifics of the minimum deterrent. Mr. Jaswant Singh stated repeatedly that it was not a “fixity”. So no outsider can judge whether further tests are necessary to maintain the deterrent. Since the NSA has stated even after the statement of Dr. Santhanam that the test was only partly successful that no further tests are necessary, the Government is relying on the judgment of the mainstream scientists that the credibility of the arsenal is intact.
The non-proliferation Ayatollahs in the US will now go hammer and tongs at India for harbouring ambitions to test thermonuclear weapons and they will campaign against the implementation of the deal. No one can take away the NSG waiver unless India tests, but the needle of suspicion will be on India right now. The non-proliferation czars in the State Department will now be preparing for the eventuality of an Indian nuclear test. India will have to work overtime to restore confidence in bilateral relations. Dr. Santhanam’s bombshell will have an impact beyond our borders.
By T.P.Sreenivasan
Two significant scientific accomplishments of India lost their sheen on the same day. The news of the loss of contact with Chandrayaan-1 flashed across the screens with an equally unexpected admission by one of the architects of the 1998 nuclear tests that the yield of the thermonuclear device was lower than what was claimed by India. Both are disappointing developments for Indian science, the latter with major strategic implications. Nothing succeeds like success and partial success will be seen as partial failure.
Dr. Santhanam, a frequent visitor to Washington during my days there, has a bit of Puckish humour about him and a certain transparency, which is unusual for nuclear scientists, bearing the burden of the nation’s secrets. But on matters of strategic thinking and scientific reasoning, he is precise and clear. It is for this reason that his sudden revelation, the first of its kind from the scientific establishment, surprised everyone. His statement carried such credibility that the whole weight of every one concerned came down heavily on him. Dr. Abdul Kalam, Mr. M.K.Narayanan, Mr. Brajesh Misra, Dr. Chidambaram and Dr.Kakodkar spoke in unison to disown Dr. Santhanam. The usual suspects in the dissident group of scientists, Dr. Prasad and Dr. Gopalakrishnan remained skeptical. The official position that the tests were a “huge success” and that the thermonuclear device had a yield of 60 kilotons was reiterated.
It is the way of the world that the general public will give greater credence to a “maverick” view rather than the establishment view as such doubts have been raised by outside agencies and strategic thinkers in India. More importantly, we need to analyze the repercussions that the Santhanam statement may have internationally. With the nuclear deal in position and the Obama Administration moving slowly, but steadily towards the CTBT and wondering whether the US should have any nuclear trade with India at all, the nuclear establishments around the globe must be revisiting the India file.
“I would like to declare on the floor of this august Assembly that India will never sign this unequal Treaty (CTBT), not now, not later” stated Ambassador Arundhati Ghose in the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996. Those words reverberate around the globe even today, though much has happened since, including Prime Minister Vajpayee’s expression of readiness to reconsider the matter if everyone else accepted the CTBT. But nothing that has happened till today has altered the reasons for the Indian position in 1996. There is no greater commitment to disarmament today, the discriminatory aspect still remains and violation of international law in the form of article 14 on Entry into Force is still there.
What has changed is the nuclear status of India, India’s moratorium and the nuclear deal, which involves the NSG waiver. Though the moratorium is voluntary, it has assumed a certain international significance as it is at the centre of the nuclear deal. Everyone understands that there is no deal without the moratorium. We have no obligation to sign the CTBT anymore as the Prime Minister’s assurance predates the nuclear deal. The CTBT itself is embroiled in the domestic politics of the US and its international power equations. Dr. Santhanam’s claim that he chose to make the revelation to reduce pressure on India to sign the CTBT, therefore, is far-fetched. Pressure on India to sign the CTBT is not an immediate contingency. President Obama has to find the required number of votes in the Senate to ratify the CTBT before he embarks on his messianic mission to bring it into force.
What the Dr. Santhanam statement does is calling into question the credibility of the Indian nuclear establishment. The findings put out by India have already been challenged by others, but Dr. Santhanam was one of those who were present at the test site with others in military fatigues. His crossing over to the side of the skeptics will be a serious challenge to the scientific establishment. His explanation that India needs more tests despite the moratorium will only make India suspect in the nuclear community. However well intentioned, his statement can only do more harm than good for India. The world outside will recall the passionate demand for testing at the time of the negotiations on the nuclear deal.
The question facing the nation relates also to the credibility of the minimum deterrent, a matter which may interest our adversaries. Dr. A.Gopalakrishnan and others have asked whether it is necessary at all to have a thermonuclear device when we already have fission weapons in our arsenal. It may be more productive to invest in research and development of fusion weapons and also participate in ITER. The higher priority should be for us to miniaturize the weapons and improve our capacity for delivery. Perhaps, this is what is implied by the confident assertion of the NSA and others that no further tests are necessary. In other words, the political purpose has been served and there is no requirement of further tests as Dr. Santhanam and others advocate. The objectives of the politicians and the scientists could be different, right from the beginning, according to Mr. CMA Nayar of the Kerala International Centre. The scientists may be disappointed, but the Government is not.
India has never revealed the specifics of the minimum deterrent. Mr. Jaswant Singh stated repeatedly that it was not a “fixity”. So no outsider can judge whether further tests are necessary to maintain the deterrent. Since the NSA has stated even after the statement of Dr. Santhanam that the test was only partly successful that no further tests are necessary, the Government is relying on the judgment of the mainstream scientists that the credibility of the arsenal is intact.
The non-proliferation Ayatollahs in the US will now go hammer and tongs at India for harbouring ambitions to test thermonuclear weapons and they will campaign against the implementation of the deal. No one can take away the NSG waiver unless India tests, but the needle of suspicion will be on India right now. The non-proliferation czars in the State Department will now be preparing for the eventuality of an Indian nuclear test. India will have to work overtime to restore confidence in bilateral relations. Dr. Santhanam’s bombshell will have an impact beyond our borders.
Monday, August 03, 2009
Thoughts About Kala Kaarthikeyan
To call Kala Kaarthikeyan one of the best friends of our family is to
make an understatement. It is the same if I say she was an exceptional
person. She was much more than a friend and much more than an
exceptional person. She personified in her all the qualities, talents
and charms that a friend, a wife, a mother and a grandmother should
possess. Every one in our family has been deeply touched by her and
each one of us lost a little of ourselves when she passed away in
sleep.
Perhaps all her goodness, all her godliness, all her service and all
her discipline gave her a most peaceful journey to her heavenly abode.
We, who have been left behind, particularly her hero, Kaarthi have
become poorer by her departure.
I cannot recall here all the acts of kindness she has shown us
beginning in Moscow and ending in New Delhi over the last 35 years.
Like Kaarthi, she was there at every important moment in our lives,
happy or unhappy. Shri. Hamid Ansari, the present Vice President told
me once that however much we may try to reciprocate their friendly
gestures, we will still owe them more. I felt the same again and
again.
It was in Moscow that we first met when we arrived there more or less
at the same time. We lived in the same building and shared many many
hours together. One thing I can never forget is the opportunity I had
to drive Kala and her newly born daughter, Kanchana, from the hospital
to their apartment. not because there was no other car or driver, but
because I very much wanted to do it. Compared to all that they had
done for us, this was but a trifle, but I was proud of that privilege.
As we moved around the world, our paths crossed and our children loved
each other. One thing that did not change was Kala's smiling face, her
humility, her cooking skills and her hospitality, which nobody could
equal. She did not speak much and did not disagree with Kaarthi about
anything. She trusted him so much that she would not even ask him
where he went even at unearthly hours. She was not hesitant to say
that she really did not know where Kaarthi was at a particular time.
I wish she had lived longer, not because she should give more of her
love to us, but because we could give her little more in return to
her. Lekha will never forget how Kala took her from the dining table
straight to a hospital as she felt Lekha did not look well. Kanchana
and Kailash are her best gifts to the world.My two sons considered her
their godmother, like many others of their age.
Kala was slim, very disciplined, adept in many arts of living, not at
all a candidate for untimely demise. The only explanation is that God
needed her more than all of us. That thought should give Kaarthi,
Kanchana, Kailash and all of us some comfort at this agonising moment.
The prayers of many, who she helped in many ways, will guide her on
her next journey.
Sreeni and Lekha
To call Kala Kaarthikeyan one of the best friends of our family is to
make an understatement. It is the same if I say she was an exceptional
person. She was much more than a friend and much more than an
exceptional person. She personified in her all the qualities, talents
and charms that a friend, a wife, a mother and a grandmother should
possess. Every one in our family has been deeply touched by her and
each one of us lost a little of ourselves when she passed away in
sleep.
Perhaps all her goodness, all her godliness, all her service and all
her discipline gave her a most peaceful journey to her heavenly abode.
We, who have been left behind, particularly her hero, Kaarthi have
become poorer by her departure.
I cannot recall here all the acts of kindness she has shown us
beginning in Moscow and ending in New Delhi over the last 35 years.
Like Kaarthi, she was there at every important moment in our lives,
happy or unhappy. Shri. Hamid Ansari, the present Vice President told
me once that however much we may try to reciprocate their friendly
gestures, we will still owe them more. I felt the same again and
again.
It was in Moscow that we first met when we arrived there more or less
at the same time. We lived in the same building and shared many many
hours together. One thing I can never forget is the opportunity I had
to drive Kala and her newly born daughter, Kanchana, from the hospital
to their apartment. not because there was no other car or driver, but
because I very much wanted to do it. Compared to all that they had
done for us, this was but a trifle, but I was proud of that privilege.
As we moved around the world, our paths crossed and our children loved
each other. One thing that did not change was Kala's smiling face, her
humility, her cooking skills and her hospitality, which nobody could
equal. She did not speak much and did not disagree with Kaarthi about
anything. She trusted him so much that she would not even ask him
where he went even at unearthly hours. She was not hesitant to say
that she really did not know where Kaarthi was at a particular time.
I wish she had lived longer, not because she should give more of her
love to us, but because we could give her little more in return to
her. Lekha will never forget how Kala took her from the dining table
straight to a hospital as she felt Lekha did not look well. Kanchana
and Kailash are her best gifts to the world.My two sons considered her
their godmother, like many others of their age.
Kala was slim, very disciplined, adept in many arts of living, not at
all a candidate for untimely demise. The only explanation is that God
needed her more than all of us. That thought should give Kaarthi,
Kanchana, Kailash and all of us some comfort at this agonising moment.
The prayers of many, who she helped in many ways, will guide her on
her next journey.
Sreeni and Lekha
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Hillary sets up camp on the right track
By T.P.Serrnivasan
Hillary Clinton, who was named after Sir Edmund Hillary [ Images ] whom her parents admired, set out on her own hazardous expedition to India well equipped and well prepared.
She could not have reached the summit in a hurry, given the treacherous glaciers on every step of the way, but she has covered some ground, set the course and is poised to climb further.
Two unrelated developments blinded the way as the journey began. The India-Pak Joint Statement from the venue of the NAM Summit completely spoiled the political climate in New Delhi [ Images ].
The polarisation was so acute that the whole thing, nothing more than a diplomatic fiasco, was seen as manipulation by the United States. If she is so effective in absentia in Egypt [ Images ], what havoc would she cause in person in Delhi? That was the question.
Kasab [ Images ] wiped Hillary Clinton [ Images ] off the television screens on the day she arrived in Delhi after her successful visit to Mumbai [ Images ], which set the tone for combating terrorism, boosting trade and enhancing economic cooperation.
The so-called confession by the terrorist should have been a non-event, which revealed no new facts, but he was given attributes of political judgement and a sense of timing. Analysts linked his confession to the India-Pakistan Joint Statement and the filing of charges in a Pakistani court and made it into the news of the decade. Hillary Clinton's visit looked like a side show beside the exploits of Kasab.
Strobe Talbott's FT op-ed suggesting that Hillary Clinton should deliver tough messages on climate change and non-proliferation made our knights put on their shining armour to take on the windmills.
There was nothing in the environment minister's speech which was new or earth-shaking. That is the language Indian climate change negotiators, including this writer, have been using ever since Rio in every forum. Ours are survival emissions and not luxury ones like those of the developed world and we would not sacrifice our development for the sake of environmental protection.
Indira Gandhi [ Images ] had declared in 1972 in Stockholm that poverty is the worst polluter and that the polluters must pay. It did not take any great courage to make these arguments, but to pre-empt a constructive discussion by posturing did not help matters.
Hillary had taken her climate change negotiator with her to India to look for solutions, not to repeat well known positions. He has been working diligently with the Chinese and eventually we will end up accepting a deal, which the Chinese will work out with the US and take credit for.
The achievements of the visit were modest. The agreement reached, but not signed, on defence matters, is a necessary formality if the defence contracts should fructify. No Administration in the US can go against a Congressional requirement, but the terms have to be such that our sovereign right to use the equipment in our best interests should not be compromised.
This must have been in the works since the 2005 signing of the Defence Agreement. It should not be beyond our officials to work out a formula, which would meet the requirement without hurting our interests.
Defence Minister Antony is not someone who is dazzled by US weapons technology. He will buy equipment after due deliberation and full consultations and he will sign nothing that will surrender our sovereignty. This is not the first time that assurances of end use have been given to secure supplies.
The progress on the nuclear deal is impressive. India's emphasis on commencing the reprocessing dialogue has been respected and the two sides will meet on neutral ground to work out the details.
The prophets of doom on the basis of moves within G-8 on enrichment and reprocessing technologies were surprised by Hillary's clarification that the contemplated prohibition would not apply to India. Now they are predicting that the truth will come out when the negotiations begin.
For the present at least, there is no reason to cry wolf. The US points are also being met by the allocation of two sites and the near completion of acceding to the Convention on Nuclear Damage.
Just after the Clinton visit, I spoke to someone close to the Obama [ Images ] Administration about the nuclear agreement. He said that he had no great expectation that India will buy nuclear reactors from the US.
The internal procedures for selling such equipment are so stringent that it will take years before any deal would be concluded. He said that the defence purchases and collaboration in combating terror were more crucial in maintaining the momentum of the relationship.
He pointed out that Hillary's reference to the syndicate of terrorism in Pakistan was a signal to India that it was not just the fight against the Taliban [ Images ] that was important, but also the elimination of terrorist outfits like the LeT.
Hillary was not at all combative in her approach to the major issues that remain to be tackled. She took a slightly long term perspective and signalled certain directions for solutions. Climate change, non-proliferation and trade are the three issues that need to be addressed in the new strategic dialogue.
More than just establishing the architecture for such a dialogue, she has given broad indications for finding a way. She established that while President Obama is engaged in more pressing problems, he considers cooperation with India a major part of his foreign policy.
On the question of matching protestations of India's importance with action to meet Indian aspirations for full participation in global governance, it was obvious that the Obama Administration had not yet come to any clear position.
To state that dialogue should continue on this issue is going behind square one. Earlier, there was at least an affirmation that India should have its place in bodies like the Security Council and G-8.
Nothing that Hillary Clinton did or said, at least publicly, has attracted criticism. This in itself is a sign of success. Further engagement is necessary to climb the heights and the two sides have at least set up a base camp to continue the climb in fair weather.
T P Sreenivasan is a former ambassador to Vienna [ Images ] and the United Nations. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, working on a book on India-US nuclear cooperation.
By T.P.Serrnivasan
Hillary Clinton, who was named after Sir Edmund Hillary [ Images ] whom her parents admired, set out on her own hazardous expedition to India well equipped and well prepared.
She could not have reached the summit in a hurry, given the treacherous glaciers on every step of the way, but she has covered some ground, set the course and is poised to climb further.
Two unrelated developments blinded the way as the journey began. The India-Pak Joint Statement from the venue of the NAM Summit completely spoiled the political climate in New Delhi [ Images ].
The polarisation was so acute that the whole thing, nothing more than a diplomatic fiasco, was seen as manipulation by the United States. If she is so effective in absentia in Egypt [ Images ], what havoc would she cause in person in Delhi? That was the question.
Kasab [ Images ] wiped Hillary Clinton [ Images ] off the television screens on the day she arrived in Delhi after her successful visit to Mumbai [ Images ], which set the tone for combating terrorism, boosting trade and enhancing economic cooperation.
The so-called confession by the terrorist should have been a non-event, which revealed no new facts, but he was given attributes of political judgement and a sense of timing. Analysts linked his confession to the India-Pakistan Joint Statement and the filing of charges in a Pakistani court and made it into the news of the decade. Hillary Clinton's visit looked like a side show beside the exploits of Kasab.
Strobe Talbott's FT op-ed suggesting that Hillary Clinton should deliver tough messages on climate change and non-proliferation made our knights put on their shining armour to take on the windmills.
There was nothing in the environment minister's speech which was new or earth-shaking. That is the language Indian climate change negotiators, including this writer, have been using ever since Rio in every forum. Ours are survival emissions and not luxury ones like those of the developed world and we would not sacrifice our development for the sake of environmental protection.
Indira Gandhi [ Images ] had declared in 1972 in Stockholm that poverty is the worst polluter and that the polluters must pay. It did not take any great courage to make these arguments, but to pre-empt a constructive discussion by posturing did not help matters.
Hillary had taken her climate change negotiator with her to India to look for solutions, not to repeat well known positions. He has been working diligently with the Chinese and eventually we will end up accepting a deal, which the Chinese will work out with the US and take credit for.
The achievements of the visit were modest. The agreement reached, but not signed, on defence matters, is a necessary formality if the defence contracts should fructify. No Administration in the US can go against a Congressional requirement, but the terms have to be such that our sovereign right to use the equipment in our best interests should not be compromised.
This must have been in the works since the 2005 signing of the Defence Agreement. It should not be beyond our officials to work out a formula, which would meet the requirement without hurting our interests.
Defence Minister Antony is not someone who is dazzled by US weapons technology. He will buy equipment after due deliberation and full consultations and he will sign nothing that will surrender our sovereignty. This is not the first time that assurances of end use have been given to secure supplies.
The progress on the nuclear deal is impressive. India's emphasis on commencing the reprocessing dialogue has been respected and the two sides will meet on neutral ground to work out the details.
The prophets of doom on the basis of moves within G-8 on enrichment and reprocessing technologies were surprised by Hillary's clarification that the contemplated prohibition would not apply to India. Now they are predicting that the truth will come out when the negotiations begin.
For the present at least, there is no reason to cry wolf. The US points are also being met by the allocation of two sites and the near completion of acceding to the Convention on Nuclear Damage.
Just after the Clinton visit, I spoke to someone close to the Obama [ Images ] Administration about the nuclear agreement. He said that he had no great expectation that India will buy nuclear reactors from the US.
The internal procedures for selling such equipment are so stringent that it will take years before any deal would be concluded. He said that the defence purchases and collaboration in combating terror were more crucial in maintaining the momentum of the relationship.
He pointed out that Hillary's reference to the syndicate of terrorism in Pakistan was a signal to India that it was not just the fight against the Taliban [ Images ] that was important, but also the elimination of terrorist outfits like the LeT.
Hillary was not at all combative in her approach to the major issues that remain to be tackled. She took a slightly long term perspective and signalled certain directions for solutions. Climate change, non-proliferation and trade are the three issues that need to be addressed in the new strategic dialogue.
More than just establishing the architecture for such a dialogue, she has given broad indications for finding a way. She established that while President Obama is engaged in more pressing problems, he considers cooperation with India a major part of his foreign policy.
On the question of matching protestations of India's importance with action to meet Indian aspirations for full participation in global governance, it was obvious that the Obama Administration had not yet come to any clear position.
To state that dialogue should continue on this issue is going behind square one. Earlier, there was at least an affirmation that India should have its place in bodies like the Security Council and G-8.
Nothing that Hillary Clinton did or said, at least publicly, has attracted criticism. This in itself is a sign of success. Further engagement is necessary to climb the heights and the two sides have at least set up a base camp to continue the climb in fair weather.
T P Sreenivasan is a former ambassador to Vienna [ Images ] and the United Nations. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, working on a book on India-US nuclear cooperation.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Good Intention, Bad Drafting
By T.P.Sreenivasan
I have lived all my professional life with comments from fellow Indians that Pakistani diplomats were smarter than the Indian ones. The only consolation was that, according to Pakistani diplomats, they heard from their nationals that Indians were way ahead of them.
In fact, no one could tell, as both were smart and often the outsiders marvelled at the brilliance of South Asian diplomats. Any document produced between them was so balanced that both could claim victory.
But for once, the Indian diplomats have been outsmarted by the Pakistanis in Egypt [ Images ]. The joint statement may be no sellout in substance because India has made it clear that the composite dialogue will begin only after verifiable action is taken by Pakistan. But the text simply says the opposite.
'Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues.'
This is simple English language, which cannot be interpreted in any way other than as a commitment by India not only to begin the dialogue without waiting for any action by Pakistan this time, but also not to suspend it even if there are other terrorist incidents in the future. There is only give and no take in this particular instance.
Some may claim that there is a major 'take' in the text in the form of the missing 'K' word. Yes, the word 'Kashmir' is not there in the text. But why all issues, including 'all outstanding issues'? Why did not the sentence stop with 'all issues with Pakistan'? Quite obviously, Kashmir is the outstanding issue in the text, as anyone can see.
The very fact that Pakistani spokesmen are gloating over their success, while many Indian thinkers and writers are agitated is proof, if proof were needed, that, for once, our capable diplomats let their guard down and let the Pakistanis run with the ball. There is no escape route in the text, even if our cleverest spokesmen like Minister of State Shashi Tharoor [ Images ], who apparently had no say in the drafting, argue that our options are open.
The only way is to refrain from starting the composite dialogue till we have satisfaction over Pakistani action on Mumbai [ Images ]. We simply do not budge and stick to our position regardless of the language of the statement.
I have no quarrel with the idea of resumption of talks if that indeed is the intention. There may be matters, which are not in the public domain, in the mind of the prime minister. He may want to strengthen the democratic forces in Pakistan as against the army and the ISI and President Zardari may well gain by the Indian gesture.
It may also please the Americans in light of the Hillary visit. But if that is the intention, we do not need to hide behind ambiguity. There may be some merit in saying in public what we say privately. If the honest judgement is that it will serve the national interests, by all means let us go for it. Let us not lose the substance and preserve the form.
NAM summits seem to be the places where we make concessions to Pakistan. It was in Havana that India conceded for the first time that Pakistan was as much a victim of terror as India was. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Pakistan was the obvious target in the eyes of the members of the UN when we talked about terrorism. We had managed to create such a vocabulary over the years and Pakistan felt compelled to exercise its right of reply every time the word, 'terrorism' was mentioned.
By conceding that the greatest perpetrator of terror against India was a victim of terror, we let Pakistan off the hook. Moreover, since Pakistan accuses India of State terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir [ Images ] and also in Lahore [ Images ], we were also unwittingly accepting the allegation.
By stating that 'terrorism is the main threat to both the countries' with an unprecedented reference to Baluchistan, we have given away our trump card. This aspect of the statement is even more damaging for us.
To say that the sentence on Baluchistan has been attributed to the prime minister of Pakistan is to question the whole logic of bilateral statements. Otherwise, why not have a sentence attributed to the Indian prime minister that Kashmir is an integral part of India?
The UN records are replete with the various tricks that Pakistan has tried to tie us in knots. One instance deserves special mention. In the midst of the preparatory work for the Vienna [ Images ] Conference on Human Rights in Geneva, the Indian delegate had to leave the committee to walk her dog.
Using this opportunity, the Pakistani delegate moved an amendment to the text to urge member states to refrain from violating human rights in 'UN recognised disputed territories'.
The committee was willing to accept it, but the chairman kept it pending till he could consult the Indian delegate. She was told the next day that the amendment would be included if India had no objection. She called me in New York and asked whether she could let it go. I was aghast because it was a thinly veiled reference to Jammu and Kashmir. There were many disputes in the world, but Kashmir was the only one which was mentioned as a disputed territory in every UN map. We were saved from great embarrassment because of the thoughtfulness of the chairman.
India-Pakistan problems have made their contribution to many UN resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. One celebrated case is on the question of self-determination. Although the UN Charter declares that all peoples have the right to self-determination, India had reserved its position on this issue.
India and Pakistan used to quarrel over this problem for many years, but it was agreed between us that all peoples 'under alien or colonial domination' have the right to self- determination, much to the relief of the rest of the world. Whenever the issue came up, this phrase was inserted and there was no more argument on it. I do not know the history of that formulation, but we believe that Palestine, but not Jammu and Kashmir, is covered by it.
I remember we had to put 'state(s)' in a text on peace-keeping because we wanted plural and Pakistan wanted singular. We were willing to accept 'state or states,' but Pakistan would not agree. We had the last laugh because neither the Chinese nor the Arabic text could accommodate the grand compromise between India and Pakistan. They just wrote 'state or states' without realising that it was not acceptable to Pakistan.
The latest joint statement may well become historic like the other compromises, but no interpretation of the text will meet our position unless we believe that terror or no terror, we will proceed with the composite dialogue. It will not matter since the battle will be in the composite talks and we will certainly mind our language there.
Former Ambassador T P Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.
By T.P.Sreenivasan
I have lived all my professional life with comments from fellow Indians that Pakistani diplomats were smarter than the Indian ones. The only consolation was that, according to Pakistani diplomats, they heard from their nationals that Indians were way ahead of them.
In fact, no one could tell, as both were smart and often the outsiders marvelled at the brilliance of South Asian diplomats. Any document produced between them was so balanced that both could claim victory.
But for once, the Indian diplomats have been outsmarted by the Pakistanis in Egypt [ Images ]. The joint statement may be no sellout in substance because India has made it clear that the composite dialogue will begin only after verifiable action is taken by Pakistan. But the text simply says the opposite.
'Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues.'
This is simple English language, which cannot be interpreted in any way other than as a commitment by India not only to begin the dialogue without waiting for any action by Pakistan this time, but also not to suspend it even if there are other terrorist incidents in the future. There is only give and no take in this particular instance.
Some may claim that there is a major 'take' in the text in the form of the missing 'K' word. Yes, the word 'Kashmir' is not there in the text. But why all issues, including 'all outstanding issues'? Why did not the sentence stop with 'all issues with Pakistan'? Quite obviously, Kashmir is the outstanding issue in the text, as anyone can see.
The very fact that Pakistani spokesmen are gloating over their success, while many Indian thinkers and writers are agitated is proof, if proof were needed, that, for once, our capable diplomats let their guard down and let the Pakistanis run with the ball. There is no escape route in the text, even if our cleverest spokesmen like Minister of State Shashi Tharoor [ Images ], who apparently had no say in the drafting, argue that our options are open.
The only way is to refrain from starting the composite dialogue till we have satisfaction over Pakistani action on Mumbai [ Images ]. We simply do not budge and stick to our position regardless of the language of the statement.
I have no quarrel with the idea of resumption of talks if that indeed is the intention. There may be matters, which are not in the public domain, in the mind of the prime minister. He may want to strengthen the democratic forces in Pakistan as against the army and the ISI and President Zardari may well gain by the Indian gesture.
It may also please the Americans in light of the Hillary visit. But if that is the intention, we do not need to hide behind ambiguity. There may be some merit in saying in public what we say privately. If the honest judgement is that it will serve the national interests, by all means let us go for it. Let us not lose the substance and preserve the form.
NAM summits seem to be the places where we make concessions to Pakistan. It was in Havana that India conceded for the first time that Pakistan was as much a victim of terror as India was. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Pakistan was the obvious target in the eyes of the members of the UN when we talked about terrorism. We had managed to create such a vocabulary over the years and Pakistan felt compelled to exercise its right of reply every time the word, 'terrorism' was mentioned.
By conceding that the greatest perpetrator of terror against India was a victim of terror, we let Pakistan off the hook. Moreover, since Pakistan accuses India of State terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir [ Images ] and also in Lahore [ Images ], we were also unwittingly accepting the allegation.
By stating that 'terrorism is the main threat to both the countries' with an unprecedented reference to Baluchistan, we have given away our trump card. This aspect of the statement is even more damaging for us.
To say that the sentence on Baluchistan has been attributed to the prime minister of Pakistan is to question the whole logic of bilateral statements. Otherwise, why not have a sentence attributed to the Indian prime minister that Kashmir is an integral part of India?
The UN records are replete with the various tricks that Pakistan has tried to tie us in knots. One instance deserves special mention. In the midst of the preparatory work for the Vienna [ Images ] Conference on Human Rights in Geneva, the Indian delegate had to leave the committee to walk her dog.
Using this opportunity, the Pakistani delegate moved an amendment to the text to urge member states to refrain from violating human rights in 'UN recognised disputed territories'.
The committee was willing to accept it, but the chairman kept it pending till he could consult the Indian delegate. She was told the next day that the amendment would be included if India had no objection. She called me in New York and asked whether she could let it go. I was aghast because it was a thinly veiled reference to Jammu and Kashmir. There were many disputes in the world, but Kashmir was the only one which was mentioned as a disputed territory in every UN map. We were saved from great embarrassment because of the thoughtfulness of the chairman.
India-Pakistan problems have made their contribution to many UN resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. One celebrated case is on the question of self-determination. Although the UN Charter declares that all peoples have the right to self-determination, India had reserved its position on this issue.
India and Pakistan used to quarrel over this problem for many years, but it was agreed between us that all peoples 'under alien or colonial domination' have the right to self- determination, much to the relief of the rest of the world. Whenever the issue came up, this phrase was inserted and there was no more argument on it. I do not know the history of that formulation, but we believe that Palestine, but not Jammu and Kashmir, is covered by it.
I remember we had to put 'state(s)' in a text on peace-keeping because we wanted plural and Pakistan wanted singular. We were willing to accept 'state or states,' but Pakistan would not agree. We had the last laugh because neither the Chinese nor the Arabic text could accommodate the grand compromise between India and Pakistan. They just wrote 'state or states' without realising that it was not acceptable to Pakistan.
The latest joint statement may well become historic like the other compromises, but no interpretation of the text will meet our position unless we believe that terror or no terror, we will proceed with the composite dialogue. It will not matter since the battle will be in the composite talks and we will certainly mind our language there.
Former Ambassador T P Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Remarks by Former Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan at the Brookings
Institution on July 15, 2009
Thank you, Steve, for your generous remarks. Let me thank you also for
inviting me to spend a delightful two months at the Brookings and for
mentoring me. Five years after retiring from the Indian Foreign
Service, I felt the need for some education and that prompted me to
seek this opportunity and it has been a marvelous experience. I am
grateful to the entire Brookings community, particularly President
Strobe Talbott, for the many courtesies extended to me. A special word
of gratitude to Dhruva Jaishankar, who has been most helpful. He
constantly reminded me of his father, Ambassador Jaishankar, who was a
young recruit to the Indian Foreign Service when I met him many years
ago.
I should also place on record my gratitude to Mr. Sreedhar Menon and
Mr. Tushar Kothari for joining hands with Brookings to make my
Fellowship possible.
The purpose of this presentation is not to give you any dramatic
findings from my study of India –US nuclear cooperation in the last
two months. I shall reserve them for my book. Today, I would rather
seek to elicit insights from you into the subject of India-US nuclear
cooperation, particularly the prospects for such cooperation in the
new setting in the US and in India.
I had noticed a certain nuclear deal fatigue in Washington, though
many of its architects and its opponents gave me their time quite
liberally. The forthcoming visit of the Secretary of State to India
and a G-8 decision on reprocessing and enrichment has, however,
generated new interest in the subject, at least in India.
The US voted for change, drastic change, while India voted for no
change. Of course, neither of the electorates had India- US relations
on their mind when they voted. But the advent of new governments in
the US and India cannot but have a major impact on India-US relations,
more so on nuclear cooperation.
In India, the Manmohan Singh Government received a new mandate, but
with a significant difference in its composition . The new coalition
is more cohesive, with the Congress Party in a commanding position.
Even more significantly, the leftist parties are not a part of the
coalition. The left parties had left the coalition on the issue of the
strategic partnership with the United States and, more specifically,
the nuclear deal and fought the election on that issue. Therefore, the
victory of the Congress party is a vindication of its policy of
seeking a closer relationship with the US and it will not be
constrained by the reservations of the leftists. In the US, the new
administration is committed to a strategic relationship with India,
but it includes individuals, who have held the view that the nuclear
deal does not contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the
US. The priorities of the new administration also seem to have changed
on account of the global economic crisis and the developments in the
Afpak region. Ironically, the coyness of the former Government of
India has now shifted to the new administration in the US, making it
still difficult for them to become embracing democracies.
To explore whether the nuclear deal has any chance of being
implemented by the present administration, we need to go into the
reasons why the Bush administration made the policies necessary to
sign a 123 agreement with India. The conventional wisdom is that
development of a strategic relationship with India to balance China,
gaining access to the emerging market in India and bringing India into
the non-proliferation regime are among the reasons. These reasons
still hold good today, though Democrats have traditionally been
comfortable with China. Against the background of global recession,
the US is likely to be more sensitive to Chinese views, which include
opposition to the nuclear agreement. But the proclaimed commitment of
the Obama administration to implement the nuclear agreement could be
attributed to the continuing validity of some of the original reasons.
No one doubts the desire of the new administration to strengthen and
diversify India-US relations, an idea, which the Bush administration
had inherited from the Clinton administration.
Perhaps, it is the adherence of the Obama administration to the
non-proliferation regime, which will create roadblocks in the
implementation of the agreement. It is far from clear whether the Bush
administration meant the agreement with India to be the beginning of
the end of the NPT regime. Possibly, it did not love NPT less, but
loved India more. If, in the process of shaping a new arrangement with
India, the NPT regime suffered, it did not seem to be of concern. A
moratorium, rather than ratification of the CTBT, was sufficient to
bring India into the nuclear mainstream. Similarly, a commitment to
negotiate an FMCT in good faith and to sign it, when ready, was
adequate and no interim measure was necessary to cease production of
fissile materials. More than anything else, India’s possession of
nuclear weapons and absence of comprehensive safeguards did not stand
in the way of India having the same rights and privileges as other
responsible states like the US. These might all be anathema to some of
the
Non-proliferation champions in the new administration.
Although President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons
is welcome to India, the path he has chosen to reach there is strewn
with dangers that may upstage the nuclear agreement. If the US Senate
ratifies the CTBT and the pressure is mounted on India to sign the
it, the two countries are likely to be on a collision course. Indian
public opinion was seen to be strongly in favor of an option to test
and one of the virtues of the agreement is that it does not expressly
prohibit testing. “We have the right to test and they have the right
to react” is the grand compromise that sold the agreement to the
Indian public. How long do the two countries have before a crisis
arises on this issue? FMCT is at some distance, but much depends on
how soon and in what form the FMCT will present itself. The
possibility of difficulties arising on this cannot be ruled out,
depending on the timing of the finalization of the FMCT.
As for the issues that the previous administration left unresolved
such as reprocessing and perpetuity of supplies, the situation is even
grimmer. A decision by G-8 to refrain from transferring enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to non-NPT countries has already set the
Ganges on fire. The fear is that the G-8 countries in the NSG will try
to reopen the clean waiver given to India, following the latest
decision. It has been pointed out that the G-8 decisions are not
binding; the NSG waiver cannot be reopened except by consensus and
that ENR material transfers, according to the 123 Agreement, were
“subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and
license policies”. It is also a fact that President Obama is not
enthusiastic about reprocessing even within the US, On June 29,
2009,he quietly cancelled a lengthy environmental review that was the
first step in allowing the resumption of commercial nuclear
reprocessing in the US. But anything that affects full civilian
nuclear cooperation is seen as detrimental to the spirit of the
agreement.
Another concern is that the agreed dialogue on reprocessing may itself
run into rough weather as the Indian position is that it cannot buy
anything
from the US till this as well as the perpetuity of supplies issue are
resolved. The US, on the other hand, attaches importance to India
signing the Convention on Nuclear Damages and earmarking two sites for
American nuclear parks. Some experts have suggested that these issues
are not so urgent, because India can merrily go on purchasing material
from other countries, leaving the US out. This approach can hardly
please the Americans, including the architects of the agreement.
Another aspect of the nuclear cooperation I would like to explore is
the linkage between the talks between Jaswant Singh and
Strobe Talbott and the 123 agreement. I had seen it as a logical
outcome of the marathon talks as the five benchmarks that Talbott had
put forward figure in one form or the other in the Joint Statement.
Headway was made in the talks on CTBT, FMCT, export controls and India
had no problem in working for the normalization of relations with
Pakistan. The only issue on which there was no progress was the
so-called strategic restraint, which had to do with the nuclear
weapons India has developed. When the US decided to exclude the
military installations from the purview of the agreement, a meeting
point suddenly emerged and an agreement became possible. In effect, it
was a change in the US insistence on strategic restraint that led to
the new understanding.
But there are others, who believe that that the agreement was a new
idea, invented by the Bush administration and that the previous talks
and the NSSP discussions were useful only in creating the atmospherics
for the
agreement. “Clinton created the atmospherics, we created policy”, an
architect of the agreement told me. This lets the BJP off the hook for
disowning an agreement they had initiated. But this is a point worth
investigating. I know for a fact that the BJP Government had mooted
the idea of inspection of additional nuclear facilities in return for
relaxation of the technology denial regime.
Today, there are a number of proposals for the globe to move towards
nuclear disarmament. Even some of the cold warriors are moving away
from the deterrence doctrine to recommend not only reduction, but also
elimination of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia are in the process
of taking the initial steps in that direction. Some cynics are of the
view that these proposals are designed merely to avoid a breakdown of
the NPT Review Conference in 2010. Some movement towards nuclear
disarmament may prompt non-nuclear weapon states to recommit
themselves to their nuclear virginity. The India-US nuclear agreement
is likely to get some attention in this context. It remains to be seen
whether the US would go slow on the implementation of the agreement to
avoid criticism on that account.
The relationship between defense and nuclear cooperation has been a
matter of discussion in India. The leftist parties had alleged that
massive acquisition of weapons from the US was a precondition for the
nuclear agreement. It is to be explored whether defense cooperation
will provide sufficient incentive for the US to maintain nuclear
cooperation even if there is delay in nuclear trade.
.
These issues I have raised are by no means exhaustive. Since the
agreement is unprecedented, it is not easy to anticipate every problem
that is likely to arise. I would very much encourage a discussion on
these and other aspects. I am sure that I will greatly benefit from
your views and advice. On that will depend the nature of the study I
am planning to produce.
Thank you.
Institution on July 15, 2009
Thank you, Steve, for your generous remarks. Let me thank you also for
inviting me to spend a delightful two months at the Brookings and for
mentoring me. Five years after retiring from the Indian Foreign
Service, I felt the need for some education and that prompted me to
seek this opportunity and it has been a marvelous experience. I am
grateful to the entire Brookings community, particularly President
Strobe Talbott, for the many courtesies extended to me. A special word
of gratitude to Dhruva Jaishankar, who has been most helpful. He
constantly reminded me of his father, Ambassador Jaishankar, who was a
young recruit to the Indian Foreign Service when I met him many years
ago.
I should also place on record my gratitude to Mr. Sreedhar Menon and
Mr. Tushar Kothari for joining hands with Brookings to make my
Fellowship possible.
The purpose of this presentation is not to give you any dramatic
findings from my study of India –US nuclear cooperation in the last
two months. I shall reserve them for my book. Today, I would rather
seek to elicit insights from you into the subject of India-US nuclear
cooperation, particularly the prospects for such cooperation in the
new setting in the US and in India.
I had noticed a certain nuclear deal fatigue in Washington, though
many of its architects and its opponents gave me their time quite
liberally. The forthcoming visit of the Secretary of State to India
and a G-8 decision on reprocessing and enrichment has, however,
generated new interest in the subject, at least in India.
The US voted for change, drastic change, while India voted for no
change. Of course, neither of the electorates had India- US relations
on their mind when they voted. But the advent of new governments in
the US and India cannot but have a major impact on India-US relations,
more so on nuclear cooperation.
In India, the Manmohan Singh Government received a new mandate, but
with a significant difference in its composition . The new coalition
is more cohesive, with the Congress Party in a commanding position.
Even more significantly, the leftist parties are not a part of the
coalition. The left parties had left the coalition on the issue of the
strategic partnership with the United States and, more specifically,
the nuclear deal and fought the election on that issue. Therefore, the
victory of the Congress party is a vindication of its policy of
seeking a closer relationship with the US and it will not be
constrained by the reservations of the leftists. In the US, the new
administration is committed to a strategic relationship with India,
but it includes individuals, who have held the view that the nuclear
deal does not contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the
US. The priorities of the new administration also seem to have changed
on account of the global economic crisis and the developments in the
Afpak region. Ironically, the coyness of the former Government of
India has now shifted to the new administration in the US, making it
still difficult for them to become embracing democracies.
To explore whether the nuclear deal has any chance of being
implemented by the present administration, we need to go into the
reasons why the Bush administration made the policies necessary to
sign a 123 agreement with India. The conventional wisdom is that
development of a strategic relationship with India to balance China,
gaining access to the emerging market in India and bringing India into
the non-proliferation regime are among the reasons. These reasons
still hold good today, though Democrats have traditionally been
comfortable with China. Against the background of global recession,
the US is likely to be more sensitive to Chinese views, which include
opposition to the nuclear agreement. But the proclaimed commitment of
the Obama administration to implement the nuclear agreement could be
attributed to the continuing validity of some of the original reasons.
No one doubts the desire of the new administration to strengthen and
diversify India-US relations, an idea, which the Bush administration
had inherited from the Clinton administration.
Perhaps, it is the adherence of the Obama administration to the
non-proliferation regime, which will create roadblocks in the
implementation of the agreement. It is far from clear whether the Bush
administration meant the agreement with India to be the beginning of
the end of the NPT regime. Possibly, it did not love NPT less, but
loved India more. If, in the process of shaping a new arrangement with
India, the NPT regime suffered, it did not seem to be of concern. A
moratorium, rather than ratification of the CTBT, was sufficient to
bring India into the nuclear mainstream. Similarly, a commitment to
negotiate an FMCT in good faith and to sign it, when ready, was
adequate and no interim measure was necessary to cease production of
fissile materials. More than anything else, India’s possession of
nuclear weapons and absence of comprehensive safeguards did not stand
in the way of India having the same rights and privileges as other
responsible states like the US. These might all be anathema to some of
the
Non-proliferation champions in the new administration.
Although President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons
is welcome to India, the path he has chosen to reach there is strewn
with dangers that may upstage the nuclear agreement. If the US Senate
ratifies the CTBT and the pressure is mounted on India to sign the
it, the two countries are likely to be on a collision course. Indian
public opinion was seen to be strongly in favor of an option to test
and one of the virtues of the agreement is that it does not expressly
prohibit testing. “We have the right to test and they have the right
to react” is the grand compromise that sold the agreement to the
Indian public. How long do the two countries have before a crisis
arises on this issue? FMCT is at some distance, but much depends on
how soon and in what form the FMCT will present itself. The
possibility of difficulties arising on this cannot be ruled out,
depending on the timing of the finalization of the FMCT.
As for the issues that the previous administration left unresolved
such as reprocessing and perpetuity of supplies, the situation is even
grimmer. A decision by G-8 to refrain from transferring enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to non-NPT countries has already set the
Ganges on fire. The fear is that the G-8 countries in the NSG will try
to reopen the clean waiver given to India, following the latest
decision. It has been pointed out that the G-8 decisions are not
binding; the NSG waiver cannot be reopened except by consensus and
that ENR material transfers, according to the 123 Agreement, were
“subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and
license policies”. It is also a fact that President Obama is not
enthusiastic about reprocessing even within the US, On June 29,
2009,he quietly cancelled a lengthy environmental review that was the
first step in allowing the resumption of commercial nuclear
reprocessing in the US. But anything that affects full civilian
nuclear cooperation is seen as detrimental to the spirit of the
agreement.
Another concern is that the agreed dialogue on reprocessing may itself
run into rough weather as the Indian position is that it cannot buy
anything
from the US till this as well as the perpetuity of supplies issue are
resolved. The US, on the other hand, attaches importance to India
signing the Convention on Nuclear Damages and earmarking two sites for
American nuclear parks. Some experts have suggested that these issues
are not so urgent, because India can merrily go on purchasing material
from other countries, leaving the US out. This approach can hardly
please the Americans, including the architects of the agreement.
Another aspect of the nuclear cooperation I would like to explore is
the linkage between the talks between Jaswant Singh and
Strobe Talbott and the 123 agreement. I had seen it as a logical
outcome of the marathon talks as the five benchmarks that Talbott had
put forward figure in one form or the other in the Joint Statement.
Headway was made in the talks on CTBT, FMCT, export controls and India
had no problem in working for the normalization of relations with
Pakistan. The only issue on which there was no progress was the
so-called strategic restraint, which had to do with the nuclear
weapons India has developed. When the US decided to exclude the
military installations from the purview of the agreement, a meeting
point suddenly emerged and an agreement became possible. In effect, it
was a change in the US insistence on strategic restraint that led to
the new understanding.
But there are others, who believe that that the agreement was a new
idea, invented by the Bush administration and that the previous talks
and the NSSP discussions were useful only in creating the atmospherics
for the
agreement. “Clinton created the atmospherics, we created policy”, an
architect of the agreement told me. This lets the BJP off the hook for
disowning an agreement they had initiated. But this is a point worth
investigating. I know for a fact that the BJP Government had mooted
the idea of inspection of additional nuclear facilities in return for
relaxation of the technology denial regime.
Today, there are a number of proposals for the globe to move towards
nuclear disarmament. Even some of the cold warriors are moving away
from the deterrence doctrine to recommend not only reduction, but also
elimination of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia are in the process
of taking the initial steps in that direction. Some cynics are of the
view that these proposals are designed merely to avoid a breakdown of
the NPT Review Conference in 2010. Some movement towards nuclear
disarmament may prompt non-nuclear weapon states to recommit
themselves to their nuclear virginity. The India-US nuclear agreement
is likely to get some attention in this context. It remains to be seen
whether the US would go slow on the implementation of the agreement to
avoid criticism on that account.
The relationship between defense and nuclear cooperation has been a
matter of discussion in India. The leftist parties had alleged that
massive acquisition of weapons from the US was a precondition for the
nuclear agreement. It is to be explored whether defense cooperation
will provide sufficient incentive for the US to maintain nuclear
cooperation even if there is delay in nuclear trade.
.
These issues I have raised are by no means exhaustive. Since the
agreement is unprecedented, it is not easy to anticipate every problem
that is likely to arise. I would very much encourage a discussion on
these and other aspects. I am sure that I will greatly benefit from
your views and advice. On that will depend the nature of the study I
am planning to produce.
Thank you.
Hillary's Passage to India
By T.P. Sreenivasan
India adored Edmund Hillary, a New Zealander who conquered Mount Everest in 1953 long before Hillary Clinton came on the scene. That name recognition may have contributed to Hillary Clinton being referred to as “(D-Punjab)” in a memo from Barack Obama’s campaign during their fight for the nomination. As she sets out on her journey to India today in her new capacity as secretary of state, she has as much a hazardous climb ahead of her as Sir Hillary had in the previous century.
The recent elections in India and the United States will have a profound impact on the ties between the two countries. The Bush Administration was ready for a tight embrace of India, but India shied away because of the hesitation of the leftists, who were part of the ruling coalition. But today, when India is ready to move forward with a popular mandate, it appears that it is the turn of the U.S. to backtrack. Priorities seem to have changed on the Potomac. Short-term concerns may well have overtaken the logic for building a long term relationship.
Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton have set the right tone with India, but it is on policy that trouble may arise. The contours of the nuclear agreement with India, in particular, do not fit neatly into the policy framework of the Democrats. In the eyes of some Obama advisers, the nuclear deal was a sellout to India and, given a choice, they would retrieve much of what was negotiated by Bush. But the Obama Administration is committed to the implementation of the deal in a way that it does not hurt the nonproliferation objectives of the U.S. India, on the other hand, wishes to consolidate the gains of the Bush era and build on them.
The next steps that each country has in mind do not coincide. The U.S. side wants India to adhere to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages to provide liability protection to U.S. companies and announce two nuclear reactor park sites for U.S. firms. The Indians would rather tackle the modalities of reprocessing and tie up perpetuity of supplies. The latest G-8 decision to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing items to non-NPT countries strikes at the very root of full civil nuclear cooperation. This move might jeopardize the talks scheduled for modalities of reprocessing. What would happen to the spent fuel from Tarapur if reprocessing is not facilitated? This partnership may end up looking like a three-legged race in which two athletes are tethered together but incapable of deploying their collective strength.
The path to a world without nuclear weapons that Mr. Obama delineates is also different from the Indian vision. He sees the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as the major milestones in this journey. India can hardly afford to embrace these as it has to preserve and protect its minimum deterrent against real and immediate threats.
Other tensions are brewing as well: Indian industry has anxieties over Mr. Obama’s emphasis on moving jobs from Bangalore to Buffalo, when the market forces dictate movement in the opposite direction. Skills developed in India and facilities set up exclusively for the U.S. market should not become monuments of failed theories of globalization.
War on terror is a common responsibility for the U.S. and India and a primary area of cooperation. But the biggest perpetrator of terror on India is also the chief fighter of terrorism for the U.S. The U.S will not talk to terrorists, but it wants India to keep talking to Pakistan even after the horror in Mumbai. Moreover, the U.S. persists with old solutions for new problems such as propping up regimes with dollar infusions. Mrs. Clinton will face questions in India as to what guarantees the U.S. has extracted about the end use of the lethal weapons that are gifted to Pakistan.
At the G-8 summit earlier this month, India once again called for the reform of the Security Council as an imperative for equity in the new international matrix. As though in anticipation, Mrs. Clinton made the tantalizing offer “to cooperate with New Delhi as it shoulders the responsibilities that accompany its new position of global leadership.” She should know that nothing short of a commitment to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council on objective criteria such as population and constructive contributions will meet the aspirations of New Delhi. If she can make that commitment, she needs to do nothing else to make the visit historic. Signing some agreements or setting up commissions will not have the same impact.
Sir Hillary did not climb Everest by himself. He shared his moment of glory with an Indian, Tenzing Norgay, whose contribution may well have been as significant. Mrs. Clinton will have the same support if she is willing to share the view from the summit with her Indian counterpart, S.M. Krishna, by no means a novice in statesmanship.
Mr. Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Istitution in Washington. He was India’s deputy ambassador to the U.S. from 1997 to 2000 and permanent representative to the United Nations from 2000 to 2004.
By T.P. Sreenivasan
India adored Edmund Hillary, a New Zealander who conquered Mount Everest in 1953 long before Hillary Clinton came on the scene. That name recognition may have contributed to Hillary Clinton being referred to as “(D-Punjab)” in a memo from Barack Obama’s campaign during their fight for the nomination. As she sets out on her journey to India today in her new capacity as secretary of state, she has as much a hazardous climb ahead of her as Sir Hillary had in the previous century.
The recent elections in India and the United States will have a profound impact on the ties between the two countries. The Bush Administration was ready for a tight embrace of India, but India shied away because of the hesitation of the leftists, who were part of the ruling coalition. But today, when India is ready to move forward with a popular mandate, it appears that it is the turn of the U.S. to backtrack. Priorities seem to have changed on the Potomac. Short-term concerns may well have overtaken the logic for building a long term relationship.
Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton have set the right tone with India, but it is on policy that trouble may arise. The contours of the nuclear agreement with India, in particular, do not fit neatly into the policy framework of the Democrats. In the eyes of some Obama advisers, the nuclear deal was a sellout to India and, given a choice, they would retrieve much of what was negotiated by Bush. But the Obama Administration is committed to the implementation of the deal in a way that it does not hurt the nonproliferation objectives of the U.S. India, on the other hand, wishes to consolidate the gains of the Bush era and build on them.
The next steps that each country has in mind do not coincide. The U.S. side wants India to adhere to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages to provide liability protection to U.S. companies and announce two nuclear reactor park sites for U.S. firms. The Indians would rather tackle the modalities of reprocessing and tie up perpetuity of supplies. The latest G-8 decision to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing items to non-NPT countries strikes at the very root of full civil nuclear cooperation. This move might jeopardize the talks scheduled for modalities of reprocessing. What would happen to the spent fuel from Tarapur if reprocessing is not facilitated? This partnership may end up looking like a three-legged race in which two athletes are tethered together but incapable of deploying their collective strength.
The path to a world without nuclear weapons that Mr. Obama delineates is also different from the Indian vision. He sees the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as the major milestones in this journey. India can hardly afford to embrace these as it has to preserve and protect its minimum deterrent against real and immediate threats.
Other tensions are brewing as well: Indian industry has anxieties over Mr. Obama’s emphasis on moving jobs from Bangalore to Buffalo, when the market forces dictate movement in the opposite direction. Skills developed in India and facilities set up exclusively for the U.S. market should not become monuments of failed theories of globalization.
War on terror is a common responsibility for the U.S. and India and a primary area of cooperation. But the biggest perpetrator of terror on India is also the chief fighter of terrorism for the U.S. The U.S will not talk to terrorists, but it wants India to keep talking to Pakistan even after the horror in Mumbai. Moreover, the U.S. persists with old solutions for new problems such as propping up regimes with dollar infusions. Mrs. Clinton will face questions in India as to what guarantees the U.S. has extracted about the end use of the lethal weapons that are gifted to Pakistan.
At the G-8 summit earlier this month, India once again called for the reform of the Security Council as an imperative for equity in the new international matrix. As though in anticipation, Mrs. Clinton made the tantalizing offer “to cooperate with New Delhi as it shoulders the responsibilities that accompany its new position of global leadership.” She should know that nothing short of a commitment to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council on objective criteria such as population and constructive contributions will meet the aspirations of New Delhi. If she can make that commitment, she needs to do nothing else to make the visit historic. Signing some agreements or setting up commissions will not have the same impact.
Sir Hillary did not climb Everest by himself. He shared his moment of glory with an Indian, Tenzing Norgay, whose contribution may well have been as significant. Mrs. Clinton will have the same support if she is willing to share the view from the summit with her Indian counterpart, S.M. Krishna, by no means a novice in statesmanship.
Mr. Sreenivasan is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Istitution in Washington. He was India’s deputy ambassador to the U.S. from 1997 to 2000 and permanent representative to the United Nations from 2000 to 2004.
Sunday, July 12, 2009
Remarks by former Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan at the Amma Satsang in Washington
July 12, 2009
I am greatly privileged to be invited to say a few words in the
presence of the highly revered, respected and loved Amma. Like all of
you, I am here to pay my respects to her, to hear her, to pray with
her and to seek solace in her divine embrace
.
I have been given this privilege perhaps because I had the great
honour to represent India abroad, including in the United States, for
many years. India is a land hallowed by a galaxy of saints
and seers like Amma, who have enriched the spiritual life of humanity.
I have also had other blessings. I was born and
brought up in a village not far from the place, where Amma grew up.
All of you understand Amma’s language of love, but I am one of those
who can also understand her mother tongue. And most of all, my wife
and I had the privilege of receiving Amma in our humble home in
Maryland ten years ago. We still cherish her visit and the love and
affection she showered on us.
I do not need to speak to you, who are devotees of Amma about her uniqueness and greatness.
You know more than me about her
boundless love for all of us and to humanity itself. The uniqueness of
Amma, as I said in my book, which includes a chapter on her, is that
her message is simple and direct. Unconditional love for God and for
humanity. And that love finds expression in her embrace, in her
comforting words and in her tireless efforts to wipe every tear from
every eye. Her work for the rehabilitation of the poor, to give them
comfort and dignity is legendary. What strikes me is that she is not
just the inspiration for the work being done by her devotees; she is
actually involved in every aspect of her labour of love. She once told
me that she had learnt enough engineering to decide how deep the
foundation should be for the homes she built for the tsunami victims.
She had a say, she said, even in the amount of salt put into the
"sambar" served to her devotees.
We are blessed that we live in the same age that Amma does. We are
blessed that she is here to guide us. We are blessed that we can feel
her motherly love and divine touch. Future generations will scarcely
believe, as Albert Einstein said about Mahatma Gandhi, that "such a one as this walked the earth in flesh and blood".
Thank you.
--
July 12, 2009
I am greatly privileged to be invited to say a few words in the
presence of the highly revered, respected and loved Amma. Like all of
you, I am here to pay my respects to her, to hear her, to pray with
her and to seek solace in her divine embrace
.
I have been given this privilege perhaps because I had the great
honour to represent India abroad, including in the United States, for
many years. India is a land hallowed by a galaxy of saints
and seers like Amma, who have enriched the spiritual life of humanity.
I have also had other blessings. I was born and
brought up in a village not far from the place, where Amma grew up.
All of you understand Amma’s language of love, but I am one of those
who can also understand her mother tongue. And most of all, my wife
and I had the privilege of receiving Amma in our humble home in
Maryland ten years ago. We still cherish her visit and the love and
affection she showered on us.
I do not need to speak to you, who are devotees of Amma about her uniqueness and greatness.
You know more than me about her
boundless love for all of us and to humanity itself. The uniqueness of
Amma, as I said in my book, which includes a chapter on her, is that
her message is simple and direct. Unconditional love for God and for
humanity. And that love finds expression in her embrace, in her
comforting words and in her tireless efforts to wipe every tear from
every eye. Her work for the rehabilitation of the poor, to give them
comfort and dignity is legendary. What strikes me is that she is not
just the inspiration for the work being done by her devotees; she is
actually involved in every aspect of her labour of love. She once told
me that she had learnt enough engineering to decide how deep the
foundation should be for the homes she built for the tsunami victims.
She had a say, she said, even in the amount of salt put into the
"sambar" served to her devotees.
We are blessed that we live in the same age that Amma does. We are
blessed that she is here to guide us. We are blessed that we can feel
her motherly love and divine touch. Future generations will scarcely
believe, as Albert Einstein said about Mahatma Gandhi, that "such a one as this walked the earth in flesh and blood".
Thank you.
--
Tuesday, July 07, 2009
Victory for the Watchdog
The long drawn out election process for the next occupant of the 28th
floor of the A block of the Vienna International Centre to succeed Dr.
Mohamed ElBaradei was not a clash of personalities, but an extension
of the perennial search for the soul of the Agency, the eternal quest
for balance between the promotional and regulatory mandates of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The victory of Yukia Amano
of Japan over its nearest rival, South Africa’s Abdul Minty is clearly
a victory for the “watchdog” role of the IAEA. The resistance to him
till July 2, 2009 by the developing countries stemmed from the fear
that he, representing as he does the only country in the world which
became a victim of a nuclear attack, would turn the Agency into a
ferocious watchdog rather than a benevolent advocate of atoms for
peace.
Amano, being aware of this perception, was careful enough to order his
agenda in a way that might reassure those who opposed him: “I will
dedicate my efforts to the acceleration and enlargement of the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world. I will work towards the enhancement of technical
cooperation and its related activities, the prevention of the spread
of nuclear weapons, and the overall management of the Agency.” But
nobody doubts that his agenda will be reversed in actual practice.
Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons will be his highest
priority and the IAEA’s “other job” will recede further in the
background.
Dr. Homi Bhabha, who chaired the preparatory meetings of the IAEA, had
shaped a carefully balanced mandate for the IAEA in 1956. The
objective of the IAEA is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution
of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”
and to “ensure, as far as it is able, that assistance provided by it
or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in
such a way as to further any military purpose.” But this delicate
balance began to get eroded as the Agency was given the additional
responsibility to monitor the implementation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Today, it is hard to remain focused on
the promotional aspects of the Agency’s work because it is perceived
as the instrument of non-proliferation. Even the budget of the Agency
becomes lopsided as voluntary contributions pour into the safeguards
budget, while the pledged contributions for technical cooperation get
dwindled every year. The original idea was that the Agency should give
equal importance to its three pillars—nuclear power, safety and
non-proliferation.
The IAEA is at the cross roads today because demands for technical
assistance to developing countries, who want to develop nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes are as pressing as the demand for measures to
deal with proliferation and nuclear terrorism. An eminent persons
group convened by the Director General to look at the prospects of the
IAEA in 2020 could not strike a balance because the group tended to
engage, to a large extent, on issues beyond the mandate of the Agency,
such as disarmament. The new Director General has the responsibility
to guide the Agency in the right direction, keeping as close as
possible to the mandate of the Agency. The developing world did not
believe that a Japanese non-proliferation expert will be the person
for the job at this time.
No statistics are available to see the percentage of success that
Japanese or Korean candidates have registered when they contest for UN
positions. Very few of them lose because they select the positions
after much thought and once candidates are put up; their Governments
go all out to support them. It was, therefore, a foregone conclusion
that Amano would win. As a candidate, he had impeccable credentials as
a specialist in non-proliferation and disarmament and had also served
as the Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors. As the resident
ambassador to the IAEA, he knew his colleagues, who had to cast the
votes. In spite of these advantages, Amano had to struggle to get the
required number of votes to make it. Till the very end, there was some
expectation that the impasse would continue and the present incumbent
would be persuaded to stay till a consensus candidate was found.
Directors General have been elected by secret ballot in the past, but
the polarization between developed and developing countries was never
so acute or persistent as it happened this time. Amano was referring
to this when he said: “The tasks awaiting us will be tremendous, but I
am confident that a Director General who is trusted fully and actively
supported by all Member States will not fail to achieve the goals
enshrined in the Statute.” It will take the new Director General time
to get universal support, given the bitterness of the election.
The towering personality of ElBaradei and the unanimous support he
received during his three terms, crowned by the Nobel Prize for Peace
has set high standards for the Agency and its head. IAEA is, perhaps,
the only UN Agency, which has never been plagued by charges of
incompetence or corruption. The same integrity was evident in the
manner in which he handled sensitive and crucial matters throughout
his term. His steadfast opposition to the second Iraq war on the
ground that there was no evidence to show that it still had nuclear
weapons was a shining example of his impartiality, transparency and
wisdom. His single-minded pursuit of truth in the case of Iran was
subject of criticism by both sides in the dispute. While he was
considered soft on Iran by the United States, Iran made no secret of
its irritation over its persistence. His commitment to
non-proliferation was unshakeable, but he had no hesitation to support
and facilitate the India-US nuclear agreement. He gave great attention
to the development dimension of the IAEA and maintained its balance.
He leaves the Agency with an impeccable reputation, which will be a
hard task to follow by his successor.
The IAEA, with the global responsibility for promoting the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, needs to reorder its priorities, considering
that its budget is less than that of the Vienna police force. Much of
its resources is spent in the safeguards area, leaving aside its
primary purpose of promoting nuclear energy in such crucial areas as
power generation, health and water. As the world moves towards “global
zero”, the IAEA should focus more on development. By the time the
General Conference formally appoints him in September, the new
Director General should win the confidence of the developing world.
The world has a major stake in his success.
July 4, 2009
--
The long drawn out election process for the next occupant of the 28th
floor of the A block of the Vienna International Centre to succeed Dr.
Mohamed ElBaradei was not a clash of personalities, but an extension
of the perennial search for the soul of the Agency, the eternal quest
for balance between the promotional and regulatory mandates of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The victory of Yukia Amano
of Japan over its nearest rival, South Africa’s Abdul Minty is clearly
a victory for the “watchdog” role of the IAEA. The resistance to him
till July 2, 2009 by the developing countries stemmed from the fear
that he, representing as he does the only country in the world which
became a victim of a nuclear attack, would turn the Agency into a
ferocious watchdog rather than a benevolent advocate of atoms for
peace.
Amano, being aware of this perception, was careful enough to order his
agenda in a way that might reassure those who opposed him: “I will
dedicate my efforts to the acceleration and enlargement of the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world. I will work towards the enhancement of technical
cooperation and its related activities, the prevention of the spread
of nuclear weapons, and the overall management of the Agency.” But
nobody doubts that his agenda will be reversed in actual practice.
Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons will be his highest
priority and the IAEA’s “other job” will recede further in the
background.
Dr. Homi Bhabha, who chaired the preparatory meetings of the IAEA, had
shaped a carefully balanced mandate for the IAEA in 1956. The
objective of the IAEA is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution
of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”
and to “ensure, as far as it is able, that assistance provided by it
or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in
such a way as to further any military purpose.” But this delicate
balance began to get eroded as the Agency was given the additional
responsibility to monitor the implementation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Today, it is hard to remain focused on
the promotional aspects of the Agency’s work because it is perceived
as the instrument of non-proliferation. Even the budget of the Agency
becomes lopsided as voluntary contributions pour into the safeguards
budget, while the pledged contributions for technical cooperation get
dwindled every year. The original idea was that the Agency should give
equal importance to its three pillars—nuclear power, safety and
non-proliferation.
The IAEA is at the cross roads today because demands for technical
assistance to developing countries, who want to develop nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes are as pressing as the demand for measures to
deal with proliferation and nuclear terrorism. An eminent persons
group convened by the Director General to look at the prospects of the
IAEA in 2020 could not strike a balance because the group tended to
engage, to a large extent, on issues beyond the mandate of the Agency,
such as disarmament. The new Director General has the responsibility
to guide the Agency in the right direction, keeping as close as
possible to the mandate of the Agency. The developing world did not
believe that a Japanese non-proliferation expert will be the person
for the job at this time.
No statistics are available to see the percentage of success that
Japanese or Korean candidates have registered when they contest for UN
positions. Very few of them lose because they select the positions
after much thought and once candidates are put up; their Governments
go all out to support them. It was, therefore, a foregone conclusion
that Amano would win. As a candidate, he had impeccable credentials as
a specialist in non-proliferation and disarmament and had also served
as the Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors. As the resident
ambassador to the IAEA, he knew his colleagues, who had to cast the
votes. In spite of these advantages, Amano had to struggle to get the
required number of votes to make it. Till the very end, there was some
expectation that the impasse would continue and the present incumbent
would be persuaded to stay till a consensus candidate was found.
Directors General have been elected by secret ballot in the past, but
the polarization between developed and developing countries was never
so acute or persistent as it happened this time. Amano was referring
to this when he said: “The tasks awaiting us will be tremendous, but I
am confident that a Director General who is trusted fully and actively
supported by all Member States will not fail to achieve the goals
enshrined in the Statute.” It will take the new Director General time
to get universal support, given the bitterness of the election.
The towering personality of ElBaradei and the unanimous support he
received during his three terms, crowned by the Nobel Prize for Peace
has set high standards for the Agency and its head. IAEA is, perhaps,
the only UN Agency, which has never been plagued by charges of
incompetence or corruption. The same integrity was evident in the
manner in which he handled sensitive and crucial matters throughout
his term. His steadfast opposition to the second Iraq war on the
ground that there was no evidence to show that it still had nuclear
weapons was a shining example of his impartiality, transparency and
wisdom. His single-minded pursuit of truth in the case of Iran was
subject of criticism by both sides in the dispute. While he was
considered soft on Iran by the United States, Iran made no secret of
its irritation over its persistence. His commitment to
non-proliferation was unshakeable, but he had no hesitation to support
and facilitate the India-US nuclear agreement. He gave great attention
to the development dimension of the IAEA and maintained its balance.
He leaves the Agency with an impeccable reputation, which will be a
hard task to follow by his successor.
The IAEA, with the global responsibility for promoting the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, needs to reorder its priorities, considering
that its budget is less than that of the Vienna police force. Much of
its resources is spent in the safeguards area, leaving aside its
primary purpose of promoting nuclear energy in such crucial areas as
power generation, health and water. As the world moves towards “global
zero”, the IAEA should focus more on development. By the time the
General Conference formally appoints him in September, the new
Director General should win the confidence of the developing world.
The world has a major stake in his success.
July 4, 2009
--
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Obama and the Fly
From the Tribune, Chandigarh
“Cruelty to animals”, cried the SPCA. “How do flies get into the White
House?”asked the health authorities. “With such skills, he should be
in Afpak, hunting Osama bin Laden”, said the terror warriors.”The
President should have the freedom at least to kill flies”, said the
apologists. “We always knew there were flies on the walls of the White
House”, said the Republicans. “He is not the Buddha (or Mahavira) to
waste his time saving pests”, said the rationalists. “He should be
cloned for every home to be a human fly swat”, said the super
marketers. “This is the change we have been looking for’, said the
Democrats. “Yes, we can”, said President Obama. The cacophony
continues.
The affair was simple. President Obama was in the White House, sitting
for a chit chat with a CNN editor, exchanging ideas on how to bring
about change in this world. There appeared a tiny fly, much like the
one that sat on Shakuntala’s nose, giving an opportunity to Dushyanta
to make a dramatic appearance with a sword in hand to save a damsel in
distress, and began to hover around the President much to his
annoyance. The CNN camera whirred on, though the editor stopped
questioning the President and began following the fly. The President
did what any one else would do in such dire circumstances and began to
wave the fly away. But the fly, like a disguised demon, determined to
seek salvation by dying at the hands of the Lord himself, settled on
his suit sleeve. Then it happened. With a swift karate chop, which
would be the envy of Bruce Lee, the President struck the fly, and
wonder of wonders, got it. He threw the carcass on to the White House
carpet and resumed his dialogue as though nothing had happened.
The scene was played on TV screens a million times, as though the
President had accomplished one of his many feats. It was as though he
made a brilliant speech without the teleprompter. He deserved all the
praise, because it is not easy to kill a fly with bare hands. The fly
is very swift in movement and you have to be swifter than the fly. And
to do it in one shot in front of the cameras is nothing short of a
miracle. But in a free country, there is no dearth of opinions and
hence the flood of commentaries ranging from high praise for his
courage to condemnation for taking the life of an innocent being.
For me, the event was evocative. I once served with an ambassador,
whose forte was karate; he was indeed a black belt, pretty high in the
karate hierarchy. He liked demonstrating martial arts to his admiring
colleagues, though there was a rumour in town that diplomats came in
the expectation of a demonstration of “marital” arts by the youthful
ambassador. He took pride in the fact that he could kill flies by the
dozens with his serviette on the dining table and he demonstrated the
art every time he had guests for lunch or dinner. The city was not
Washington and flies were a perennially present everywhere. He would
challenge his guests to beat him in the game, but most of them shied
away even from trying. My not joining the younger colleagues in
cheering him was seen as part of the inevitable squabbles between the
number one and the number two. But once I had to speak up, but only in
his ear in Hindi that it was not polite to engage in his pastime at
the dinner table of a pious Buddhist former Prime Minister of the
country! I reminded him that India too is a non-violent nation, though
in his own part of the country, chopping of heads was a part of the
sporting tradition.
I wished I had the skills of the venerable ambassador when I was
confronted with a fly when I was trying to record a conversation in a
studio. Every time I came to make an important point, a fly came and
settled on my nose. The cameraman cut off the shoot and chased the fly
around in the room and I myself joined in the hunt. The fly
disappeared till we resumed the recording and came to the same point.
Since it was targeting my nose and not my suit sleeve, there was no
way we could even try to kill it. Nor could we record the programme
for the week. I smiled when the anchor announced that the week’s
analysis of world events could not be brought to the viewers for
technical reasons. She should have said that there was a fly in the
ointment!
As we go to the press, public opinion in the United States has not
determined whether the President was justified in his action. It will
be left to the Presidential historians to pass the verdict. But the
fly must have been preserved for a pride of place in the Obama library
in Chicago.
From the Tribune, Chandigarh
“Cruelty to animals”, cried the SPCA. “How do flies get into the White
House?”asked the health authorities. “With such skills, he should be
in Afpak, hunting Osama bin Laden”, said the terror warriors.”The
President should have the freedom at least to kill flies”, said the
apologists. “We always knew there were flies on the walls of the White
House”, said the Republicans. “He is not the Buddha (or Mahavira) to
waste his time saving pests”, said the rationalists. “He should be
cloned for every home to be a human fly swat”, said the super
marketers. “This is the change we have been looking for’, said the
Democrats. “Yes, we can”, said President Obama. The cacophony
continues.
The affair was simple. President Obama was in the White House, sitting
for a chit chat with a CNN editor, exchanging ideas on how to bring
about change in this world. There appeared a tiny fly, much like the
one that sat on Shakuntala’s nose, giving an opportunity to Dushyanta
to make a dramatic appearance with a sword in hand to save a damsel in
distress, and began to hover around the President much to his
annoyance. The CNN camera whirred on, though the editor stopped
questioning the President and began following the fly. The President
did what any one else would do in such dire circumstances and began to
wave the fly away. But the fly, like a disguised demon, determined to
seek salvation by dying at the hands of the Lord himself, settled on
his suit sleeve. Then it happened. With a swift karate chop, which
would be the envy of Bruce Lee, the President struck the fly, and
wonder of wonders, got it. He threw the carcass on to the White House
carpet and resumed his dialogue as though nothing had happened.
The scene was played on TV screens a million times, as though the
President had accomplished one of his many feats. It was as though he
made a brilliant speech without the teleprompter. He deserved all the
praise, because it is not easy to kill a fly with bare hands. The fly
is very swift in movement and you have to be swifter than the fly. And
to do it in one shot in front of the cameras is nothing short of a
miracle. But in a free country, there is no dearth of opinions and
hence the flood of commentaries ranging from high praise for his
courage to condemnation for taking the life of an innocent being.
For me, the event was evocative. I once served with an ambassador,
whose forte was karate; he was indeed a black belt, pretty high in the
karate hierarchy. He liked demonstrating martial arts to his admiring
colleagues, though there was a rumour in town that diplomats came in
the expectation of a demonstration of “marital” arts by the youthful
ambassador. He took pride in the fact that he could kill flies by the
dozens with his serviette on the dining table and he demonstrated the
art every time he had guests for lunch or dinner. The city was not
Washington and flies were a perennially present everywhere. He would
challenge his guests to beat him in the game, but most of them shied
away even from trying. My not joining the younger colleagues in
cheering him was seen as part of the inevitable squabbles between the
number one and the number two. But once I had to speak up, but only in
his ear in Hindi that it was not polite to engage in his pastime at
the dinner table of a pious Buddhist former Prime Minister of the
country! I reminded him that India too is a non-violent nation, though
in his own part of the country, chopping of heads was a part of the
sporting tradition.
I wished I had the skills of the venerable ambassador when I was
confronted with a fly when I was trying to record a conversation in a
studio. Every time I came to make an important point, a fly came and
settled on my nose. The cameraman cut off the shoot and chased the fly
around in the room and I myself joined in the hunt. The fly
disappeared till we resumed the recording and came to the same point.
Since it was targeting my nose and not my suit sleeve, there was no
way we could even try to kill it. Nor could we record the programme
for the week. I smiled when the anchor announced that the week’s
analysis of world events could not be brought to the viewers for
technical reasons. She should have said that there was a fly in the
ointment!
As we go to the press, public opinion in the United States has not
determined whether the President was justified in his action. It will
be left to the Presidential historians to pass the verdict. But the
fly must have been preserved for a pride of place in the Obama library
in Chicago.
Creativity and Connectivity
(A review of ‘Clueless in California’ by B.S.Prakash. Konark Publishers
Foreign Service officers, by definition, are people with a flair for words, whether in print or in speech. They also have the opportunity to have a variety of extraordinary experiences worthy of sharing. No wonder, therefore, many of them turn writers of imagination and talent. But their writings are mostly consigned to the archives of the Ministry of External Affairs, sometimes even unread. Many a gem of unimaginable worth must lie buried in the dusty cupboards of South Block, Akbar Bhavan, Shastri Bhavan and even Patiala House. Some, of course, find the freedom of retirement conducive to creative writing for a wider audience. Of late, several people find time and leisure to write fiction or essays on non-political matters, which do not attract the provisions of the official secrets act. One of them, Vikas Swarup, has not only produced a sensational novel, but also reached, with its movie adaptation, the red carpet at the Oscars. With the standards set so high, it is difficult for others to measure up to expectations.
B.S.Prakash, presently ambassador in Brazil, was the right man in the right place at the right time in California as the Indian Consul General, with a parish bigger and more important than those of many ambassadors. Even while doing a splendid job there as the representative of a resurgent India, Prakash was dazzled by the technology and the lifestyle of the new breed of multitasking youngsters, including those from South Asia. They spoke a different language, worked differently and even dreamt differently. The American setting and the entrepreneurial atmosphere added more mystery to them. His curiosity was aroused more than the call of duty required him to do and he began to delve into the phenomenon and, what is more, began recording his observations in highly readable essays for Rediff.com, India’s premiere web portal. ‘Clueless in California-America in Bits and Bytes’ is a collection of those essays, brought out imaginatively by Konark Publishers, Delhi. The book is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the body of literature on the dot com world in Silicon Valley and beyond. It also tells the saga of thousands of Indian immigrants, who chased their dreams to California and either made their millions or eked out a living by driving taxis. Prakash treats them all with objectivity, sympathy and good humour.
The fascinating tale of an enigmatic American, imploring the author to be wary of a chip being put under the skin to make him an agent of the devil, right in the beginning of the book sets the tone. It is a world full of people and ideas, bewildering in its variety and reach. The strange shopping habits of the Americans are equally fascinating. Even millionaires carefully clip shopping coupons from newspapers and use them to get discounts in cents. The art of availing of sale in stylish shops is something to master. Things are purchased to save money, not to spend it, but you may never see them again till you have your own garage sale, when one man’s trash becomes another man’s treasure. Even the author is tempted to stop writing to rush to buy a digital camera at half the price.
The gun culture in America puzzles Prakash, but he is assured that guns do not kill people, only people do. The similarities and differences between cricket and base ball lead to the conclusion that each is crazy as the other and equally addictive to players and spectators alike. The burger culture convinces him of George Santayana’s theory that the special character of the American is to “apply mind to matter”. In America, mind is being applied continuously, rigorously and systematically to produce solutions to every problem. The book has its own fairy tales like an arranged marriage taking place after a chance meeting on a plane leading to romance and wedding of total strangers. Well, authors of essays should be permitted some flights of fancy. But Prakash swears that such things do happen in Silicon Valley.
California was, after all, the birthplace of the United Nations and Californians are as interested as the Ghanaians about the future of the UN. But they have long considered the UN as a useless body, which has not stopped any war, not even the Bush war on Iraq. Passports and visas are perennial subjects of conversation among the Indian immigrants till they finally get their green cards, or, even better, US nationality.
The heart of the book, of course, is the life and culture of the computer geeks and dot com millionaires and the way India has finally captured the imagination of the Americans. Prakash quotes Tom Friedman, recalling his mother telling him to think of the hungry millions of India before wasting food. Today’s mothers are telling American children to finish their maths homework for fear that the bright kids of India would come and make them starve. The whole transformation is beautifully described. By listening “silently and respectfully to the paeans sung for technology”, he has discovered “the speed, the ease, the efficacy, the joys of the toys, the quantum transformation, in short, how the ungadgetted world is indeed not worth living.”
Away from the tumultuous world of California, Prakash must be either enjoying the relative calm in Brasilia or having severe withdrawal symptoms. But write, he must, not just for the archives but also for his admirers he has won through his first book. The creativity must continue despite less connectivity. “Clueless in California could not be more clued up”, declares the new IFS icon, Vikas Swarup, enthusiastically.
(A review of ‘Clueless in California’ by B.S.Prakash. Konark Publishers
Foreign Service officers, by definition, are people with a flair for words, whether in print or in speech. They also have the opportunity to have a variety of extraordinary experiences worthy of sharing. No wonder, therefore, many of them turn writers of imagination and talent. But their writings are mostly consigned to the archives of the Ministry of External Affairs, sometimes even unread. Many a gem of unimaginable worth must lie buried in the dusty cupboards of South Block, Akbar Bhavan, Shastri Bhavan and even Patiala House. Some, of course, find the freedom of retirement conducive to creative writing for a wider audience. Of late, several people find time and leisure to write fiction or essays on non-political matters, which do not attract the provisions of the official secrets act. One of them, Vikas Swarup, has not only produced a sensational novel, but also reached, with its movie adaptation, the red carpet at the Oscars. With the standards set so high, it is difficult for others to measure up to expectations.
B.S.Prakash, presently ambassador in Brazil, was the right man in the right place at the right time in California as the Indian Consul General, with a parish bigger and more important than those of many ambassadors. Even while doing a splendid job there as the representative of a resurgent India, Prakash was dazzled by the technology and the lifestyle of the new breed of multitasking youngsters, including those from South Asia. They spoke a different language, worked differently and even dreamt differently. The American setting and the entrepreneurial atmosphere added more mystery to them. His curiosity was aroused more than the call of duty required him to do and he began to delve into the phenomenon and, what is more, began recording his observations in highly readable essays for Rediff.com, India’s premiere web portal. ‘Clueless in California-America in Bits and Bytes’ is a collection of those essays, brought out imaginatively by Konark Publishers, Delhi. The book is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the body of literature on the dot com world in Silicon Valley and beyond. It also tells the saga of thousands of Indian immigrants, who chased their dreams to California and either made their millions or eked out a living by driving taxis. Prakash treats them all with objectivity, sympathy and good humour.
The fascinating tale of an enigmatic American, imploring the author to be wary of a chip being put under the skin to make him an agent of the devil, right in the beginning of the book sets the tone. It is a world full of people and ideas, bewildering in its variety and reach. The strange shopping habits of the Americans are equally fascinating. Even millionaires carefully clip shopping coupons from newspapers and use them to get discounts in cents. The art of availing of sale in stylish shops is something to master. Things are purchased to save money, not to spend it, but you may never see them again till you have your own garage sale, when one man’s trash becomes another man’s treasure. Even the author is tempted to stop writing to rush to buy a digital camera at half the price.
The gun culture in America puzzles Prakash, but he is assured that guns do not kill people, only people do. The similarities and differences between cricket and base ball lead to the conclusion that each is crazy as the other and equally addictive to players and spectators alike. The burger culture convinces him of George Santayana’s theory that the special character of the American is to “apply mind to matter”. In America, mind is being applied continuously, rigorously and systematically to produce solutions to every problem. The book has its own fairy tales like an arranged marriage taking place after a chance meeting on a plane leading to romance and wedding of total strangers. Well, authors of essays should be permitted some flights of fancy. But Prakash swears that such things do happen in Silicon Valley.
California was, after all, the birthplace of the United Nations and Californians are as interested as the Ghanaians about the future of the UN. But they have long considered the UN as a useless body, which has not stopped any war, not even the Bush war on Iraq. Passports and visas are perennial subjects of conversation among the Indian immigrants till they finally get their green cards, or, even better, US nationality.
The heart of the book, of course, is the life and culture of the computer geeks and dot com millionaires and the way India has finally captured the imagination of the Americans. Prakash quotes Tom Friedman, recalling his mother telling him to think of the hungry millions of India before wasting food. Today’s mothers are telling American children to finish their maths homework for fear that the bright kids of India would come and make them starve. The whole transformation is beautifully described. By listening “silently and respectfully to the paeans sung for technology”, he has discovered “the speed, the ease, the efficacy, the joys of the toys, the quantum transformation, in short, how the ungadgetted world is indeed not worth living.”
Away from the tumultuous world of California, Prakash must be either enjoying the relative calm in Brasilia or having severe withdrawal symptoms. But write, he must, not just for the archives but also for his admirers he has won through his first book. The creativity must continue despite less connectivity. “Clueless in California could not be more clued up”, declares the new IFS icon, Vikas Swarup, enthusiastically.
Friday, June 26, 2009
Remarks by Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan
Luncheon Meeting of the US-India Security Forum.
June 25, 2009.
The canvas given to me is very wide: US-India Security Relations in
the context of the nuclear deal, the elections and the appointment of
the first NRI Minister. There is no way I can cover all these in a
short time. Thank you for coming. I know you are here to renew old
friendships rather than to be educated by me on these issues. I shall
speak in that spirit.
When you say security relations, I do not think that you mean only
military cooperation. Security is comprehensive covering safeguarding
national integrity, energy, environment, combating terrorism and
fighting the pandemics. These issues cannot be resolved by any one
country by itself. Cooperation rather than confrontation is the order
of the day. US-India cooperation is imperative in resolving these
issues and we are fully engaged. The cooperation between us will go
forward, regardless of changes in Governments in either country.
The US voted for change, big change, and India voted for no change.
But there has been change in India too in the sense that the Manmohan
Singh Government has been elected with added strength, not held
hostage any longer to the whims and fancies of coalition partners.
Among the many reasons for the victory of the Congress Party, Ashis
Nandy lists out the essential decency of Dr. Manmohan Singh, the
desire of the people to bring down the temperature in politics and to
teach humility to the arrogant leaders of certain parties, who
imagined themselves as Prime Ministers and the support to national
rather than regional causes, such as secularism and pluralism.
I would add two more factors: acceptance of the nuclear deal and a
strategic alliance with the US and a sense that the nation needs a
strong and stable Government to battle terrorism of the Mumbai
variety. If Dr. Manmohan Singh stood up for something in the last five
years, it was for his foreign policy and the credibility of his
Government in dealing with foreign Governments. He would not have been
brought back if there was no acceptance of his foreign policy.
Similarly, his firm diplomatic stand against Pakistan after 26/11 was
broadly approved by the people. The nation felt that a firm, stable
and wise leadership was necessary to deal with such contingencies. The
restrained liberalization policies of the Government and popular
measures like employment schemes and loan waiver for farmers also
played their role.
It must be remembered, however, that the second Manmohan Singh
Government would not go either for a closer embrace with the US or for
unbridled liberalization of the economy. The Government will be more
confident, but will remain in the present path. Suspicion of the
United States and socialism is a part of the psyche of the Congress
leaders also.
India-US relations will be pursued vigorously by both Governments as
its logic is unquestioned, but ironically, at a time when India is in
a position to give priority to them, the US has other priorities and
preoccupations, which have made it less receptive to Indian
sensitivities. The international economic situation has brought
US-China relations to the forefront and there is talk of a “G-2” to
resolve global problems. If the US and China divide the world between
themselves and relegate India to a secondary position in Asia,
India-US relations cannot have the vigour of the Bush era. Similarly,
the nuclear deal will be implemented, but at a slower pace if the US
agenda on non-proliferation stresses the NPT regime as the preferred
route to nuclear disarmament, making India a target rather than a
partner again in non-proliferation. Unless there is agreement on the
sequencing of follow-up measures, the implementation of the nuclear
deal is likely to run into rough weather. Both sides have to steer
clear of hazards and move with determination. As for defence
arrangements, things are likely to move on, as envisaged during the
Bush Administration.
The new Afpak policy of the Obama Administration may also cause
certain discomfort in India if the focus is on what India can do to
make Pakistan feel comfortable enough to fight the Taliban,
Suggestions for concessions on Kashmir to achieve this end have not
been received well in India. The important thing is for the two
countries to engage in a serious discussion to prevent irritants from
emerging in the relationship. We cannot expect President Obama to take
bold initiatives in the first term, but he has pledged continuity in
the recent statements from his Government, notably the speech by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the US-India Business Council.
You also wanted to hear about the significance of the appointment of a
NRI Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs. Shashi Tharoor lived
abroad most of his life but he remained an Indian citizen throughout.
His appointment is in recognition of his distinction as well as his
impressive victory at the elections. He crossed the hurdles of
dynasty, party hierarchy and election funding on his own and mounted a
successful campaign. His success shows that you do not have to serve
the country in a particular capacity to win recognition. Indian
passport holders have the choice of returning to the country and
entering public life. To that extent, his election and elevation give
reasons for NRIs to feel reassured. As he is a talented and
experienced person, he will do well in any assignment.
Thank you, Rajesh and others for hosting the lunch.
Luncheon Meeting of the US-India Security Forum.
June 25, 2009.
The canvas given to me is very wide: US-India Security Relations in
the context of the nuclear deal, the elections and the appointment of
the first NRI Minister. There is no way I can cover all these in a
short time. Thank you for coming. I know you are here to renew old
friendships rather than to be educated by me on these issues. I shall
speak in that spirit.
When you say security relations, I do not think that you mean only
military cooperation. Security is comprehensive covering safeguarding
national integrity, energy, environment, combating terrorism and
fighting the pandemics. These issues cannot be resolved by any one
country by itself. Cooperation rather than confrontation is the order
of the day. US-India cooperation is imperative in resolving these
issues and we are fully engaged. The cooperation between us will go
forward, regardless of changes in Governments in either country.
The US voted for change, big change, and India voted for no change.
But there has been change in India too in the sense that the Manmohan
Singh Government has been elected with added strength, not held
hostage any longer to the whims and fancies of coalition partners.
Among the many reasons for the victory of the Congress Party, Ashis
Nandy lists out the essential decency of Dr. Manmohan Singh, the
desire of the people to bring down the temperature in politics and to
teach humility to the arrogant leaders of certain parties, who
imagined themselves as Prime Ministers and the support to national
rather than regional causes, such as secularism and pluralism.
I would add two more factors: acceptance of the nuclear deal and a
strategic alliance with the US and a sense that the nation needs a
strong and stable Government to battle terrorism of the Mumbai
variety. If Dr. Manmohan Singh stood up for something in the last five
years, it was for his foreign policy and the credibility of his
Government in dealing with foreign Governments. He would not have been
brought back if there was no acceptance of his foreign policy.
Similarly, his firm diplomatic stand against Pakistan after 26/11 was
broadly approved by the people. The nation felt that a firm, stable
and wise leadership was necessary to deal with such contingencies. The
restrained liberalization policies of the Government and popular
measures like employment schemes and loan waiver for farmers also
played their role.
It must be remembered, however, that the second Manmohan Singh
Government would not go either for a closer embrace with the US or for
unbridled liberalization of the economy. The Government will be more
confident, but will remain in the present path. Suspicion of the
United States and socialism is a part of the psyche of the Congress
leaders also.
India-US relations will be pursued vigorously by both Governments as
its logic is unquestioned, but ironically, at a time when India is in
a position to give priority to them, the US has other priorities and
preoccupations, which have made it less receptive to Indian
sensitivities. The international economic situation has brought
US-China relations to the forefront and there is talk of a “G-2” to
resolve global problems. If the US and China divide the world between
themselves and relegate India to a secondary position in Asia,
India-US relations cannot have the vigour of the Bush era. Similarly,
the nuclear deal will be implemented, but at a slower pace if the US
agenda on non-proliferation stresses the NPT regime as the preferred
route to nuclear disarmament, making India a target rather than a
partner again in non-proliferation. Unless there is agreement on the
sequencing of follow-up measures, the implementation of the nuclear
deal is likely to run into rough weather. Both sides have to steer
clear of hazards and move with determination. As for defence
arrangements, things are likely to move on, as envisaged during the
Bush Administration.
The new Afpak policy of the Obama Administration may also cause
certain discomfort in India if the focus is on what India can do to
make Pakistan feel comfortable enough to fight the Taliban,
Suggestions for concessions on Kashmir to achieve this end have not
been received well in India. The important thing is for the two
countries to engage in a serious discussion to prevent irritants from
emerging in the relationship. We cannot expect President Obama to take
bold initiatives in the first term, but he has pledged continuity in
the recent statements from his Government, notably the speech by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the US-India Business Council.
You also wanted to hear about the significance of the appointment of a
NRI Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs. Shashi Tharoor lived
abroad most of his life but he remained an Indian citizen throughout.
His appointment is in recognition of his distinction as well as his
impressive victory at the elections. He crossed the hurdles of
dynasty, party hierarchy and election funding on his own and mounted a
successful campaign. His success shows that you do not have to serve
the country in a particular capacity to win recognition. Indian
passport holders have the choice of returning to the country and
entering public life. To that extent, his election and elevation give
reasons for NRIs to feel reassured. As he is a talented and
experienced person, he will do well in any assignment.
Thank you, Rajesh and others for hosting the lunch.
Saturday, June 20, 2009
India can pursue independent foreign policy
by T. P. Sreenivasan
An assertion heard in the context of the foreign policy of the first Manmohan Singh Government was that it abandoned India’s independent foreign policy, or was in the process of abandoning it, had it not been for the pressures of its leftist partners. Now that Winston Churchill’s “little man walking into the little booth with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper” has rejected that assertion, at least in the sense that his little cross has led to the advent of a second Manmohan Singh Government, time has come to examine how independent or otherwise was the foreign policy of India in the last five years. The critics of that policy have not been vindicated, though they will say that foreign policy was not an issue at the elections.
Foreign policy, by its very definition, has to relate to the world realities and it has to be reshaped constantly on the basis of the response it gets from its “consumers”, who are the foreign countries, whose actions we aim to influence by our foreign policy moves. An independent foreign policy, in that sense, is a myth. It must have, as its basis, a solid sense of the world around us and must be adjusted to derive the most from it.
The other question is who should foreign policy be independent of? Once it is established that we should hear every one in the process of formulating and implementing foreign policy, the argument that policy should be independent of external influences does not hold. The only consideration has to be whether or not the foreign policy benefits India. The impression created during the first Manmohan Singh Government was that somehow the government could not be trusted to have a sound judgment about India’s interests. Or worse, there could be ulterior motives in pursuing a particular policy. The net result was the creation of a veil of suspicion and an atmosphere of pressure, making it difficult for the government to act decisively. The world watched in consternation when other countries had to deal not with one Government of India, but also with its different factions. The government, it looked, lacked independence to pursue a foreign policy. When the government was being criticised inside the country for lacking an independent foreign policy, it was being perceived abroad as being unable to be independent enough to keep its commitments.
The independence of Indian foreign policy has been questioned before both internally and externally. Freedom of thought and independence of action were at the heart of the nonaligned movement, but the movement itself was seen as a natural ally of one of the power blocs. While India took its decisions independently, on the basis of its own judgment, it was seen as tilting to the Soviet Union, more so after the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and the Bangladesh war. History will testify that India did not succumb to pressure from the Soviet Union on issues such as Asian Collective Security and some of the other strategic moves of the Soviet Union. India proved that it was too big and too independent a country to be subservient to any other country.
The events of 2004 to 2009 did not make India any less independent, just as the events of 1970 to 1977 did not make it any more dependent on any foreign power. In 2004, the UPA Government inherited the shattered theory of “India Shining”, shattered not by the rest of the world, but by the Indian electorate itself. The rest of the world was dazzled by India’s growth, the nuclear tests and the way India coped with their aftermath. They had abandoned their attempts at isolating India and had come round to working with a nuclear India despite apprehensions about India’s nuclear posture. The most remarkable achievement of the UPA Government was the way it went about bringing India into the nuclear mainstream, an effort, which was seen as surrendering our independence. Suffice it to say here that the much criticised shift in policy took place in Washington than in New Delhi. The NDA Government left off the talks with the United States, accepting four of the five benchmarks the US set for normalising relations. The fifth, strategic restraint, a euphemism for restricting India’s nuclear arsenal, was as unacceptable to UPA as it was to NDA. It was the change of heart in Washington that it could work with the other bench marks that led to the nuclear deal. In achieving it, there was give and take, but those decisions were taken with India’s interests kept intact. Even if the elections were not fought on this issue, Dr Manmohan Singh, identified as he was with the deal, would not have become Prime Minister again without wide acceptance of his stand on this issue.
India’s Pakistan policy is another matter in which the charge of dependence was made. It was alleged that Washington had its hold on our responses to Pakistan. The truth is that India has been ferociously independent in conducting our relations with Pakistan. The most innovative ideas reported to have been put forward in the back channel negotiations on Kashmir were not conjured up outside India. The sketchy details that have emerged have been received well in the West, but no one outside could claim any credit for them. For the rest, India was basically watching the chaos in Pakistan and encouraging the advent of democracy. We did not need anyone’s advice to respond to President Zardari’s overtures. The Bush Administration, mercifully, took no interest in Kashmir at any time. The charge of external influence came up in the post 26/11 situation due to American activism. But today, there is recognition that the Indian response was prudent, logical and inevitable. The rest of the world may have wished that there would be no conflagration, but our decision not to take that route was dictated only by our judgment.
Our vote on Iran at the IAEA is another issue on which there were charges of external pressure. But long before the Iranian situation became a contentious issue, India had taken the position that Iran should abide by its commitments under the treaties that it had signed and that should remove the fears of the international community by answering the questions raised by the IAEA. We had a sense, right from the beginning, that Iran had something to hide and that it was important to have a full disclosure of their peaceful intentions.
On neighbourhood policy, the charges were not about independence, but about ineffectiveness of our policy to turn things around in our favour. Some have the perception that we have unlimited influence on our neighbours and if we do not have it, we should force our way there. Some feel that it is India’s duty to solve all the problems of our neighbours. The test of a good neighbourhood policy is whether it protects our political and economic interests in the neighbourhood. Goodwill from small nations towards their big neighbours is limited and any evidence of interference will be resented. Neither unilateral concessions nor strong arm tactics will help us to deal with our neighbours. In Sri Lanka, the eventual outcome has suited us, while in Nepal, we would have desired a different outcome. But our policies of restraint and helpful posturing have enabled us to retain our influence and to be able to play a role in the eventual dispensation.
Our links with China, Russia, Japan and the European Union have also won approbation of the public in India, though none of these was smooth sailing or without hazards. Our nonaligned links were preserved and nurtured and new partnerships with Brazil and South Africa have prospered. We are no nearer to becoming a permanent member of the Security Council and the chances are bleak not because we have not tried, but because the world is not ready for it yet. We should appear unattached on this issue as permanent membership without veto will be a liability rather than an asset. We should remain ready and willing, but we should not do any deals for it or make our bilateral relations hostage to the support we get on this issue.
No one will claim that the election results are a vindication of India’s foreign policy in the last five years. But the truth is that foreign policy was thoroughly examined in an unprecedented manner and it found favour with a majority of the people. We should not forget that it was on foreign policy issues that Dr. Manmohan Singh staked the very existence of his Government. He is now fully equipped to follow a foreign policy free of extraneous factors and his enhanced prestige around the world will be good for the nation.
The writer, a former Indian Ambassador, is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington.
by T. P. Sreenivasan
An assertion heard in the context of the foreign policy of the first Manmohan Singh Government was that it abandoned India’s independent foreign policy, or was in the process of abandoning it, had it not been for the pressures of its leftist partners. Now that Winston Churchill’s “little man walking into the little booth with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper” has rejected that assertion, at least in the sense that his little cross has led to the advent of a second Manmohan Singh Government, time has come to examine how independent or otherwise was the foreign policy of India in the last five years. The critics of that policy have not been vindicated, though they will say that foreign policy was not an issue at the elections.
Foreign policy, by its very definition, has to relate to the world realities and it has to be reshaped constantly on the basis of the response it gets from its “consumers”, who are the foreign countries, whose actions we aim to influence by our foreign policy moves. An independent foreign policy, in that sense, is a myth. It must have, as its basis, a solid sense of the world around us and must be adjusted to derive the most from it.
The other question is who should foreign policy be independent of? Once it is established that we should hear every one in the process of formulating and implementing foreign policy, the argument that policy should be independent of external influences does not hold. The only consideration has to be whether or not the foreign policy benefits India. The impression created during the first Manmohan Singh Government was that somehow the government could not be trusted to have a sound judgment about India’s interests. Or worse, there could be ulterior motives in pursuing a particular policy. The net result was the creation of a veil of suspicion and an atmosphere of pressure, making it difficult for the government to act decisively. The world watched in consternation when other countries had to deal not with one Government of India, but also with its different factions. The government, it looked, lacked independence to pursue a foreign policy. When the government was being criticised inside the country for lacking an independent foreign policy, it was being perceived abroad as being unable to be independent enough to keep its commitments.
The independence of Indian foreign policy has been questioned before both internally and externally. Freedom of thought and independence of action were at the heart of the nonaligned movement, but the movement itself was seen as a natural ally of one of the power blocs. While India took its decisions independently, on the basis of its own judgment, it was seen as tilting to the Soviet Union, more so after the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 and the Bangladesh war. History will testify that India did not succumb to pressure from the Soviet Union on issues such as Asian Collective Security and some of the other strategic moves of the Soviet Union. India proved that it was too big and too independent a country to be subservient to any other country.
The events of 2004 to 2009 did not make India any less independent, just as the events of 1970 to 1977 did not make it any more dependent on any foreign power. In 2004, the UPA Government inherited the shattered theory of “India Shining”, shattered not by the rest of the world, but by the Indian electorate itself. The rest of the world was dazzled by India’s growth, the nuclear tests and the way India coped with their aftermath. They had abandoned their attempts at isolating India and had come round to working with a nuclear India despite apprehensions about India’s nuclear posture. The most remarkable achievement of the UPA Government was the way it went about bringing India into the nuclear mainstream, an effort, which was seen as surrendering our independence. Suffice it to say here that the much criticised shift in policy took place in Washington than in New Delhi. The NDA Government left off the talks with the United States, accepting four of the five benchmarks the US set for normalising relations. The fifth, strategic restraint, a euphemism for restricting India’s nuclear arsenal, was as unacceptable to UPA as it was to NDA. It was the change of heart in Washington that it could work with the other bench marks that led to the nuclear deal. In achieving it, there was give and take, but those decisions were taken with India’s interests kept intact. Even if the elections were not fought on this issue, Dr Manmohan Singh, identified as he was with the deal, would not have become Prime Minister again without wide acceptance of his stand on this issue.
India’s Pakistan policy is another matter in which the charge of dependence was made. It was alleged that Washington had its hold on our responses to Pakistan. The truth is that India has been ferociously independent in conducting our relations with Pakistan. The most innovative ideas reported to have been put forward in the back channel negotiations on Kashmir were not conjured up outside India. The sketchy details that have emerged have been received well in the West, but no one outside could claim any credit for them. For the rest, India was basically watching the chaos in Pakistan and encouraging the advent of democracy. We did not need anyone’s advice to respond to President Zardari’s overtures. The Bush Administration, mercifully, took no interest in Kashmir at any time. The charge of external influence came up in the post 26/11 situation due to American activism. But today, there is recognition that the Indian response was prudent, logical and inevitable. The rest of the world may have wished that there would be no conflagration, but our decision not to take that route was dictated only by our judgment.
Our vote on Iran at the IAEA is another issue on which there were charges of external pressure. But long before the Iranian situation became a contentious issue, India had taken the position that Iran should abide by its commitments under the treaties that it had signed and that should remove the fears of the international community by answering the questions raised by the IAEA. We had a sense, right from the beginning, that Iran had something to hide and that it was important to have a full disclosure of their peaceful intentions.
On neighbourhood policy, the charges were not about independence, but about ineffectiveness of our policy to turn things around in our favour. Some have the perception that we have unlimited influence on our neighbours and if we do not have it, we should force our way there. Some feel that it is India’s duty to solve all the problems of our neighbours. The test of a good neighbourhood policy is whether it protects our political and economic interests in the neighbourhood. Goodwill from small nations towards their big neighbours is limited and any evidence of interference will be resented. Neither unilateral concessions nor strong arm tactics will help us to deal with our neighbours. In Sri Lanka, the eventual outcome has suited us, while in Nepal, we would have desired a different outcome. But our policies of restraint and helpful posturing have enabled us to retain our influence and to be able to play a role in the eventual dispensation.
Our links with China, Russia, Japan and the European Union have also won approbation of the public in India, though none of these was smooth sailing or without hazards. Our nonaligned links were preserved and nurtured and new partnerships with Brazil and South Africa have prospered. We are no nearer to becoming a permanent member of the Security Council and the chances are bleak not because we have not tried, but because the world is not ready for it yet. We should appear unattached on this issue as permanent membership without veto will be a liability rather than an asset. We should remain ready and willing, but we should not do any deals for it or make our bilateral relations hostage to the support we get on this issue.
No one will claim that the election results are a vindication of India’s foreign policy in the last five years. But the truth is that foreign policy was thoroughly examined in an unprecedented manner and it found favour with a majority of the people. We should not forget that it was on foreign policy issues that Dr. Manmohan Singh staked the very existence of his Government. He is now fully equipped to follow a foreign policy free of extraneous factors and his enhanced prestige around the world will be good for the nation.
The writer, a former Indian Ambassador, is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
